L. H. J. Kloprogge

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tagsperson, dutch, military, colonial, knil, marechaussee, atjeh, world-war-ii
aliasesCaptain Kloprogge, Kapitein Kloprogge, L.H.J. Kloprogge, Kloprogge (Westkust), commandant IIde divisie Maréchaussee, Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge

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L. H. J. Kloprogge was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, in his capacity as commander of the IIde divisie of the Korps Maréchaussee on the Westkust van Atjeh, conducted the most sustained Dutch delaying action of the Japanese invasion of March 1942: the evacuation of approximately 3,000 women and children from the Westkust bivaks to Lae Boetar in the Singkelse (a 600-km march under repeated Atjehnese and Japanese attack), and the eventual capitulation of his reduced force at Lae Boetar on 29 March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Kloprogge is the central figure of the 1ste hoofdgroep and is presented as the model of the calm, resourceful Dutch field officer of the Atjeh campaign.

Pre-invasion command

By 1 January 1940 Kloprogge commanded the IIde divisie Maréchaussee, with brigades at Djeuram (4 brigades), Lam Ie (4 brigades) and Koeala Bee (4 brigades). His was the only Maréchaussee divisie on the Westkust after the 1940 reductions, and by December 1941 the Westkust Maréchaussee strength was down to 11 brigades — four at Koeala Bee, three at Djeuram, four at Meulaboh (one of them detached to Tjalang).

The Tjalang relief and march on Lam No (10–13 March 1942)

When, on the night of 9–10 March 1942, the bivak at Tjalang (held by a single brigade) was attacked by a bende of kwaadwilligen, Kloprogge marched from Meulaboh with two brigades to relieve it, handing command of the rest of the divisie to 1st Lt A. Zijlmans. He found the road cut, the telephone line destroyed, and Atjehnese ambushes along the way; the brigade commander at Tjalang had successfully beaten off the attack and rescued the controleur of the Binnenlands Bestuur and his wife, though the bestuurskantoor had been plundered and the brandkast broken open. About 400 women and children of indigenous militairen were in the campement.

From Tjalang, Kloprogge marched on Lam No on 11 March 11 March 1942 with two brigades and the controleur of Tjalang, again under repeated ambush. The bridges were destroyed, the telephone net was wrecked, and the pont over the river at Lam No had been set adrift by verzetslieden. On 13 March 13 March 1942 he crossed by a small vlerkprauwtje with one brigade, leaving Lt M. C. Thomson with the rest at the crossing point. From soldiers of the Lho’Nga airfield garrison who appeared on the opposite bank he learned that the Japanese had landed at Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March and were marching a battalion-strength force along the Westkust. Captain F. Steinhorst, whose Lho’Nga garrison had been cut off by the landing, decided to join Kloprogge.

The evacuation of 3,000 women and children

Kloprogge was now responsible for some 3,000 women and children of indigenous militairen concentrated in the Westkust bivaks — 1,500 at Meulaboh, 600 at Blang Pidië, 500 at Tapatoean, 400 at Tjalang and 600 at Lam No — with only 15 autobuses and 20 passenger cars available, capable of moving about 500 per convoy. The decision was taken to evacuate them by road to the Lae Boetar cultuur-onderneming 60 km north-east of Singkel.

The staff history registers the scale: “De evacuatie van vrouwen en kinderen (3000, over een afstand van 600 km) maakte deze taak nog zwaarder.” Kloprogge conducted the retreat in three columns: a vertragende actie column under Captain Steinhorst reinforced with Maréchaussee brigades; an escort column for the convoys and un-evacuated bivaks; and a Zuiverings column under Lt Zijlmans operating ahead of the evacuees to clear ambushes.

The most-cited single engagement of the retreat is the action at Blang Pidië on 16 March 16 March 1942 (see Battle of Blang Pidië), when a bende of about 200 men attacked the bivak. Lt Zijlmans’s relief column from Meulaboh fought through 15 hours of ambush between Blang Pidië and Tapatoean the next day, leaving 200–300 Atjehnese dead. Sergeant Evers of the Maréchaussee distinguished himself in the action.

Capitulation at Lae Boetar (29 March 1942)

By 29 March 29 March 1942 Kloprogge’s reduced force — about 140 man — had reached Lae Boetar. The staff history records that “Kloprogge, die de ongelijke strijd toch wilde doorzetten, met het lot van de vrouwen en kinderen voor ogen, overreden met het restant van de troepen, zich te Lae Boetar te capituleren.” Several officers — among them Captain Steinhorst, Lt Mathus and Lt Thomson — refused to surrender and attempted to break through to the still-fighting Dutch troops around Blangkedjeren. Steinhorst was captured and killed by opstandelingen; Mathus was captured and later executed by the Japanese; Thomson eventually reached the column of Captain Van Dormolen in the Medan area and was finally captured on 26 April 26 April.

Significance

Kloprogge is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the figure who carries the moral weight of the Westkust campaign. The compilers single out his “rustig en beleidvol optreden” by which “aan onze zijde practisch geen verliezen werden geleden” in the Tjalang relief — a contrast drawn explicitly with the panic and demoralisation that overtook the 2de hoofdgroep under Bekkers on the noordkust. The staff history’s Nabeschouwing cites Kloprogge as one of the “aantal dikwijls nog jonge officieren” who, “ook onder deze omstandigheden … de troep weten te inspireren.” His capitulation at Lae Boetar on 29 March 29 March is the last discrete Dutch military act of the Atjeh campaign before the general capitulation at Blangkedjeren.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.

