C. P. J. van Vliet

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descriptionC. P. J. van Vliet — Luitenant-Kolonel van den Generalen Staf (Chief of Staff of the Dutch military command in Aceh in the first semester of 1896), later promoted to Kolonel and appointed Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden on 8 November 1896 — combined operational planning with personal reconnaissance under fire throughout 1896. His tenure as governor, which lasted from 17 November 1896 until 1898, was the bridge between the pacificatie of the second semester of 1896 and the decisive korte oorlog phase which would be launched by Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz.
tagsperson, dutch, colonial, military, officer, aceh-war, 1896, aceh, governor, civiel-en-militair-gouverneur, kruisheer-vol1, kruisheer-vol3, general, knil, 19th-century
aliasesoverste van Vliet, Kolonel van Vliet, C. P. J. van Vliet (Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden), J. J. van Vliet, Gouverneur van Vliet, Van Vliet

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C. P. J. van Vliet — also written overste van Vliet — Luitenant-Kolonel van den Generalen Staf, was the Chief of Staff of the Dutch military command in Aceh throughout the first semester of 1896, as recorded in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96. He was later promoted to Kolonel (Colonel) and appointed Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden in November 1896 — the principal subject of Hoofdstuk IV (pp. 145–160) of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel. His tenure as governor, which lasted from 17 November 1896 until 1898 — when he would be succeeded by Van Heutsz — was the bridge between the pacificatie (pacification) of the second semester of 1896 and the decisive korte oorlog phase which would be launched by Van Heutsz.

The Cancelled Lamkrak Operation of 30 March 1896

Van Vliet’s first major appearance in ATJEH ‘96 is as the planner of the Lamkrak operation of 30 March 1896 — a multi-column operation intended to clear the four eigentliche Lamkrak mukims (Lam-Krak, Lam-Lheuë, Ateuh and Kroeng Mak) of hostile bands. The operation, which had been prepared with the cooperation of Teuku Umar’s legion, was cancelled when Umar defected on 29 March 1896 — three days before the planned attack. The composition of the cancelled column is recorded in detail: 3 companies of the 3e Bataljon (under Maj. Steinmetz), the 6e Bataljon (under Lt.-Col. Bendien), the 12e Bataljon (under Overste Ilgen), the 14e Bataljon (under Maj. Van der Noordaa), two sections of under Kapitein Bangert, the under Luitenants Plantenga and Ruzette, and 4 brigades maréchaussée — an expeditionary force of approximately 1,500 men. The cancellation of the operation, on the eve of its execution, was the first Dutch operational consequence of Umar’s defection, and Van Vliet’s role as its planner placed him at the centre of the institutional shock which the defection represented.

Personal Reconnaissances under Fire and the May–June Operations

Throughout April, May and June 1896, Van Vliet combined his staff duties with personal reconnaissance under fire. He personally conducted reconnaissances under fire on 21 April, 30 April and 4 May 1896 — the same dates as the 20 April 1896 operation, the night surprise of Benting Batoe and the 4 May 1896 expedition to XIII Moekims Toengkoeb. He commanded the colonne Lamtih on 23 May 1896 during the three-day offensive — the same operation in which Van Heutsz’s bergcolonne stormed Tjot Tjako and Linck’s 4e compagnie stormed the versterking Belang. He served as Chef van den Staf (Chief of Staff) of the 16–17 June 1896 expedition under Kolonel Stemfoort (with three colonnes under Bisschoff van Heemskerck, Van Heutsz and Soeters) and of the 22–23 June 1896 expedition (with the sea-landing 1e Colonne under Lt.-Col. Hansen and the land 2e Colonne under Stemfoort).

On 12 June 1896 he was sent with luit. ter zee 1e klasse Hissink and the commander of H. M. Madoera (luit. ter zee 1e kl. Reinders) aboard the gouvernementsstoomer Albatros to reconnoitre the Westkust for a possible landing at Lepong; the reconnaissance returned the following evening with an unsatisfactory result, and the expedition was postponed due to weather. His combination of staff planning and field reconnaissance made him one of the most versatile and continuously active Dutch officers of the spring 1896 operations.

