The evacuation of women and children from the Westkust of Atjeh — conducted by Captain Kloprogge’s IIde divisie Maréchaussee in mid-March 1942 under repeated Atjehnese and Japanese attack — was the largest sustained Dutch convoy operation of the Japanese invasion of March 1942, moving approximately 3,000 indigenous women and children of the Westkust bivaks over 600 km of road from Meulaboh, Blang Pidië, Tapatoean, Tjalang and Lam No southward to the cultuuronderneming Lae Boetar in the Singkelse. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the evacuation is the principal logistical feat of the Westkust campaign — a 600-km movement of non-combatants under klewangaanval, ambush and bridge destruction — and the principal cause of Captain Kloprogge’s decision to capitulate at Lae Boetar on 29 March 29 March 1942.
The scale of the evacuation
The Westkust bivaks held, by mid-March 1942, the following populations of women and children of indigenous militairen:
- Meulaboh: 1,500
- Blang Pidië: 600
- Tapatoean: 500 (originally Tapatoean 400 + 100 from elsewhere)
- Tjalang: 400
- Lam No: 600
Total: approximately 3,000. The transport materieel available was “15 autobussen 20 personenauto’s” — about 500 gezinsleden per trip. The destination was the cultuuronderneming Lae Boetar, 60 km north-east of Singkel, outside Atjeh.
Operational dispositions
Kloprogge, after relieving Tjalang on 10 March 10 March 1942 and marching to Lam No on 11 March 11 March 1942, divided the available Maréchaussee into three groups:
- The vertragende actie column under Captain Steinhorst, reinforced with Maréchaussee brigades, which was to fight the rear-guard against the Japanese battalion-strength force marching down the Westkust from Kotaradja.
- The Zuiverings column under Lt Zijlmans, which was to clear the convoy route of kwaadwilligen.
- The convoy escort, which was to protect the bivaks still holding women and children and the moving convoys.
The staff history records the operational difficulty: “alle door ons vernielde bruggen werden onmiddellijk door de Atjehers hersteld en alle opstellingen en hinderlagen werden onmiddellijk aan de Japanners verraden.” The Dutch troops were reluctant to fight near the kampementen where the women and children were still concentrated, “omdat men bevreesd was, dat de Japanners hun woede zouden koelen op de nog in deze kampementen aanwezige vrouwen en kinderen.”
The 16–17 March 1942 Blang Pidië fighting
The principal engagement of the evacuation was the Battle of Blang Pidië of 16 March 16 March–17 March 17 March 1942, in which Zijlmans’s two-brigade relief column fought a 15-hour ambush march from Blang Pidië to Tapatoean, leaving 200–300 Atjehnese dead for no Dutch loss. The Blang Pidië bivak itself, holding 1,500 women and children under three brigades, had been attacked at dawn on 16 March 16 March 1942 by a band of about 200 men, and the attack had been beaten off. By the morning of 17 March 17 March 1942 the entire bivak was omsingeld; the troops succeeded in clearing the terrain in a few hours.
The 17–18 March 1942 march to Tapatoean and Bakongan
By 23.00 on 17 March 17 March 1942 Zijlmans’s column had reached the Tapatoean bivak (1,400 women and children under one brigade dekking). On 18 March 18 March 1942 Zijlmans was ordered to Bakongan to prepare the campement for the next transport. By this point the combined Meulaboh–Blang Pidië–Tapatoean convoy had moved south, joining the Lam No evacuees who had marched under Captain Kloprogge.
The staff history records that “het gros moest tenslotte in Tapatoean en Bakongan worden achtergelaten” — that is, the bulk of the women and children could not be moved further south than Bakongan, owing to the approach of the Japanese battalion and to the verraad of the convoy’s positions by the Atjehnese population. The European women and children were evacuated in private passenger cars over “smalle en slechte wegen” to the Lae Boetar onderneming, but “begrijpelijker wijze maakte dit geen goede indruk op de inheemse militairen, die hun gezinnen onder bescherming van enkele vrijwilligers hadden moeten achterlaten.” The Dutch geest of the indigenous soldaten collapsed accordingly; “gevallen van desertie waren schering en inslag.”
The 29 March 1942 capitulation at Lae Boetar
By 29 March 29 March 1942 Kloprogge’s reduced force — about 140 men — had reached Lae Boetar. “Kloprogge, die de ongelijke strijd toch wilde doorzetten, met het lot van de vrouwen en kinderen voor ogen, overreden met het restant van de troepen, zich te Lae Boetar te capituleren.” Several officers — Captain Steinhorst, Lt Mathus, Lt Thomson and the officier van gezondheid Dingemans — refused to surrender and attempted to break through to the still-fighting Dutch forces around Blangkedjeren. Steinhorst was captured and killed by opstandelingen; Mathus and Dingemans were captured by the Japanese and “enige tijd daarna terechtgesteld.” Only Thomson escaped, eventually reaching the Medanse before his capture on 26 April 26 April.
Significance
The evacuation of 3,000 women and children over 600 km of Westkust road under repeated klewangaanval and ambush is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal logistical feat of the Westkust campaign — a feat the compilers attribute to Kloprogge’s “rustig en beleidvol optreden” and to the voorbeeld function of European NCOs like sergeant Evers. The capitulation at Lae Boetar, forced by the women-and-children’s presence rather than by enemy pressure, is the staff history’s principal illustration of the moral and operational impossibility of sustained Dutch resistance in the Westkust theatre once the convoy had absorbed the bulk of the Maréchaussee’s fighting strength.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- A. Zijlmans
- M. C. Thomson
- F. Steinhorst
- E. F. K. R. Mathus
- Evers
- Battle of Blang Pidië (16 March 1942)
- Lae Boetar
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 128–137.