The First Aceh Expedition of 5–29 April 1873 — in Kreemer’s history, the first Dutch military expedition against Atjèh, commanded by generaalmajoor J. H. R. Kohler — was, in Kreemer’s judgement, “een totale mislukking” — “a total failure.” Kohler was killed on 14 April; the Kraton — the operation’s objective — was not taken; and the expeditionary force was repulsed with great losses, obliging the Indische Regeering to withdraw to Java and prepare a far larger second expedition.
The landing
Kreemer records that, after naval bombardment had “ingewijd” — inaugurated — the war over several days, “verscheen den 25en April ter reede van Atjèh een troepenmacht van 168 officieren en 3200 mindere militairen onder bevel van den generaalmajoor J. H. R. Kohler” — “on the 25th of April there appeared before the roadstead of Atjèh a force of 168 officers and 3,200 lesser military under the command of generaalmajoor J. H. R. Kohler.” (Kreemer’s dates combine the 5–29 April period-label of the tijdvak with the 25 April landing-date and the 14 April death-date of Kohler, suggesting some OCR confusion in the source; the landing preceded the death.)
The failure
“De tegenstand der Atjèhers was veel grooter dan men gemeend had te moeten verwachten, de organisatie van het leger was gebrekkig en terreinkennis van Atjèh ontbrak nagenoeg geheel. Een paar dagen nadat de opperbevelhebber gesneuveld was (14 April) bleek het duidelijk, dat met de beschikbare macht het niet mogelijk was Atjèh te dwingen tot het inwilligen onzer eischen. Het operatie-object: de kraton, werd niet genomen, we werden met groote verliezen afgeslagen. De eerste expeditie was dus een totale mislukking” — “The resistance of the Atjèhnese was much greater than one had expected; the organisation of the army was defective; and terrain-knowledge of Atjèh was almost entirely lacking. A few days after the supreme commander had fallen (14 April) it became clear that with the available force it was not possible to compel Atjèh to grant our demands. The operation-object — the Kraton — was not taken; we were repulsed with great losses. The first expedition was thus a total failure.”
The withdrawal
“Met het oog op het aanstaande voor militaire operatiën hoogst ongunstige jaargetijde werd door de Indische Regeering besloten de troepen naar Java te doen terugkeeren, met het voornemen, den krijgstocht in het goede seizoen te doen hervatten. Alleen werd aan de expeditionnaire zeemacht opgedragen, de kusten van Atjèh zoo goed mogelijk te blokkeeren, om zoodoende pressie uit te oefenen op onze tegenstanders. Die politiek had echter weinig resultaat. Door die blokkade toch ondervonden de Onderhoorigheden alleen de nadeelen, geenszins eenig voordeel van ons optreden op Soematra’s Noordkust” — “With a view to the approaching season highly unfavourable for military operations, the Indische Regeering decided to return the troops to Java, with the intention of resuming the campaign in the good season. Only the expeditionary naval force was charged with blockading the coasts of Atjèh as well as possible, in order thereby to exert pressure on our opponents. That policy, however, had little result. Through that blockade the Onderhoorigheden suffered only the disadvantages, by no means any benefit, of our action on Sumatra’s North Coast.”
Kreemer notes that the blockade was inadequate — “de scheepsmacht was niet voldoende om werkelijk den toegang tot het vijandelijk gebied te beletten” — “the ship-force was not sufficient really to prevent access to enemy territory” — and that under the so-called licentiën — licences — “allerlei oorlogscontrabande van uit Pinang ingevoerd werd” — “all sorts of war-contraband was imported from Penang.” He also records the role of the “Atjèhsche kolonie” — Atjèhnese colony — on Poelau Pinang, from which “het Atjèhsche revolutionnaire comité, de ‘Raad van achten’, dat te Pinang gevestigd was, de bevolking tot verzet aan spoorde en bij voortduring brieven naar de hoofden in Atjèh zond met de mededeeling, dat onze middelen, zoowel in geld als in troepen, uitgeput waren en wij spoedig den strijd zouden moeten opgeven” — “the Atjèhnese revolutionary committee, the ‘Council of Eight’, established at Pinang, spurred the population to resistance and continuously sent letters to the chiefs in Atjèh with the message that our means, in money as well as in troops, were exhausted and we would soon have to give up the struggle.”
Significance
The failure of the first expedition is, in Kreemer’s narrative, the discovery that the Atjèh sultanate would not be conquered in a single campaign. The scale of the second expedition — “385 officieren en ongeveer 7800 minderen” — “385 officers and about 7,800 lesser men” — “een macht zooals nog nimmer te voren in onze Oost was uitgerust!” — “a force such as never before had been equipped in our East!” — is the direct military consequence of Kohler’s defeat. The blockade period between the expeditions also revealed the role of the Penang revolutionary committee in sustaining Atjèhnese resistance, a factor that would persist throughout the war.
See Also
- Acheh
- General J. H. R. Kohler
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873-1874)
- Declaration of war on Atjèh (26 March 1873)
- Kraton Atjeh
- Aceh War
- Raad van Achten
- Penang
- Java
- 1873
Source
Atjèh. Algemeen samenvattend overzicht van land en volk van Atjèh en onderhoorigheden, door J. Kreemer, Archivaris van het Atjèh Instituut. Eerste Deel. Leiden: N.V. Boekhandel en Drukkerij voorheen E.J. Brill, 1922. Hoofdstuk I, C (“Atjèh-oorlog (1873—1910)”), Eerste tijdvak, blz. 14–15.