The Instructie gouvernements-commissaris of 1873 was the official instruction given to the gouvernements-commissaris — first Schiff and Van de Wall, then Nieuwenhuyzen — dispatched to Atjeh to negotiate with the Sultan. The instruction, particularly its article 6, became a central point of contention in the Tweede Kamer debate, because the Minister’s modification of article 6 after blood had been shed transformed the mission from one seeking sovereignty on paper to one demanding the right of Dutch establishment — a fundamental change that, according to critics, proved the Government’s true intention had always been war.
The original instruction
The instruction for the first commissioners Schiff and Van de Wall was made entirely in conformity with the unanimous advice of the Raad van Indie, which had been against all aggression and had sought a peaceful solution. The letter of 4 January 1873 from the General Secretariat to the resident of Riouw — appended to the mail report of 9 January — instructed that if clashes occurred between parties and the Sultan, and the Sultan sought help, such help should be granted “under condition however of the recognition of the supreme lordship of the Netherlands over Atjeh.” The letter also stated: “a so favourable opportunity will perhaps not easily occur again.”
Insinger in the Tweede Kamer read this passage aloud to demonstrate that, contrary to the Minister’s claim, the instruction was not purely peaceful but contained “peaceful contact with significant display of power, with the point of the bayonet!”
Article 6 and its modification
Article 6 of the original instruction envisaged obtaining only “sovereignty on paper” — recognition of Dutch sovereignty without the establishment of a permanent Dutch presence. Fransen van de Putte acknowledged: “When that instruction came here, the Minister already had the report of the success of the first bloody encounters, and then I said: let us at least reserve the right of establishment.” He took this modification “entirely upon myself.”
Nierstrasz argued that the modification was not merely a change from 24 hours to twice 24 hours (as the Minister suggested), but a fundamental transformation: before the declaration of war, sovereignty had not been mentioned at all; it was only after the declaration that the sovereignty demand was placed at the forefront.
The Minister’s telegrams on sovereignty
The Minister’s telegrams revealed his ambivalence about the sovereignty demand. On 7 March 1873: “Wij mogen en willen uwe handen niet binden door verbod, maar meenen dat souvereiniteit of oorlog als eerste eisch hier en elders slechten indruk zou maken” — the Government could not and would not bind the Governor-General’s hands by prohibition, but believed that sovereignty or war as a first demand would make a bad impression. On 9 March, Loudon insisted: “Geen andere waarborg denkbaar dan souvereiniteits-erkenning; zonder dit expeditie geen zin. Wil mij terstond stellige bevelen geven of mij laten handelen geheel op eigen verantwoordelijkheid.” On 12 March, the Minister advised against the overly harsh demand but ultimately acquiesced.
The Tweede Kamer assessment
Haffmans concluded that the Minister’s modification of article 6 proved that the Government had always intended war, and that the original instruction had been designed to lead inevitably to war: “An instruction that places demands on the Sultan of Atjeh that one could a priori know and must know would not be accepted” was itself the first step toward the war declaration.
See Also
- T.N. Nieuwenhuyzen
- Schiff
- I.D. Fransen van de Putte
- Loudon
- Declaration of war on Atjeh (1873)
- Manifest aan Sultan van Atjeh (22 March 1873)
- Tweede Kamer debate on Atjeh war origins (April 1874)
- Gouvernements-commissaris
- Raad van Nederlandsch Indie
- Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904)
Source
Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergaderingen der Tweede Kamer in comité-général van 16, 17, 18 en 20 April 1874: Oorlog met Atjeh, gedrukt ter Algemene Landsdrukkerij van het Koloniaal Instituut (1881), pp. 10–15, 87–93.