E. de Waal was a Dutch colonial administrator and man of letters, the author of the multi-volume Onze Indische Financiën (“Our Indian Finances”) and of Nederlandsch-Indië in de Staten-Generaal, who is cited repeatedly by Van der Kemp in his 1900 monograph on the Raffles–Coombs convention and its long aftermath. De Waal’s writings furnish Van der Kemp with one of his principal interpretive lenses for the Acheh question and the connected Sumatra-tractaat of 1871.

Author of Onze Indische Financiën

De Waal’s Onze Indische Financiën, of which the sixth volume is most frequently cited by Van der Kemp, was a sustained analysis of Netherlands Indian fiscal and colonial policy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It combined statistical depth with political judgment, and Van der Kemp draws upon it for a series of judicious observations on the diplomacy of the treaty of 1824, on the Pinang Nota of Fullerton, and on the Sumatra-tractaat of 1871. He is also the author of Nederlandsch-Indië in de Staten-Generaal, volume I of which (p. 82) Van der Kemp cites as one of the standard printed collections of the Anglo-Dutch treaty documents of 1824.

On Palmerston and the Letter of the 1824 Treaty

The most striking of De Waal’s observations, drawn upon by Van der Kemp, concerns the use made by Lord Palmerston of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824. Palmerston, De Waal had written, “simply attached himself to the letter of the treaty of 1824” in resisting Dutch extensions of authority on Sumatra. The treaty provided only that England would not establish itself on Sumatra; it did not confer upon the Netherlands an explicit right to extend its authority there. This narrow reading of Article 2 of the 1824 treaty, in conjunction with the Dutch declaration of Achehnese “independence” annexed to the treaty, allowed Palmerston to protest Dutch advances on the East Coast of Sumatra as inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1824 settlement. De Waal’s formulation of the point gave Van der Kemp a pithy statement of the dilemma that had beset Dutch policy from 1825 onward.

On the Cape of Guinea Trade-off

De Waal’s most substantial intervention in the Acheh debate, however, concerns the celebrated trade-off between the Sumatra-tractaat and the surrender of the Cape of Guinea in the same year. Public opinion in the Netherlands had long held that the Dutch abandonment of the Guinea Coast was the price exacted by Britain for the withdrawal of its Acheh-protest. De Waal, in Onze Indische Financiën (volume VI, pp. 69, 71), “condemned this view as an historical inaccuracy.” According to De Waal, he himself, as minister, had offered the Guinea Coast to England “without particular occasion,” in order to put an end to the fighting among the negroes — “a charming idea,” Van der Kemp adds, with heavy irony — and it was only afterwards that England demanded that the two treaties “should stand and fall together.” Whether or not this version is itself free of apologetic colour, Van der Kemp credits De Waal with having posed the question of the Guinea Coast trade-off in its sharpest form.

On the Style of the British Notes

A third observation, drawn from page 57 of the same sixth volume, runs to the manner in which the British diplomatic correspondence with the Netherlands was conducted. “The style of the British notes,” De Waal had dryly observed, “really did not always excel in politeness.” The remark is cited by Van der Kemp during his discussion of the British protests against the Dutch differential tariff policy of the 1820s–1830s, and is emblematic of De Waal’s combination of fiscal expertise with an acute sense of diplomatic style. De Waal’s writings furnished Van der Kemp with the historical sensitivity that the more pedantic narratives of Lauts, Smulders, and Meinsma lacked.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.

E. de Waal was a Dutch colonial administrator and man of letters, the author of the multi-volume Onze Indische Financiën (“Our Indian Finances”) and of Nederlandsch-Indië in de Staten-Generaal, who is cited repeatedly by Van der Kemp in his 1900 monograph on the Raffles–Coombs convention and its long aftermath. De Waal’s writings furnish Van der Kemp with one of his principal interpretive lenses for the Acheh question and the connected Sumatra-tractaat of 1871.

Author of Onze Indische Financiën

De Waal’s Onze Indische Financiën, of which the sixth volume is most frequently cited by Van der Kemp, was a sustained analysis of Netherlands Indian fiscal and colonial policy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It combined statistical depth with political judgment, and Van der Kemp draws upon it for a series of judicious observations on the diplomacy of the treaty of 1824, on the Pinang Nota of Fullerton, and on the Sumatra-tractaat of 1871. He is also the author of Nederlandsch-Indië in de Staten-Generaal, volume I of which (p. 82) Van der Kemp cites as one of the standard printed collections of the Anglo-Dutch treaty documents of 1824.

On Palmerston and the Letter of the 1824 Treaty

The most striking of De Waal’s observations, drawn upon by Van der Kemp, concerns the use made by Lord Palmerston of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824. Palmerston, De Waal had written, “simply attached himself to the letter of the treaty of 1824” in resisting Dutch extensions of authority on Sumatra. The treaty provided only that England would not establish itself on Sumatra; it did not confer upon the Netherlands an explicit right to extend its authority there. This narrow reading of Article 2 of the 1824 treaty, in conjunction with the Dutch declaration of Achehnese “independence” annexed to the treaty, allowed Palmerston to protest Dutch advances on the East Coast of Sumatra as inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1824 settlement. De Waal’s formulation of the point gave Van der Kemp a pithy statement of the dilemma that had beset Dutch policy from 1825 onward.

On the Cape of Guinea Trade-off

De Waal’s most substantial intervention in the Acheh debate, however, concerns the celebrated trade-off between the Sumatra-tractaat and the surrender of the Cape of Guinea in the same year. Public opinion in the Netherlands had long held that the Dutch abandonment of the Guinea Coast was the price exacted by Britain for the withdrawal of its Acheh-protest. De Waal, in Onze Indische Financiën (volume VI, pp. 69, 71), “condemned this view as an historical inaccuracy.” According to De Waal, he himself, as minister, had offered the Guinea Coast to England “without particular occasion,” in order to put an end to the fighting among the negroes — “a charming idea,” Van der Kemp adds, with heavy irony — and it was only afterwards that England demanded that the two treaties “should stand and fall together.” Whether or not this version is itself free of apologetic colour, Van der Kemp credits De Waal with having posed the question of the Guinea Coast trade-off in its sharpest form.

On the Style of the British Notes

A third observation, drawn from page 57 of the same sixth volume, runs to the manner in which the British diplomatic correspondence with the Netherlands was conducted. “The style of the British notes,” De Waal had dryly observed, “really did not always excel in politeness.” The remark is cited by Van der Kemp during his discussion of the British protests against the Dutch differential tariff policy of the 1820s–1830s, and is emblematic of De Waal’s combination of fiscal expertise with an acute sense of diplomatic style. De Waal’s writings furnished Van der Kemp with the historical sensitivity that the more pedantic narratives of Lauts, Smulders, and Meinsma lacked.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.