Anton Reinhard Falck (1777–1843) was a Dutch statesman who served successively as minister of Education, National Industry, and Colonies, and as the Netherlands’ plenipotentiary at London during the negotiations that produced the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. In P. H. van der Kemp’s 1900 article he is one of the principal objects of criticism, together with his colleague Fagel: Van der Kemp charges that the Dutch plenipotentiaries were “not suited to their task,” that they “had too good an opinion of their counterparties,” and that they “trusted too much in the honesty of our mighty neighbour and natural ally.” The article’s central irony is that Falck, returning from London in triumph, wrote privately to his friend J. H. van der Palm of having “for the first time placed all of Sumatra outside the sphere of British influence,” while in fact — through the mishandling of the Acheh reservation — he had opened the door to half a century of Anglo-Dutch dispute over the island.
Background: The 1814 Treaty and Falck’s Earlier Work
Falck had been involved in the negotiation of the earlier colonial treaty of 1814. Van der Kemp notes that, on the worthlessness of the Dutch possessions in Hindostan (Bengal), “Falck and Fagel were already agreed in 1814 upon the conclusion of the then colonial treaty.” That early agreement on the value of the Indian factories formed, in Van der Kemp’s view, the foundation for the later Dutch willingness to surrender them in 1824 in exchange for a free hand on Sumatra. Falck was therefore a figure of continuity across the entire decade of Anglo-Dutch colonial re-arrangement that followed the Napoleonic wars.
The London Negotiations of 1824
The financial disputes outstanding from the convention of 24 January 1817 were the immediate occasion of the 1824 negotiations. Once Britain’s “last word” — a Dutch payment of £100,000 — proved negotiable, Falck and Fagel, with the assistance of Captain Elout (son of the minister of Finance), constructed a draft treaty. The financial demand disappeared, replaced by articles 10, 11, and 12, under which the Netherlands undertook to afford British ships friendly reception at Tapanoeli and Anjer. Minister Elout (the elder), in his advice of 12 February 1824, sternly warned against these “duurzame rechten” (permanent rights) and recommended that the King prefer a cash settlement. Van der Kemp judges Elout’s advice “ernstig en volkomen juist” — serious and entirely correct.
The Acheh Reservation
The single most consequential episode in Van der Kemp’s treatment of Falck concerns the raising of the Treaty of Pedir (1819) at the eleventh hour of the negotiations. Neither Falck nor Fagel had read the Acheh treaty when, on the eve of Captain Elout’s departure for The Hague with the draft, the British plenipotentiaries mentioned its existence and described it as a mere engagement of hospitality to shipwrecked British sailors. The Dutch, on this representation, raised no objection. When the Acheh treaty was at last read out in London on 23 February 1824, it proved to be far from innocent — having been contrived by Raffles to vest British sovereignty at Acheh. Falck and Fagel, instead of repudiating the concession, accepted it; they even went beyond the King’s instructions in agreeing to guarantee Acheh’s independence in the supplementary notes exchanged at the signing of the treaty. This guarantee became, in Van der Kemp’s analysis, the “Trojan horse” by which Britain retained a foothold of influence on Sumatra until the Sumatra Treaty of 1871.
Falck’s Private Correspondence
Van der Kemp makes free use of Falck’s published letters (Falck’s Brieven) to demonstrate the gap between Falck’s private satisfaction and the actual outcome. On 7 April 1824 Falck wrote to Van der Palm: “Long shall I probably wait before anything so succeeds as the treaty of 18 March, whereby the whole island of Sumatra (Java minor) is at last withdrawn from British influence and placed in the sphere of Dutch policy.” A few months later, having met Raffles in London, he accepted his compliment on the treaty with thanks: “Although I had a mind to expostulate with him over his conduct, he disarmed me by the obliging expressions he used concerning the treaty, which carries his full approval.” Van der Kemp cites this correspondence with undisguised irony: Falck had, in his view, accepted at face value the very man whose machinations in 1819 had produced the Acheh treaty.
Van der Kemp’s Verdict
For Van der Kemp, Falck’s career on the colonial stage raises a direct question of historical judgement: “He who knows A. R. Falck especially from his activities on colonial ground has, it seems to me, the right to ask himself: how did one come to elevate this statesman so high?” The article’s reproach is not that Falck was dishonest, but that he was too confiding — both of his British counterparts and of Raffles personally — and that this misplaced trust produced a treaty whose principal reservation, on Acheh, was to dog Dutch colonial policy for nearly fifty years. Falck’s letters to Elout and Van der Palm reveal a man genuinely satisfied with what he believed he had achieved; Van der Kemp’s article is in large measure an indictment of that satisfaction.
See Also
- Hendrik Fagel
- Elout
- Captain Elout
- Ridder Reinhold
- Cornelis Felix van Maanen
- J. H. van der Palm
- J. C. Baud
- Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824)
- Acheh treaty of 1819
- Treaty of Pedir (1819)
- Elout’s advice of 12 February 1824
- Raising of the Acheh treaty in London negotiations
- Article 6 controversy
- Sumatra Treaty of 1871
- Pinang Nota (1825)
- Paper war
Source
Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.
