Van Dormolen was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, on the orders of major Van Aarsen, had executed a tegenstoot from the Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling (see Hoofdstuk IV of the staff history) and was still in the terrein in late March 1942 when he was joined by Lt M. C. Thomson — fresh from the Lae Boetar capitulation — and Thomson’s three Maréchaussee brigades. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the combined Van Dormolen–Thomson column’s six-week evasion march from the Medan area to Pematangsiantar is the longest individual escape-and-evasion episode of the Atjeh campaign after the Van Zanten resistance.
The tegenstoot from Koeta Boeloebenteng
The Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling was the Dutch defensive position north of Blangkedjeren (see Hoofdstuk IV), held in March 1942 by troops under Van Aarsen. When the Overakker capitulation was imminent, major Van Aarsen ordered Van Dormolen to execute a tegenstoot — a counter-stroke — from the stelling. Van Dormolen did so, and remained in the terrein with his detachment after the stelling was abandoned.
Around 30 March 30 March 1942 Van Dormolen was joined by Lt Thomson, who had broken out of the Lae Boetar capitulation with three Maréchaussee brigades. Thomson briefed Van Dormolen on the Westkust situation; the two detachments were combined.
The march to the Medan area
The combined column — initially 18 men (three officers and fifteen onderofficieren en soldaten) — moved northward into the Medanse. On 8 April 8 April 1942 the column reached a kampong on the cultuuronderneming „Merijke” in the Medanse. Van Dormolen contacted the still-serving Dutch administrateur of the onderneming, who agreed to supply food and shoes for the next day. On the morning of 9 April 9 April 1942 a patrol reported Japanese in a ladang opposite the kampong. Van Dormolen ordered the kampong evacuated; it was already surrounded, but the small group succeeded in slipping away.
Van Dormolen then noticed that he had left his actetas — containing f 2000,— — in the house. One soldier returned for it but was captured by the Japanese. After some minutes the soldier was heard calling to the group that it was surrounded and should return. From the tone of his voice Van Dormolen suspected coercion and refused to return; Thomson, later in captivity, confirmed that the soldier had been coerced by a Japanese with a pistol.
The march to Pematangsiantar and surrender
The group — reduced to six men — moved on, “waarbij last werd ondervonden van verklikkers onder de bevolking.” Whenever the group foraged in a kampong, a message was immediately sent to the Japanese. Because the Medanse was saturated with Japanese troops, the group resolved to make for Zuid-Sumatra, navigating mainly by compass for want of a good map. Near Pematangsiantar the group met a bevolkingspatrouille with a Dutch-speaking Indonesian, who told them that the zelfbestuurder of the streek had an urgent message and begged Van Dormolen to come with him. The zelfbestuurder, “zeer hulpvaardig,” explained that the Japanese had ordered every kampong to report the presence of Europeans on pain of severe punishment. He had not yet reported the group’s arrival but was forced to do so because of the verklikkers in the bevolking. The gezondheidstoestand of several members was poor; Van Dormolen decided to report to the Japanese at Pematangsiantar.
On 24 April 24 April the group — now six men — was taken by an auto supplied by the zelfbestuurder to Pematangsiantar. On 26 April 26 April the group was moved to a prisoner-of-war camp at Medan.
Significance
Van Dormolen’s tegenstoot from Koeta Boeloebenteng is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the only Dutch counter-attack of the central-Atjeh theatre, and the combined Van Dormolen–Thomson march is the staff history’s principal case study of the impossibility of sustained Dutch evasion in the face of a population that — under Japanese threat of punishment — systematically reported Dutch movements. The capitulation at Pematangsiantar on 24 April 24 April is the staff history’s effective close of the Dutch evasion phase in northern Sumatra.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- M. C. Thomson
- Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling
- Lae Boetar
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Pematangsiantar
- Medan
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 137–143.
Van Dormolen was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, on the orders of major Van Aarsen, had executed a tegenstoot from the Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling (see Hoofdstuk IV of the staff history) and was still in the terrein in late March 1942 when he was joined by Lt M. C. Thomson — fresh from the Lae Boetar capitulation — and Thomson’s three Maréchaussee brigades. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the combined Van Dormolen–Thomson column’s six-week evasion march from the Medan area to Pematangsiantar is the longest individual escape-and-evasion episode of the Atjeh campaign after the Van Zanten resistance.
The tegenstoot from Koeta Boeloebenteng
The Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling was the Dutch defensive position north of Blangkedjeren (see Hoofdstuk IV), held in March 1942 by troops under Van Aarsen. When the Overakker capitulation was imminent, major Van Aarsen ordered Van Dormolen to execute a tegenstoot — a counter-stroke — from the stelling. Van Dormolen did so, and remained in the terrein with his detachment after the stelling was abandoned.
Around 30 March 30 March 1942 Van Dormolen was joined by Lt Thomson, who had broken out of the Lae Boetar capitulation with three Maréchaussee brigades. Thomson briefed Van Dormolen on the Westkust situation; the two detachments were combined.
The march to the Medan area
The combined column — initially 18 men (three officers and fifteen onderofficieren en soldaten) — moved northward into the Medanse. On 8 April 8 April 1942 the column reached a kampong on the cultuuronderneming „Merijke” in the Medanse. Van Dormolen contacted the still-serving Dutch administrateur of the onderneming, who agreed to supply food and shoes for the next day. On the morning of 9 April 9 April 1942 a patrol reported Japanese in a ladang opposite the kampong. Van Dormolen ordered the kampong evacuated; it was already surrounded, but the small group succeeded in slipping away.
Van Dormolen then noticed that he had left his actetas — containing f 2000,— — in the house. One soldier returned for it but was captured by the Japanese. After some minutes the soldier was heard calling to the group that it was surrounded and should return. From the tone of his voice Van Dormolen suspected coercion and refused to return; Thomson, later in captivity, confirmed that the soldier had been coerced by a Japanese with a pistol.
The march to Pematangsiantar and surrender
The group — reduced to six men — moved on, “waarbij last werd ondervonden van verklikkers onder de bevolking.” Whenever the group foraged in a kampong, a message was immediately sent to the Japanese. Because the Medanse was saturated with Japanese troops, the group resolved to make for Zuid-Sumatra, navigating mainly by compass for want of a good map. Near Pematangsiantar the group met a bevolkingspatrouille with a Dutch-speaking Indonesian, who told them that the zelfbestuurder of the streek had an urgent message and begged Van Dormolen to come with him. The zelfbestuurder, “zeer hulpvaardig,” explained that the Japanese had ordered every kampong to report the presence of Europeans on pain of severe punishment. He had not yet reported the group’s arrival but was forced to do so because of the verklikkers in the bevolking. The gezondheidstoestand of several members was poor; Van Dormolen decided to report to the Japanese at Pematangsiantar.
On 24 April 24 April the group — now six men — was taken by an auto supplied by the zelfbestuurder to Pematangsiantar. On 26 April 26 April the group was moved to a prisoner-of-war camp at Medan.
Significance
Van Dormolen’s tegenstoot from Koeta Boeloebenteng is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the only Dutch counter-attack of the central-Atjeh theatre, and the combined Van Dormolen–Thomson march is the staff history’s principal case study of the impossibility of sustained Dutch evasion in the face of a population that — under Japanese threat of punishment — systematically reported Dutch movements. The capitulation at Pematangsiantar on 24 April 24 April is the staff history’s effective close of the Dutch evasion phase in northern Sumatra.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- M. C. Thomson
- Koeta Boeloebenteng-stelling
- Lae Boetar
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Pematangsiantar
- Medan
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 137–143.