Appointment as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur and the Instruction of November 1896

The appointment of Kolonel Van Vliet to the governorship of Atjeh was made by the Opperbestuur (Supreme Government) in the autumn of 1896, in succession to the late Generaal-Majoor De Moulin (who had died of sunstroke on 7 July 1896) and the acting governor Stemfoort (who had served since 11 July 1896). The appointment was accompanied by the issue of the Instruction for the Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van A. en O., den kolonel C. P. J. van Vliet — preserved as Bijlage III of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel (pp. 168–172). The instruction explicitly withdrew and replaced all prior policy documents — Vetter’s instruction of 28 June 1896 (Bijlage I), the conference of 18 June 1896 (Bijlage II), and the telegram of 17 July 1896 — and consolidated the policy framework within which the Van Vliet governorship would be conducted.

The instruction laid down the policy framework for the Van Vliet governorship in detail. The principal provisions included the maintenance of the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) as the kern of the Dutch occupation; the regulation of the pasenstelsel (pass system) for the control of movement between the Dutch-held and Acehnese-held territories; the regulation of the hoofden (chiefs) and the toekenning van traktementen of geldelijke toelagen (granting of salaries or monetary allowances) to them; the prohibition on contact with the pretendent-sultan; and the regulation of the belastingen (taxes) collected without legal basis in the gewest. The instruction further specified that het beperken van de gemeenschap tusschen de buiten de linie wonenden, met het gebied daarbinnen, ongewenscht [is] (the restriction of communication between those living outside the linie and the area within is undesirable), but that het binnenkomen en naar buiten terugkeeren mag echter alleen plaats hebben, langs onze posten, waar de wapens tijdelijk worden afgelegd (entering and returning outside may only take place through our posts, where weapons are temporarily laid down).

Arrival and Assumption of the Governorship (8–17 November 1896)

Van Vliet arrived at Koeta-Radja on 8 November 1896 — aankomst van den nieuw benoemden Civiel- en Militairen Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden den kolonel C. J. P. van Vliet op 8 November — nine days before the formal handover of command of 17 November 1896. His arrival opened Hoofdstuk IV of ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel and marked the beginning of the transition from Stemfoort’s second tenure to the Van Vliet governorship.

The formal handover of command took place on 17 November 1896 — overgave en overname van het bestuur, Kolonel J. W. Stemfoort keert naar Java terug — at which Stemfoort returned to Java and Van Vliet formally assumed the governorship. A portrait of Kolonel Van Vliet appears in ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel opposite page 145 — the opening page of Hoofdstuk IV — and is the third of the six portraits bound into the volume, marking the formal transition from the post-De Moulin transitional period (covered in Hoofdstuk III) to the Van Vliet governorship (covered in Hoofdstuk IV).

The Operations of November–December 1896

Under Van Vliet’s new governorship, the Dutch undertook the following operations in November–December 1896:

The Van Vliet governorship — which would last until 1898, when Van Vliet would be succeeded by Van Heutsz — was thus a transitional period, between the pacificatie (pacification) of the second semester of 1896 and the decisive korte oorlog phase which would be launched by Van Heutsz. The cholera epidemic of December 1896 prevented the colonne tegen Oemar (column against Umar) from taking the field, and the strategic opportunity which the August intelligence on Oemar’s vulnerable position in Lohong had presented was lost.

The 1897 governorship: Lhong, the Sigli expedition, and Van Heutsz

H. T. Damsté’s Drie Atjeh-Mannen supplies a second-source account of Van Vliet’s governorship (there rendered “J. J. van Vliet”) through 1897, marked by strained relations with Van Heutsz and his gradual displacement as Van der Wijck’s confidence shifted toward Van Heutsz as the future governor of Atjeh. On 22 September 1896, Van der Wijck wrote to Snouck Hurgronje that Van Vliet would have to declare, before his appointment, “that he with full conviction accepts the present situation with all its consequences.” Van Vliet arrived at Oeléëlheu on 8 November 1896 and took over command and administration on 17 November, declaring that he would “relentlessly pursue the hostile bands… and gradually put an end to the resistance against our authority.”

Van Vliet’s first political report was not cheerful: the weather was poor, the terrain muddy, cholera cases appeared, and Van Heutsz had already predicted on 12 September that the operation lacked offensive character. On 1 January 1897 an expedition was sent to Lhong to capture Teukoe Oema, but an Atjehsche guide misled the column and the capture failed; De Locomotief of 16 January placed the blame squarely on the guide. Van der Wijck nonetheless defended Van Vliet in his letter to Snouck of 17 February 1897, writing that Van Vliet “has, in my opinion, shown to conduct a wise policy.”

