The brigade was the basic tactical and social unit of the Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh — the small, self-contained patrol group in which the corps habitually operated, and around which its distinctive discipline, comradeship and command structure were built.

Place in the establishment

By the Gouvernementsbesluit of 3 March 1899 the corps was brought to a strength of 20 officers and 1,212 men, divided over five divisies of three afdeelingen, each afdeeling being subdivided into four brigades.

Internal structure in Mosselman’s account

W. J. Mosselman, writing in the 1930 jubilee number, set out the corps’s internal hierarchy in the vocabulary it had borrowed from the Acehnese enemy. One Toeangkoe or divisiecommandant had under him three Oeleuhbalangs (officers); each Oeleuhbalang had four Toekoes (European non-commissioned officers); and each Toekoe disposed of one Panglima (indigenous sergeant), one Keutjih (corporal) and seventeen Kawans (maréchaussées). See Maréchaussée-vocabulaire.

Tactical doctrine

The corps was, Mosselman wrote, “bestemd om den tegenstander met zijn eigen tactiek te bestrijden, getraind voor den onverbiddelijken guerilla-krijg met uiterst kleine, maar hechte troepjes, die slechts, indien noodzakelijk, tot grooter benden werden vereenigd” — destined to fight the adversary with his own tactics, trained for the implacable guerrilla war with extremely small but tightly-knit little troops, which were united into larger bands only when necessary. Their model, he added, was “de dappere en in dien krijg volleerde vijand” — the brave enemy, fully accomplished in that kind of war.

Authority within the brigade

Within his group, brigade, afdeeling or division, every leader possessed “een soort absoluut gezag” — a kind of absolute authority — which had arisen and grown naturally through the purposeful and tactful attitude of the organisers and the conduct of the officers, who would never pass over the relevant subordinate leaders and seniors for any order or command. Interference with, or the giving of orders to, men or cadre not belonging to one’s own band was avoided wherever possible. Among the kawans themselves, respect for the man senior in years of service predominated. It was this, Mosselman held, that produced “die hechte band, die eensgezindheid, die subtiele Korpsgeest van hoog tot laag” — the close bond, the unanimity, the subtle corps spirit from top to bottom — which was the secret of the great deeds performed by the corps.

Brigades in the field

Brigades were the units in which the corps was counted on operations. The expedition to the Gajo-Loeös of 1904 consisted initially of ten brigades of Maréchaussée and was gradually enlarged to fourteen. Three brigades were sent in 1905 to the Zuider- en Oosterafdeeling van Borneo to render the pretendent-sultan harmless. In the Westkust engagement of 19251927 a single brigade lost its captain, its brigade commander, five other men killed and twelve wounded, only two remaining unhurt.

Mosselman recalled with affection “ons familieleven in brigade doea-blas van de 1e en in brigade doea-blas van de 5e Divisie” — the family life of the twelfth brigade of the 1st and of the 5th Division.

See Also

Source

Het Korps Maréchaussée in Atjeh: De Atjehsche Garde, 1890 - 2 April 1930, Extra Jubileum-nummer of Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië issued for the fortieth anniversary of the corps (1930), pp. 1-16. Offprint DLP-143, Bibliotheek KITLV, accession 621 116 794.