Anton Reinhard Falck (1777–1843) was a Dutch statesman who served successively as minister of Education, National Industry, and Colonies, and as the Netherlands’ plenipotentiary at London during the negotiations that produced the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. In P. H. van der Kemp’s 1900 article he is one of the principal objects of criticism, together with his colleague Fagel: Van der Kemp charges that the Dutch plenipotentiaries were “not suited to their task,” that they “had too good an opinion of their counterparties,” and that they “trusted too much in the honesty of our mighty neighbour and natural ally.” The article’s central irony is that Falck, returning from London in triumph, wrote privately to his friend J. H. van der Palm of having “for the first time placed all of Sumatra outside the sphere of British influence,” while in fact — through the mishandling of the Acheh reservation — he had opened the door to half a century of Anglo-Dutch dispute over the island.
Background: The 1814 Treaty and Falck’s Earlier Work
Falck had been involved in the negotiation of the earlier colonial treaty of 1814. Van der Kemp notes that, on the worthlessness of the Dutch possessions in Hindostan (Bengal), “Falck and Fagel were already agreed in 1814 upon the conclusion of the then colonial treaty.” That early agreement on the value of the Indian factories formed, in Van der Kemp’s view, the foundation for the later Dutch willingness to surrender them in 1824 in exchange for a free hand on Sumatra. Falck was therefore a figure of continuity across the entire decade of Anglo-Dutch colonial re-arrangement that followed the Napoleonic wars.
The London Negotiations of 1824
The financial disputes outstanding from the convention of 24 January 1817 were the immediate occasion of the 1824 negotiations. Once Britain’s “last word” — a Dutch payment of £100,000 — proved negotiable, Falck and Fagel, with the assistance of Captain Elout (son of the minister of Finance), constructed a draft treaty. The financial demand disappeared, replaced by articles 10, 11, and 12, under which the Netherlands undertook to afford British ships friendly reception at Tapanoeli and Anjer. Minister Elout (the elder), in his advice of 12 February 1824, sternly warned against these “duurzame rechten” (permanent rights) and recommended that the King prefer a cash settlement. Van der Kemp judges Elout’s advice “ernstig en volkomen juist” — serious and entirely correct.
The Acheh Reservation
The single most consequential episode in Van der Kemp’s treatment of Falck concerns the raising of the Treaty of Pedir (1819) at the eleventh hour of the negotiations. Neither Falck nor Fagel had read the Acheh treaty when, on the eve of Captain Elout’s departure for The Hague with the draft, the British plenipotentiaries mentioned its existence and described it as a mere engagement of hospitality to shipwrecked British sailors. The Dutch, on this representation, raised no objection. When the Acheh treaty was at last read out in London on 23 February 1824, it proved to be far from innocent — having been contrived by Raffles to vest British sovereignty at Acheh. Falck and Fagel, instead of repudiating the concession, accepted it; they even went beyond the King’s instructions in agreeing to guarantee Acheh’s independence in the supplementary notes exchanged at the signing of the treaty. This guarantee became, in Van der Kemp’s analysis, the “Trojan horse” by which Britain retained a foothold of influence on Sumatra until the Sumatra Treaty of 1871.
Falck’s Private Correspondence
Van der Kemp makes free use of Falck’s published letters (Falck’s Brieven) to demonstrate the gap between Falck’s private satisfaction and the actual outcome. On 7 April 1824 Falck wrote to Van der Palm: “Long shall I probably wait before anything so succeeds as the treaty of 18 March, whereby the whole island of Sumatra (Java minor) is at last withdrawn from British influence and placed in the sphere of Dutch policy.” A few months later, having met Raffles in London, he accepted his compliment on the treaty with thanks: “Although I had a mind to expostulate with him over his conduct, he disarmed me by the obliging expressions he used concerning the treaty, which carries his full approval.” Van der Kemp cites this correspondence with undisguised irony: Falck had, in his view, accepted at face value the very man whose machinations in 1819 had produced the Acheh treaty.
Van der Kemp’s Verdict
For Van der Kemp, Falck’s career on the colonial stage raises a direct question of historical judgement: “He who knows A. R. Falck especially from his activities on colonial ground has, it seems to me, the right to ask himself: how did one come to elevate this statesman so high?” The article’s reproach is not that Falck was dishonest, but that he was too confiding — both of his British counterparts and of Raffles personally — and that this misplaced trust produced a treaty whose principal reservation, on Acheh, was to dog Dutch colonial policy for nearly fifty years. Falck’s letters to Elout and Van der Palm reveal a man genuinely satisfied with what he believed he had achieved; Van der Kemp’s article is in large measure an indictment of that satisfaction.
See Also
- Hendrik Fagel
- Elout
- Captain Elout
- Ridder Reinhold
- Cornelis Felix van Maanen
- J. H. van der Palm
- J. C. Baud
- Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824)
- Acheh treaty of 1819
- Treaty of Pedir (1819)
- Elout’s advice of 12 February 1824
- Raising of the Acheh treaty in London negotiations
- Article 6 controversy
- Sumatra Treaty of 1871
- Pinang Nota (1825)
- Paper war
Source
Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.