The arrest of the eight Atjeh chiefs on 11 March 11 March 1942 at the residentserf at Kotaradja — the seizure, on the orders of the Territoriaal Commandant Colonel Gosenson, of eight of the foremost Atjehnese hoofden then in attendance at a resident-convened conference — was the most controversial Dutch command decision of the pre-invasion Atjeh rising. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the arrest is presented as an “impulsieve daad” that worsened rather than calmed the unrest, and as the principal Dutch coup of the February–March 1942 crisis.
The conferences of 8–11 March 1942
By 8 March 8 March 1942, with the F. beweging sabotage renewed, the resident convened a bespreking with the foremost hoofden. One of them “meende dat de opstandige beweging over geheel Atjeh was verspreid” and offered “het bestuur aan hem over te dragen, in welk geval hij zich verantwoordelijk stelde voor de levens en bezittingen der Europeanen tot de komst der Japanners.” The offer was refused. The night of 8–9 March 9 March 1942 saw renewed sabotage of roads and bridges even in the immediate neighbourhood of Kotaradja, with pamphlets circulating that exhorted the population to resistance and threatened with death anyone who aided the Europeans. News of the capitulation of Java became known.
On 9 March 9 March 1942 the order was given to evacuate the remaining European gezinnen (some of whom were already at Takengon) to Medan. The evacuation was conducted partly by auto to Seulimeum and thence by train.
On the evening of 10 March 10 March 1942 the resident convened another vergadering with the hoofden, because some of them wished to raise bezwaren against certain Dutch military measures. The Territoriaal Commandant — who had returned to Kotaradja in connection with the new difficulties — attended. Because one of the foremost hoofden was absent and because the Territoriaal Commandant preferred to discuss the objections in the presence of the local military commander, the meeting was postponed to the following morning.
The 11 March 1942 conference and arrest
The postponed vergadering took place at noon on 11 March 11 March 1942 at the residence. Several hoofden did not appear. The resident “bracht de hoofden nogmaals de ernst van de toestand onder het oog” and “werd volkomen medewerking inzake het tegengaan van de sabotage geëist.” During the meeting Captain majoor Palmer van den Broek — commander of the troops at Seulimeum — appeared and reported that during the previous night his troops in one of the bivaks had been fired upon by kwaadwilligen. As proof he showed bullets found in the bivak after the shooting.
The Territoriaal Commandant “nam daarop plotseling het woord, verweet de hoofden onvoldoende medewerking inzake de bestrijding van de opstandige beweging en deelde mede besloten te hebben, tot hun arrestatie over te gaan.” A request from the resident to exclude a particular hoofd — “wiens loyaliteit boven elke twijfel verheven was” — was granted, but the hoofd in question declined to avail himself of the exemption. The eight hoofden “werden door reeds gereedstaande troepen gearresteerd en met op het residentserf opgestelde overvalwagens afgevoerd naar de haven, vanwaar de hoofden per schip naar Sigli en vandaar per auto naar Takengon werden gebracht.”
At the resident’s insistence, the arrested hoofden were told “dat hun arrestatie als een beschermingsmaatregel tegen kwade beïnvloeding van de verzetsactie diende te worden beschouwd en dat zij dan ook als zodanig behandeld zouden worden.” The hoofden “uitten hun voldoening” over this interpretation.
Legal basis and staff-history judgment
The Territoriaal Commandant, on the basis of the afkondiging van de Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg (State of War and Siege), was authorised to order the arrest on his own authority — “al was het ongebruikelijk, dat deze maatregel genomen werd zonder voorafgaand overleg met de resident.” The staff history’s editorial judgment is severe: “Of het verstandig van de Territoriaal Commandant is geweest, onder deze omstandigheden, zonder positieve bewijzen van kwaadwilligheid de arrestatie van de hoofden te gelasten, moet ernstig worden betwijfeld.” The compilers conclude that the arrest “als een impulsieve daad moet worden beschouwd” and that, as the subsequent narrative shows, “de onrust na deze „coup” … eerder toe dan af” took.
Significance
The arrest of the eight chiefs is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal Dutch command decision of the pre-invasion Atjeh rising, and the staff history’s severest single judgment on a Dutch commander of the campaign. The compilers’ framing of the arrest as an “impulsieve daad” — taken under the authority of the State of War and Siege but “zonder positieve bewijzen van kwaadwilligheid” — places the responsibility for the worsening of the unrest directly on Gosenson. The arrest is also the staff history’s clearest illustration of the operational futility of Dutch beschermingsmaatregelen in the face of a rising that had already penetrated the indigenous lower administration: the eight hoofden, even if loyal, could no longer command their districts, and their removal to Takengon simply accelerated the collapse of Dutch authority in the countryside.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- F-beweging
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- Resident J. Pauw
- Kotaradja
- Sigli
- Takengon
- Japanese invasion of Atjèh
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 127–128.