The murder of Tiggelman at Seulimeum on the night of 23–24 February 24 February 1942 — the killing of the Dutch controleur van het Binnenlands Bestuur J. C. Tiggelman at his post in Seulimeum in the sagi der XXII moekims of Groot-Atjeh — was the first killing of a Dutch civil official by the F. beweging in the pre-invasion Atjeh rising, and the terminus a quo of the organised Atjehnese resistance to Dutch rule on the eve of the Japanese invasion of March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Tiggelman murder is paired with the murder of Von Sperling the following morning as the defining acts of the eerste actie-periode of the F. beweging.
The sabotage wave of 19–24 February 1942
The first Atjehnese sabotage of the pre-invasion period occurred on the night of 19–20 February 20 February 1942 in the sagi der XXII moekims around Seulimeum — the district whose sagihoofd was the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem — when the telephone line to Kotaradja was cut at a single point. The cutting, “slechts op één plaats,” was at first attributed to baldadigheid, but bevolkings-patrouilles were immediately instituted to guard the telephone and telegraph lines and the spoorbaan.
On the night of 21–22 February 22 February 1942 the sabotage was renewed: the telephone and telegraph lines were cut in the Seulimeumse, a bridge was blocked, and the telephone connection to the Westkust was cut at Tjalang. “Door gebrek aan medewerking van de bevolking konden de daders niet worden opgespoord.”
The sabotage “bereikte het hoogtepunt in de nacht van 23 op 24 Februari.” Between Kotaradja and Seulimeum the spoorbaan was torn up at two points, wissels were disabled, a stoomwals was driven across the road, and the workshop of the Atjehse staatsspoorwegen was plundered. Three bridges were blocked, trees were felled across the road at numerous points, and the telephone and telegraph lines were cut. The telephone link to the Westkust was cut at four points.
The murder
It was during this peak night that the attack on Tiggelman took place. “In Seulimeum zelf werd de controleur, de heer J. C. Tiggelman, des nachts (23/24 Februari) door het slaan van alarm naar buiten gelokt en op beestachtige wijze vermoord, terwijl de Atjehse beheerder van het postkantoor zich van de kas meester maakte en verdween.”
The killing was thus a luring-out: a false alarm was raised at the controleur’s dwelling at night, and Tiggelman, on stepping outside, was killed “op beestachtige wijze.” The murder was coordinated with the looting of the postkantoor by its own Atjehnese beheerder, “die zich van de kas meester maakte en verdween” — a coordination the staff history treats as evidence of the F-beweging’s penetration of the indigenous lower staff of the Dutch civil administration.
Dutch response
The Tiggelman murder and the Von Sperling killing the following morning produced an immediate Dutch operational response. Colonel Gosenson returned from his command post at Takengon to Kotaradja on 23 February 23 February 1942, and ordered:
- onmiddellijk enige brigades Maréchaussee van de dichtstbij gelegen IVde divisie onder een officier naar Seulimeum te zenden;
- zo spoedig mogelijk 10 brigades Maréchaussee onder majoor Palmer van den Broek eveneens naar dit gebied te dirigeren.
Palmer van den Broek arrived at Kotaradja and was ordered to: restore order and rust in the XXII moekims; prevent further sabotage; track down the gevluchte hoofden (including the eldest son of the late Panglima Polem); and take over the bestuur of the XXII moekims. By “dag en nacht te patrouilleren en hinderlagen te leggen” he succeeded within days in restoring an outward calm — though the staff history notes that “bepaalde verzetskernen waren nergens ontmoet en geen der gevluchte hoofden had men in handen kunnen krijgen,” and that the restored calm “was slechts een schijnsucces.”
Significance
The Tiggelman murder is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the moment at which the F. beweging’s sabotage shifted from nuisance to open revolt, and at which the Dutch command first confronted the existence of an organised fifth-column that had penetrated the indigenous lower administration. The compiler’s pairing of the murder with the postkantoor looting by its own Atjehnese beheerder is the staff history’s principal evidence that the rising was not a spontaneous volksopstand but a coordinated infiltration. The operational consequences — the recall of Palmer van den Broek’s ten Maréchaussee brigades from the central-Atjeh guerrilla reserve — directly determined the Dutch inability to mount a sustained central-Atjeh guerrilla after the Japanese landings of 12 March 12 March.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- J. C. Tiggelman
- murder of Von Sperling
- F-beweging
- Seulimeum
- Atjehsche Staatsspoorwegen
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- Panglima Polem
- Seulimeum-colonne
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 124–127.