The Manifest aan Sultan van Atjeh of 22 March 1873 was the written demand delivered by gouvernements-commissaris Nieuwenhuyzen to the Sultan of Atjeh, simultaneously announcing that the demands would be confirmed by bombardment of the Sultan’s residence from 3,600 metres offshore. The Manifest — which accompanied the ultimatum that inaugurated the Atjeh War — was cited extensively during the Tweede Kamer debate as evidence that the gouvernements-commissaris had come equipped for war rather than for negotiation.
Content
The Manifest stated: “Dit manifest zal nog heden aan den Sultan worden toegezonden, terwijl het zoordaig van zijne ontvangst zal zijn gebleken nader door het werpen van eenige projectilen in of nabij des Sultans verblijf, waarvan wij slechts 3600 meters verwijderd liggen, bevestigd zal worden.” — “This manifest will be sent to the Sultan today, and as soon as his receipt of it has been confirmed, it will be further confirmed by the firing of some projectiles into or near the Sultan’s residence, from which we are only 3,600 metres distant.”
The language simultaneously delivered demands and threatened bombardment — a form that parliamentary critics characterised as neither a negotiation nor an ultimatum in the accepted diplomatic sense, but as an act of war wrapped in the form of a diplomatic communication.
The Minister’s modification
Fransen van de Putte acknowledged that the original instruction (article 6) had envisaged only obtaining sovereignty on paper — “the governor-general meant nothing else than sovereignty on paper, and if that could have been obtained without a shot being fired, I would have been satisfied.” But once blood had been shed, the Minister took upon himself the modification: “let us at least reserve the right of establishment.” The Minister also claimed that the only difference between his instructions and what was actually done concerned the period of the ultimatum: 24 hours instead of the originally stipulated longer period. Haffmans however argued that the modification went much further, and that the entire proceeding constituted a war declaration rather than a negotiation.
The Tweede Kamer debate
During the Tweede Kamer debate, Haffmans characterised the gouvernements-commissaris’s entire approach as one in which “he fell, as they say, with the door in the house; he came equipped for war and brought the war. The asking of clarification and accountability that preceded was merely for form, an idle display.” Nierstrasz noted that the Minister had originally said one should not place the sovereignty demand too roughly at the forefront, yet the manifest did exactly that — and the Minister had not prevented it.
Fransen van de Putte defended the form by arguing that one should look at how such matters were handled in the Javanese War, in Bali, and in Boni: “if one does not treat those friends in that way, one never comes to an end.”
See Also
- T.N. Nieuwenhuyzen
- I.D. Fransen van de Putte
- Loudon
- Declaration of war on Atjeh (1873)
- First Atjeh expedition (March-April 1873)
- Tweede Kamer debate on Atjeh war origins (April 1874)
- Gouvernements-commissaris
- Instructie gouvernements-commissaris (1873)
- Atjeh-oorlog (1873-1904)
Source
Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergaderingen der Tweede Kamer in comité-général van 16, 17, 18 en 20 April 1874: Oorlog met Atjeh, gedrukt ter Algemene Landsdrukkerij van het Koloniaal Instituut (1881), pp. 13–14, 87–93.