L. H. J. Kloprogge was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, in his capacity as commander of the IIde divisie of the Korps Maréchaussee on the Westkust van Atjeh, conducted the most sustained Dutch delaying action of the Japanese invasion of March 1942: the evacuation of approximately 3,000 women and children from the Westkust bivaks to Lae Boetar in the Singkelse (a 600-km march under repeated Atjehnese and Japanese attack), and the eventual capitulation of his reduced force at Lae Boetar on 29 March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Kloprogge is the central figure of the 1ste hoofdgroep and is presented as the model of the calm, resourceful Dutch field officer of the Atjeh campaign.

Pre-invasion command

By 1 January 1940 Kloprogge commanded the IIde divisie Maréchaussee, with brigades at Djeuram (4 brigades), Lam Ie (4 brigades) and Koeala Bee (4 brigades). His was the only Maréchaussee divisie on the Westkust after the 1940 reductions, and by December 1941 the Westkust Maréchaussee strength was down to 11 brigades — four at Koeala Bee, three at Djeuram, four at Meulaboh (one of them detached to Tjalang).

The Tjalang relief and march on Lam No (10–13 March 1942)

When, on the night of 9–10 March 1942, the bivak at Tjalang (held by a single brigade) was attacked by a bende of kwaadwilligen, Kloprogge marched from Meulaboh with two brigades to relieve it, handing command of the rest of the divisie to 1st Lt A. Zijlmans. He found the road cut, the telephone line destroyed, and Atjehnese ambushes along the way; the brigade commander at Tjalang had successfully beaten off the attack and rescued the controleur of the Binnenlands Bestuur and his wife, though the bestuurskantoor had been plundered and the brandkast broken open. About 400 women and children of indigenous militairen were in the campement.

From Tjalang, Kloprogge marched on Lam No on 11 March 11 March 1942 with two brigades and the controleur of Tjalang, again under repeated ambush. The bridges were destroyed, the telephone net was wrecked, and the pont over the river at Lam No had been set adrift by verzetslieden. On 13 March 13 March 1942 he crossed by a small vlerkprauwtje with one brigade, leaving Lt M. C. Thomson with the rest at the crossing point. From soldiers of the Lho’Nga airfield garrison who appeared on the opposite bank he learned that the Japanese had landed at Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March and were marching a battalion-strength force along the Westkust. Captain F. Steinhorst, whose Lho’Nga garrison had been cut off by the landing, decided to join Kloprogge.

The evacuation of 3,000 women and children

Kloprogge was now responsible for some 3,000 women and children of indigenous militairen concentrated in the Westkust bivaks — 1,500 at Meulaboh, 600 at Blang Pidië, 500 at Tapatoean, 400 at Tjalang and 600 at Lam No — with only 15 autobuses and 20 passenger cars available, capable of moving about 500 per convoy. The decision was taken to evacuate them by road to the Lae Boetar cultuur-onderneming 60 km north-east of Singkel.

The staff history registers the scale: “De evacuatie van vrouwen en kinderen (3000, over een afstand van 600 km) maakte deze taak nog zwaarder.” Kloprogge conducted the retreat in three columns: a vertragende actie column under Captain Steinhorst reinforced with Maréchaussee brigades; an escort column for the convoys and un-evacuated bivaks; and a Zuiverings column under Lt Zijlmans operating ahead of the evacuees to clear ambushes.

The most-cited single engagement of the retreat is the action at Blang Pidië on 16 March 16 March 1942 (see Battle of Blang Pidië), when a bende of about 200 men attacked the bivak. Lt Zijlmans’s relief column from Meulaboh fought through 15 hours of ambush between Blang Pidië and Tapatoean the next day, leaving 200–300 Atjehnese dead. Sergeant Evers of the Maréchaussee distinguished himself in the action.

Capitulation at Lae Boetar (29 March 1942)

By 29 March 29 March 1942 Kloprogge’s reduced force — about 140 man — had reached Lae Boetar. The staff history records that “Kloprogge, die de ongelijke strijd toch wilde doorzetten, met het lot van de vrouwen en kinderen voor ogen, overreden met het restant van de troepen, zich te Lae Boetar te capituleren.” Several officers — among them Captain Steinhorst, Lt Mathus and Lt Thomson — refused to surrender and attempted to break through to the still-fighting Dutch troops around Blangkedjeren. Steinhorst was captured and killed by opstandelingen; Mathus was captured and later executed by the Japanese; Thomson eventually reached the column of Captain Van Dormolen in the Medan area and was finally captured on 26 April 26 April.

Significance

Kloprogge is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the figure who carries the moral weight of the Westkust campaign. The compilers single out his “rustig en beleidvol optreden” by which “aan onze zijde practisch geen verliezen werden geleden” in the Tjalang relief — a contrast drawn explicitly with the panic and demoralisation that overtook the 2de hoofdgroep under Bekkers on the noordkust. The staff history’s Nabeschouwing cites Kloprogge as one of the “aantal dikwijls nog jonge officieren” who, “ook onder deze omstandigheden … de troep weten te inspireren.” His capitulation at Lae Boetar on 29 March 29 March is the last discrete Dutch military act of the Atjeh campaign before the general capitulation at Blangkedjeren.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 113–155.

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