Tuchtiging van Lam Goet (14 April 1896)

The Tuchtiging van Lam Goet (14 April 1896) — the chastisement, punitive expedition of the kampong of Lam-Goet, residence of the band-leader Toekoe Hoesin Lehong Bata — was the first offensive operation launched by the Dutch after the evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit and the first Dutch tuchtiging of the Vetter interregnum. Conducted by two colonnes under Lt.-Col. Bisschoff van Heemskerck and Lt.-Col. Bendien, totalling three infantry battalions, eight maréchaussée brigades, two mountain batteries and auxiliary arms, the operation stormed the fortification of Lam-Goet — Kapitein A. B. B. B. Jansen leading the assault, against orders but successfully — destroyed an iron 9 c.M. cannon with dynamite, and was marked by heavy casualties on the retreat through the so-called “1000 m vrije stralso” (the thousand-metre free sone) in which Lt. Maarschalk was killed. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the tuchtiging of Lam Goet was a foretaste of the heavy fighting that would characterise the April–June campaign.

Background

The Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, had arrived on 7 April 1896, ordered the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 8 April, and the evacuation of the two posts on 12 April. He was not yet decided on which course to follow with respect to the other buitenposten on the western line. Before deciding, he wished to test the provisioning of Tjot Rang and to use the occasion to chastise Lam-Goet — the kampong and residence of the bendehoofd Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta, one of the principal Achehnese war-leaders in the central mukims. The objective was twofold: to demonstrate, in the immediate aftermath of the abandonment of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, that the Government could still strike; and to clear the road to Tjot Rang for the provisioning column.

Two colonnes were formed. The 1e Colonne, under Lt.-Col. Bisschoff van Heemskerck — staffed by Kap. Kronouer of the General Staff, 1e Luit. van Kappen, and Luit. der Art. F. H. de Bruïne — comprised the 6e Bataljon under Maj. Okhuizen (17 officers, 342 men), the 12e Bataljon under Maj. Soeters (16 officers, 457 men), the maréchaussée under 1e Luit. Vis, the 4e Bergbatterij under Kapt. Bangert (six guns), the 4th Squadron of Cavalry under Ritmeester Jhr. de Lannoy, the engineers under 1e Luit. Ruzette, and two ambulances under Off. v. Gez. Rasoux-Kühr and van Leent. Its orders were: march 7 a.m. from Roempit over Lam Batoe to Lam-Goet, chastise that kampong, then march south to the Tjot Iri–Tjot Rang road; by a westward movement, in conjunction with the 2e Colonne, clear and hold that road with surrounding terrain to enable provisioning and relief of Tjot Rang.

The 2e Colonne, under Lt.-Col. Bendien with 1e Luit.-Adj. Kroesen as adjutant, comprised the 9e Bataljon (18 officers, 294 European, 261 native), the 1e Bergbatterij under Kapt. Nauta (with Romswinckel; six guns), the engineers under 1e Luit. Plantenga, and one ambulance under Off. v. Gez. 1e kl. Juda. Its orders were: march 7 a.m. from Tjot Iri toward Tjot Rang, engage the enemy in the stellingen Baba Djoeroeng–Oleh Tjoet–Tjap Tanah in a dragging firefight until further orders or until the 1e Colonne’s flanking movement began, then advance toward Tjot Rang, joining the 1e Colonne to clear and hold the road.

The March and the Combat

Foot troops were moved by extra trains from Koeta Radja: the 1e Colonne to Roempit, the 2e Colonne to Tjot Iri. At 7:18 a.m. on 14 April 1896 the Roempit column advanced. The cavalry rode ahead independently, followed by maréchaussée and engineers, then the 6e Bataljon with one section, then the 12e Bataljon with the other two sections. The enemy had removed the decking from all bridges and replaced it with one or two tree-trunks. The terrain east of the railway grew ever swampier, becoming wholly impassable at Lam Baloi. The kampongs in it sat on elevations and were hard to approach. The cavalry could keep moving; the infantry could march through; the artillery had to wait for coupures or bridge repairs. The engineers were ordered to lift planks behind passing troops and carry them forward — much delay ensued, which the enemy noticed. From the initially unoccupied randen of Lam Baloi and Raboes, the enemy soon opened fire. The cavalry cleared the front for the maréchaussée, who fired the first shots at 8:15 a.m.

