The Battle of Blang Pidië — fought at the Dutch bivak of Blang Pidië on the Westkust van Atjeh on 16 March 16 March 1942, and continued in the 15-hour ambush march of Lt Zijlmans’s two-brigade column from Blang Pidië to Tapatoean on 17 March 17 March 1942 — was the largest sustained infantry engagement of the Westkust evacuation, leaving some 200–300 Atjehnese dead for no Dutch loss. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the Blang Pidië engagement is the staff history’s principal illustration of klewangaanval against a Maréchaussee column, and of the voorbeeld function of the European sergeant Evers in small-unit combat.
The 16 March 1942 attack on the Blang Pidië bivak
By 16 March 16 March 1942 the bivak at Blang Pidië held 1,500 women and children of the Westkust evacuation, guarded by three brigades. At dawn the bivak was attacked by “een bende van ongeveer 200 man.” The attack was beaten off; the detachementscommandant “met 2 brigades uitgerukt en had het terrein om het bivak van vijanden gezuiverd.”
Zijlmans’s relief column (16 March 1942)
At Meulaboh Lt Zijlmans — acting commander of the IIde divisie Maréchaussee — received on 16 March 16 March 1942 the report that “in het gebied tussen Blang Pidië en Tapatoean onrust was uitgebroken en sabotagedaden werden verricht.” He was ordered to take two brigades and march on the area. The colonne departed Meulaboh at 13.00.
Initially, “kon niets bijzonders worden opgemerkt,” but after passing Lam Ie “waren geen vrouwen en kinderen meer op de weg te zien, terwijl ook mannen nog slechts sporadisch aanwezig waren.” The colonne then struck hindernissen. After these had been cleared without opposition, the colonne — now reduced to one brigade by the breakdown of a vrachtauto — drove on. Some kilometres further it reached a section of road where, on both sides, the struikgewas grew close to within 12 metres of the road. A Maréchaussee fired on an Atjehnese dressed in black, armed, who was lurking at about 20 metres’ range, about to give the signal of attack. The Atjehnese was killed. Zijlmans, convinced that the dead man had been the signal-poster, ordered the brigade to deploy to the left and right.
The brigade was hardly in position when the attack broke: “een bende van ongeveer 50 man, welke zich hoofdzakelijk rechts, maar ook gedeeltelijk links van de weg in het struikgewas had verscholen, stormde gewapend met klewangs op de brigade af.” The attack was repulsed by karabijn fire and blanke wapen. The staff history attributes the slordige character of the attack to the failure of the signal — the signal-attacker having been killed — and notes that the Atjehnese therefore fell “in groepjes van ongeveer 5 man,” which could be repulsed one group at a time.
The European sergeant Evers “onderscheidde zich … door zijn beheerst optreden, ook in de hierna volgende gevechten, dat hij een voorbeeld was voor de anderen en tevens een grote steun voor luitenant Zijlmans in de brigade.” After the fight, “15 gesneuvelde Atjehers” were counted; the rest fled in disorder. Zijlmans ordered the bedekte terrein doorzocht; “nog enkele kwaadwilligen, dikwijls in gevechten van man tegen man, neergelegd.” At 17.45 the march was resumed. At 18.30 electric zaklantaarns were fixed to the karabijn-lopen. Scarcely had the brigade deployed when a second attack broke out; this too was repulsed, at the cost of one lightly wounded. The bodies of seven further Atjehnese were found near the brigade.
Ten kilometres north of Blang Pidië the colonne struck a 60-metre bridge whose deck had been removed over a distance of 10 metres. A nearby abandoned wooden house provided planks for the repair. At 22.00 the brigade reached Blang Pidië, where Zijlmans decided to overnight “teneinde de troep voldoende rust te gunnen, om krachten te doen op de volgende dag, waarop naar Tapatoean zou worden doorgestoten.”
The 17 March 1942 march Blang Pidië–Tapatoean
Zijlmans had intended to depart at 07.00 on 17 March 17 March 1942, but the departure had to be postponed to 09.00 because at daybreak the entire bivak proved to be omsingeld. The troops succeeded in clearing the terrain in a few hours. The march to Tapatoean — normally a two-hour drive — would take 15 hours that day.
The entire streek “was in opstand.” Zijlmans’s orders were to fire only when the colonne was attacked; this happened “talrijke malen.” “Die dag ongeveer 200 à 300 kwaadwilligen werden neergelegd.” The verzetslieden were armed principally with blanke wapens; a few had firearms. The colonne struck versperringen of every kind: a kar gevuld met stenen wired across a bridge; boomstammen thrown across the road; bridges destroyed. Some versperringen were defended.
At one omhaal of a bocht, the voorste auto came on a districtshoofd uit het Blang Pidiëse, “die als onbetrouwbaar bekendstond,” accompanied by two helpers, all dressed as Japanese officers and riding bicycles. The three threw down their bicycles and fled; the districtshoofd escaped, but the two helpers were caught and killed. Some kilometres further, a hinderlaag was discovered in time and shot up; a number of verzetslieden took refuge in a wooden house. During the omsingeling of the house, sergeant Evers was suddenly attacked from behind; Zijlmans “zag dit gelukkig tijdig en wist de aanvaller neer te schieten, voordat hij onheil kon stichten.” All who had taken refuge in the house were shot, “daar zij zich verzetten.”
The 17 March 1942 arrival at Tapatoean
By 23.00 the colonne had reached the neighbourhood of a missigit (Mohammedan prayer-house) just north of Tapatoean, where about 300 armed Atjehnese had gathered. The band, seeing the Dutch troops in the dark, mistook them for Japanese and “stormden juichend naderbij.” “Een salvo maakte een einde aan hun illusie dat de Japanners reeds in hun midden waren. Dit salvo, dat onmiddellijk door een snelvuur werd gevolgde, deed een ware paniek onder de verzetslieden ontstaan, die in wanorde vluchtten, waarbij de meesten hun wapens wegwierpen.” The band had gathered to attack the Tapatoean bivak; “van deze aanval is niets meer gekomen.”
By midnight the colonne rode into the Tapatoean bivak, under the dekking of one brigade, where 1,400 women and children were concentrated. The following morning, 18 March 18 March 1942, Zijlmans was ordered to march to Bakongan to prepare the campement for the following transports.
Significance
The Battle of Blang Pidië is, in the staff history’s Westkust narrative, the largest sustained Dutch infantry engagement of the evacuation, and the staff history’s principal illustration of klewangaanval against a Maréchaussee column. The 200–300 Atjehnese dead, sustained over a 15-hour march without Dutch loss, is the staff history’s clearest single quantitative measure of the combat effectiveness of the Maréchaussee against the F-beweging’s irregulars. The engagement is also the staff history’s principal instance of the voorbeeld function of the European sergeant Evers — the individual NCO whose beheerst optreden steadied the indigenous soldaten through repeated klewangaanval.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- A. Zijlmans
- Evers
- Captain L. H. J. Kloprogge
- Evacuation of women and children from the Westkust of Atjeh (March 1942)
- Blang Pidië
- Tapatoean
- Bakongan
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 133–137.