The resistance in Daja and Lhong of 1914 was the short, fierce outbreak on the western edge of Groot Atjeh that began with the murder of the Civil Authority, 1ste luitenant W. van Kregten, at Lam No on 20 May 1914, continued with the murder of the B.O.W. overseer C. H. R. Heins at Lhong on 13 July 1914, and ended on 5 August 1914 with the destruction of the united bands of Nja’ Ali and Nja’ Asém at the holy grave near the mouth of the Daja-rivier by lieutenant C. A. Snell. Behind it, as the investigation established, stood the intrigue of Teukoe Mamat of Lambeusdë.
The murder of W. van Kregten, 20 May 1914
The maandverslag reported: “On 20 May the Civil Authority, First Lieutenant W. van Kregten, on tour in the Daja country (Swart’s former patrol district), was murdered at Lam No together with two soldiers by a band of twelve men armed with dagger and sabre and coming from the territories of Lam No, Panté Tjeureumèn, Djeunamprong and Oenga. The band, which fled to the mountains carrying off the weapons of the murdered soldiers, is being pursued by several brigades.”
The attack gave H. N. A. Swart occasion to conduct a personal investigation in a district he knew through and through. That investigation brought complete clarity and illuminated once more a purely Acehnese way of thinking and acting. Swart reported:
“The investigation showed most clearly that a certain Si Ali of Oenga had long had good reason to be aggrieved at the oelèëbalang of Lambeusdë, because the latter stood in an illicit understanding with Ali’s wife. More than once matters had come to an outburst between the two, and the fact that Si Ali did not proceed to an attack on this chief earlier must be attributed to the fact that an Acehnese does not readily raise his hands against a territorial chief.” Du Croo added a footnote of his own: “Van Kregten was a quiet, calm, well-balanced man.”
“Taking the Acehnese national character into account, he now needed to let nothing restrain him from playing his own judge. That could most easily be done by gathering about him a band of people who likewise had grievances against the administration or against their chiefs. These he found in Tgk. Machmoed van Lam No, a former teungkoe-meunasah (“village prayer-house teacher”), who had fallen out with his oelèëbalang over his share in the zakat (“religious tax”), and Si Seuna, whose wife had shortly before been unlawfully taken from him by the same oelèëbalang. As a fourth there joined them Pang Abaih, a former bendehoofd (“band-leader”), for whom the life of the jungle still evidently held a certain attraction. These four managed to gather about them a few young men, likewise kaom-fellows (kinsmen).”
“The plan to withdraw had already been formed when, in the night of 19 to 20 May, the utterly careless manner in which the Civil Authority and his escort chose and occupied their night quarters at the market quarter of Lam No (the weapons of both soldiers, who lodged in two different unwalled rooms, lay on the floor) gave them a fine chance to make a name and at the same time to provide themselves with weapons. That night a meeting of the band members took place, after which, in the early morning of 20 May at about half past five, when the soldiers had even left their weapons unguarded to go and drink coffee and lieutenant Van Kregten was innocently winding his puttees, Si Ali, Tgk. Machmoed, Pang Abaih, Si Seuha and a certain Pang Hitam suddenly attacked him, with the known result.”
After the murder of the Civil Authority and the two soldiers, Si Ali sought the oelèëbalang of Lambeusdë, who had hidden himself so well that he was not found and escaped.
In the Daja country there were twice encounters between the marechaussée patrols sent out and the band of murderers, in which six of the band were laid low and one severely wounded brought in, while on the Dutch side two men were killed and seven wounded. Three band members reported themselves to the commander of the acting brigades.
That action, du Croo noted, was no unqualified success: the marechaussée had suffered heavy losses and lost some carbines, in consequence of which the band-head Si (Nja’) Ali at once acquired a great reputation — “and that is and was in Atjeh a dangerous and highly contagious phenomenon.”
The murder of C. H. R. Heins at Lhong, 13 July 1914
That became apparent the following month, and again in the quiet directly administered territory of the afdeeling Groot Atjeh. The maandverslag reported: “On the morning of 13 July the overseer of Public Works, C. H. R. Heins, was murdered at Lhong (sub-division Lho’ Nga) by seven persons of that territory, while a Chinese mason was severely wounded. After the murder the killers fled into the mountains with two sporting guns belonging to the overseer and with ammunition. That same morning the controleur of Lho’ Nga left overland for Lhong with two groups, while the reporting officer went there in the afternoon with a group aboard the s.s. Dog. On the same day two further groups left for Leupoeëng to prevent what had happened at Lhong from spreading there.”