The 12e Bataljon commander had orders to take two compagnieën and one artillery section on a footpath 1,300 m east of and parallel to the railway in a southward direction, to take position against kampongs Tjap Tanah and Baba Djoeroeng — heavily occupied per intelligence — and so support the 2e Colonne’s attack. To save time these compagnieën went 600 m east of Roempit onto good terrain, avoiding a bridge. The other two 12e compagnieën under Kapt. Steup, with an artillery section, followed the main column. As rifle fire against the kampong randen yielded little, the colonne-commander ordered Maj. Okhuizen to advance as fast as possible. By 8:55 a.m. the maréchaussée and the 3e compagnie of the 6e Bataljon reached the covered but dry terrain of Raboee. To contain the enemy in the south rand of Lagan, the 1e compagnie of the 6e Bataljon talso position in the north rand of the covered terrain near Raboee. The 4e compagnie covered the artillery.

The Storming of Lam Goet

The fortification of Lam-Goet itself — the residence of Toekoe Hoesin Lhongbatta — was a substantial work with earthen walls, bamboo-thorn abatis, and a parapet pierced for rifle-fire. Kapitein A. B. B. B. Jansen of the 6e Bataljon, in defiance of the standing orders of the colonne-commander — which specified a methodical approach with artillery preparation — led his company in a direct assault on the work. The assault, against orders, succeeded: the benteng was carried, the defenders driven out, and the work occupied. An iron 9 c.M. cannon found inside the work was destroyed with dynamite by the engineers. The capture of the benteng was, in tactical terms, a clear success; in disciplinary terms, however, it was a breach of orders that the colonne-commander could not overlalso, however grateful he may have been for the result.

The Retreat and the “1000 m vrije stralso”

The hardest fighting of the day came on the retreat. The column had to withdraw through what the source calls the “1000 m vrije stralso” — the thousand-metre free sone — a stretch of open ground between the benteng of Lam-Goet and the cover of the next kampong, across which the column was exposed to Achehnese fire from multiple directions. The Achehnese, recognising the moment of greatest Dutch vulnerability, pressed hard. The casualties were heavy. Lt. Maarschalk was killed. The artillery — the 4e Bergbatterij under Kapt. Bangert — was brought into action repeatedly to break up the Achehnese concentrations, and the maréchaussée brigades under 1e Luit. Vis fought a series of rear-guard actions to hold the enemy at a distance while the infantry and the wounded were extricated.

By the end of the day the two colonnes had effectually cleared the road to Tjot Rang and had chastised Lam-Goet; but the cost — Lt. Maarschalk killed, an unknown but considerable number of NCOs and men killed and wounded, and a substantial expenditure of ammunition — was heavy. The 2e Colonne under Lt.-Col. Bendien, advancing from Tjot Iri against the stellingen Baba Djoeroeng–Oleh Tjoet–Tjap Tanah, had been engaged in a long firefight that had served its purpose of pinning the enemy while the 1e Colonne executed its flanking movement.

Significance

The tuchtiging of Lam Goet on 14 April 1896 was a deliberate demonstration that the Dutch retained the operational initiative even as they abandoned the western buitenlinie. It was also the first major test of the colonne-commanders — Bisschoff van Heemskerck, Bendien, Okhuizen, Soeters, Jansen — who would carry the principal burden of the fighting through the spring and summer of 1896. The storming of the benteng by Jansen against orders was a portent of the aggressive command culture that would, within weeks, produce the battle of Senelop and the three-day offensive. The cost of the retreat through the “1000 m vrije stralso,” however, was a sober reminder that the Achehnese, armed with Dutch weapons and led by the former allies of the Government, were no longer the disorganised force of the pre-defection period.

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 82–92, 577, 1108.

tags	event, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliases	Tuchtiging van Lam Goet, Chastisement of Lam Goet, Punitive expedition against Lam Goet, 14 April 1896

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