The Sigli expedition of August 1897 was the defining operation of Van Vliet’s later governorship: Van Heutsz led the operation while Van Vliet observed from a watchtower at Sigli. When cholera broke out among the troops and Van Vliet considered postponing, Van Heutsz’s insistence (“Waarom zouden wij hier blijven afwachten…”) prevailed, and on 6 August the bentengs at Peukan Baroe–Peukan Sòt were stormed and taken.

Van Vliet appreciated Van Heutsz’s military judgement — consulting him on all matters concerning the XXII Moekims — but found Van Heutsz’s personality a barrier to confidential relations. Van der Wijck wrote to Snouck on 25 September 1897 that Van Vliet recognised Van Heutsz “in his full value,” but that “the personality of the latter presents an obstacle to standing on a confidential footing with him,” and that Van Vliet and general Vetter had both refrained from reporting Van Heutsz’s “great character defects.” Van Vliet’s position weakened further after Vetter’s departure and the arrival of general Swart as army commander. On 30 September 1897 Van Heutsz received extraordinary promotion to colonel and appointment as chief of staff, and Van Vliet reportedly told confidants that Van Heutsz would probably succeed him as governor within four months — a prediction confirmed by Van Heutsz’s eventual succession in 1898.

Significance

Van Vliet’s significance in ATJEH ‘96 lies in his embodiment of the Chef van den Staf (Chief of Staff) who combined operational planning with personal field reconnaissance — a combination which gave him an unusually comprehensive view of the Dutch war effort in the first semester of 1896. His planning of the cancelled Lamkrak operation of 30 March 1896 placed him at the centre of the institutional shock of Umar’s defection, and his subsequent reconnaissances under fire on 21 April, 30 April and 4 May 1896 demonstrated a personal courage and operational engagement which the balso explicitly documents. His role as Chef van den Staf (Chief of Staff) of the major June operations, and his reconnaissance to the Westkust on 12 June 1896, confirm that his responsibilities extended across the full breadth of the Dutch theatre of operations.

His significance in ATJEH ‘96 — Tweede Deel is that of the Civiel en Militair Gouverneur (Civil and Military Governor) who closed the transitional period opened by the death of De Moulin and the second tenure of Stemfoort — the governor under whom the pacificatie (pacification) policy of the second semester of 1896 was consolidated, and under whom the Dutch forward movement was paralysed by the cholera epidemic of December 1896. His governorship — which would last until 1898, when he would be succeeded by Van Heutsz — was the bridge between the pacificatie (pacification) of the second semester of 1896 and the decisive korte oorlog phase which would be launched by Van Heutsz.

Account in du Croo’s Generaal Swart (1943)

Van Vliet, like Stemfoort before him, “was no man for the Van Heutsz tempo; our activity remained moderate, Van Heutsz met with open and covert obstruction, and so the opposing party recovered after every blow.” When he retired in March 1898 van Heutsz was appointed Governor with Snouck Hurgronje as adviser.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96. 1e Deel, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 20, 38, 60, 67, 77, 83, 94, 119, 125, 136, 149, 154, 176, 177, 183, 203, 245, 267, 292, 323.

ATJEH ‘96. Tweede Deel (2c Deel), door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 3 kaarten en 6 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-90-Atjeh_96_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_3_kaarten_en_6_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 9, 145–160 (Hoofdstuk IV), 168–172 (Bijlage III — Instruction for Civiel en Militair Gouverneur Van Vliet).

H. T. Damsté, “Drie Atjeh-Mannen: Snouck Hurgronje — Van Heutsz — Van Daalen,” Kolonial Tijdschrift, No. 4, 26e Jaargang (1937), overdruck, pp. 356–375.

Generaal Swart, Pacificator van Atjeh (“General Swart, Pacifier of Atjeh”), by M. H. du Croo, Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with the collaboration of H. J. Schmidt, Titular Colonel K.N.I.L. (retired), with a foreword by His Excellency Lieutenant-General K.N.I.L. (retired) G. K. Dijkstra (Maastricht: N.V. Leiter-Nypels, 1943), Chapter III.

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