This was “a very sharp and painful disappointment for Swart — after the attack at Daja, now murder and band-formation in quiet Groot Atjeh as well.” Swart therefore took the most conclusive measures, but measures that had also to take account of the quiet population, which had experienced no resistance since the time of T. Oemar.
Schmidt’s investigation
For the suppression Swart brought in H. J. Schmidt, then Civil Authority at Meulaboh — a mark, du Croo noted, of how important he considered swift and wholly conclusive measures — who had already learned of the murder by telephone that morning from his assistant resident. The account is taken from Marechaussee in Atjeh: “The suppression of this resistance became once again a purely Acehnese piece of work.”
Schmidt had brought with him from Meulaboh Teukoe Agam, formerly head of his intelligence service at Djeuram and known to him through and through, and with Teukoe Agam he began the investigation in his own way. Not for nothing had the Governor said at parting: “remember, you must keep an eye on Teukoe Mamat of Lambeusdë!” In all such Acehnese affairs there is always something or someone pulling strings behind the scenes and therefore deserving more than ordinary attention; the difficulty is to find that something or someone.
It began with a hoofdenvergadering and the announcement that the toean besar wished order and rest to be restored within forty days, and the warning that anyone who dared give support or help to the uitgewekenen would be severely punished. “Denk er aan,” the patrol commander continued, “if the band demands rice, then that rice may indeed be given, but I must be informed of it at once. And no one but the chiefs may carry edged weapons, and everyone must carry a burning torch when outside his house after dark.”
As the chiefs went home, one of them, pointing to a group of soldiers and convicts at work, asked what those people were doing. “They are building a cage!” — a temporary prison of wooden posts set in the ground, strung with barbed wire. “Waarvoor?” asked the curious district head, who had not lived through the time of perang and cages. “Om die bende uitgewekenen (“those who had fled to the resistance”) op te sluiten!” — “But surely you have not got them yet?” — “By order of the Governor, everyone who has not been killed will be sitting in it within forty days.” It was excellent in style and hit home exactly; that same evening a spy reported that the chief in question had let fall: “we need not be afraid of that captain — he is a great braggart!”
The band, originally only a few perpetrators strong, now numbered thirty-seven men, all full of fire and zeal for the holy war. The patrol commander had no feeling for that holy war: the sooner he knew the band’s hiding-places the better. And besides: what could be the cause of Nja Asém’s treacherous conduct, and how was it possible that he had so quickly formed so relatively strong a band in this quiet country?
It became again the patient work that had produced results everywhere — the use of knowledge of language, of customs and family relations, and of skilful, confidence-inspiring dealings with the population.
It appeared that Nja Asém had been the son-in-law of the principal woman in the moekim Lhong, the daughter of the oelèëbalang of the whole Lhong district, who had stood in high esteem with the administration. At his death he left only a daughter, who could not succeed him; another member of the family thus became oelèëbalang. But the daughter still had great influence among the population, so that the patrol commander had a polite note delivered to her with the request that she come and talk with him. Promptly and orally the princess’s daughter replied: if the officer wanted anything of her, he must come to her. And so he came, that same evening and after the evening prayer.
The old lady received him in the front gallery, stiff and surly. But after half an hour the ice was broken: this toean spoke her language like a born Acehnese and knew moreover the Acehnese forms of intercourse and courtesy. And by midnight that toean knew exactly the how and why of this resistance.
Nja Asém was by birth an ordinary gampong man, but through his marriage with the daughter of the principal woman in the landschap he had risen greatly in esteem, not only in the eyes of the population but also in his own. How far his ambitious plans went is not known, but they were completely destroyed by the sudden death of his wife, through which he fell back to the status of an ordinary gampong man. This threw him entirely off balance, he began to brood — “and… then Nja Ali struck his blow in neighbouring Daja.”
That success took on disproportionate dimensions in Nja Asém’s eyes; he fell into an overwrought nervous state — “and… Atjeh is Atjeh: then his brother-in-law Teukoe Mamat (against whom the Governor had already warned) saw his chance for his own ambitious plans.”
For T. Mamat was a relative of the oelèëbalang of the IV Moekims Lhong, with whom he was on bad terms, and a personal enemy of the district head of the moekim Lhong. His reasoning ran: if I can secretly stir up a revolt, both the district head and the oelèëbalang fall into discredit with the administration, because they neither prevented the revolt nor warned of it. I then make myself deserving of the administration’s favour by bringing the uitgewekenen back, thanks to my influence; the oelèëbalang is deposed and I come in his place. “A typical Acehnese intrigue — whether an innocent European official became its victim, or the deceived villagers lost their lives in it, left T. Mamat wholly unmoved. But… this time he was playing against a master who had not much left to learn in the field of Acehnese intrigue, and… he lost.”
Suppression
It became no difficult counter-play. The IV Moekims Lhong lay in a plain about three hours’ walk broad. Behind it rose an inhospitable complex of limestone rocks as outliers of the Boekit Barisan. In that limestone mountain a band could hold out only in a couple of caves, whose location the patrol commander soon knew entirely, and which he moreover had watched by spies.
A restless pursuit, now begun in the plain, drove the band either to those caves or into the landschap Daja, where another marechaussée column was pursuing the band of Nja’ Ali. Thus before the end of July three men of the Lhong band fell, while seven reported themselves — and indeed through the intervention of Teukoe Mamat. Nja Asém apparently considered this too high a toll; at any rate he fled with his men to Daja and joined Nja Ali’s band.
It was a short joy, for already on 5 August the marechaussée commander in Daja, lieutenant Snell, after a neatly prepared action, surprised the united bands at the holy grave near the mouth of the Daja river, killing fifteen band members, among them both band-heads Nja’ Ali and Nja’ Asém, while the repeating carbines lost by the Daja column and the overseer’s Mauser rifle were recaptured.
That blow broke the last resistance drives: on 9 August five more men of the Lhong band reported themselves — six of them had fallen in the surprise attack — while the remaining nine came to offer their submission on 18 August, handing in the still-missing double-barrelled sporting gun.
Then the patrol commander sent for the moekim head who had taken so remarkable an interest in the kooi: “You called me a braggart in front of the population, but you see: the resistance has lasted not even forty, but only thirty days.” The disconcerted chief fell at the captain’s feet and humbly begged forgiveness — “ave Cesar!”
The reckoning with Teukoe Mamat
But the account with Teukoe Mamat was still open, and that did not tally. He was the instigator of the resistance, but he had — and that lay in the line of his design — worked “netjes” to bring the wicked rebels back. A reward had even been promised him for that, on condition that Teukoe Mamat should prove to have played a wholly pure role. And T. Mamat, feeling himself entirely safe and expecting the oelèëbalangschap as his reward, had indeed walked the fire out of his sandals.
But then followed the investigation, “and that investigation was led by a man who needed no interpreter and who knew too much of Atjeh and the Acehnese to go astray, and… on 2 September T. Mamat was arrested and banished from the Government of Atjeh, while the incompetent territorial chief was dismissed and replaced by another member of the family.”
Significance
The Daja and Lhong affair is du Croo’s fullest illustration of his general thesis about the outbreaks of 1913–1918: “a short, fierce outburst, led by a couple of malcontents with an intriguing chief behind the scenes. A swift and telling riposte by the Kompeuni (“the Company (the Dutch power)”), and then a swift and complete ‘mèl sadja’ (“simply to report and submit”).” It was no longer the fanatical, general and stubborn resistance of former years; it remained confined to a few, the population did not go over and kept out of it — “the attraction of life as an evildoer in the jungle did not tempt the quiet farmer and no longer held anything alluring for him.”
See Also
- H. N. A. Swart
- H. J. Schmidt
- W. van Kregten
- Nja’ Ali
- Nja’ Asém
- Teukoe Mamat
- C. A. Snell
- Teukoe Agam
- Daja
- Lhong
- Lam No
- The resistance in Atjeh 1913–1918
- 1914
Source
Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter XII, pp. 123–127.
Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), pp. 118 e.v., as quoted in Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh, Chapter XII.