Elout — Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767–1841), minister of Finance of the Netherlands and former commissioner-general — is one of the central figures in P. H. van der Kemp’s account of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. Although not himself a plenipotentiary in 1824, he was the minister to whom all the papers of the London negotiators were referred for advice, the author of the celebrated nota of 12 February 1824, and the father of Captain Elout who carried the draft treaty and the oral message on the Acheh reservation to The Hague. Van der Kemp holds him up as the one Dutch statesman whose judgement, in the whole affair, was both sound and unheeded.
Earlier Career: Commissioner-General and the 1817 Convention
Elout had served as one of the three commissioners-general who, in 1816, took over the Netherlands Indies from the British interim administration. In that capacity he had had to deal with the convention of 24 January 1817 under which a series of financial disputes were left for resolution by the European governments. He had also, in February 1817, recommended the idea of exchanging the Dutch factories in Hindostan for Bencoolen on Sumatra’s west coast — an idea which, in Van der Kemp’s view, “laid the ground-thought for a revision of the treaty of 1814.” That revision was to take seven years to accomplish.
The 1820 Negotiations with Fagel
In August 1820, in his capacity as commissioner-general, Elout joined Fagel in the notes exchange of 4 August 1820 with Castlereagh and Canning. It was Elout who, on that occasion, had drafted the concept-convention of 24 July 1820, the first article of which called on Britain to disavow the conduct of her agents in the archipelago — a formulation that Raffles’s machinations at Singapore and elsewhere had made rhetorically necessary. The 1820 attempt failed; but the concept-convention remains one of the strongest statements the Dutch ever made of their position, and Elout was its principal author.
The 1824 Advice
In February 1824, with the London negotiations in their final stage, the Dutch plenipotentiaries — Falck and Fagel — sent the draft treaty to The Hague for the King’s approval. The Dutch Colonial Office was at that time “without a head,” since its minister Falck was himself in London. The Foreign Office was likewise without a leading figure, being merely “looked after by one of our envoys, Ridder Reinhold, who had no understanding of the matter.” For these reasons, all the London papers were referred for advice to Elout, although he was the minister of Finance. Elout’s advice, dated 12 February 1824, was — in Van der Kemp’s judgement — “ernstig en volkomen juist” (serious and entirely correct). He sternly warned against articles 10, 11, and 12, which granted the British flag friendly reception at Tapanoeli and Anjer, and observed that “the three named articles contain so many and so great objections that one does not hesitate to advise His Majesty most strongly to settle the whole affair with a sum of money, even if it be the sum demanded, rather than to grant by treaty any particular and permanent privileges.” The King followed this advice; the offending articles were dropped.
The Acheh Reservation
What Elout did not advise on, however, was the Acheh reservation — and this, in Van der Kemp’s reading, is the central puzzle of the case. “It seems to me,” Van der Kemp writes, “that I must conclude that his advice was not sought on this; for it would have had to be disapproving, on exactly the same grounds as those he brought forward against Tapanoeli and Anjer.” The grounds are, indeed, identical: Elout’s argument was that such “permanent privileges” are sources of future disputes, and that under article 9 of the draft treaty — which guaranteed Dutch supremacy on Sumatra — the Netherlands would be in a position to protect foreign sailors shipwrecked on Acheh’s coast without needing a separate treaty engagement. Elout’s silence on Acheh is the more inexplicable because his own son, Captain Elout, was the messenger who carried the oral message on the Acheh reservation to The Hague.
Later Interventions
Even after the treaty was signed, Elout continued to be consulted. He drew up the Pro Memorie on the instructions to be given to the Indian government concerning execution of the treaty; it was on this Pro Memorie that Falck advised on 6 August 1824 “without naturally contesting it.” The instructions of 31 August 1824, which Van der Kemp singles out for containing the erroneous statement that the Acheh treaty of 1819 had reserved “exclusive trade,” were drafted under Elout’s supervision. Van der Kemp laments that this misrepresentation was then transmitted, uncorrected, by a long series of Dutch historians — Lauts, Smulders, Meinsma — and even by the official Nota of 1873.
Assessment
Van der Kemp’s portrait of Elout is that of a sound adviser in overreached circumstances: his advice against the Anjer and Tapanoeli articles was accepted, but his silence (or lack of consultation) on Acheh allowed the most consequential single error of the 1824 treaty to slip through. His Bijdragen (Elout’s Bijdragen), published in 1863, remain one of Van der Kemp’s principal primary sources for the reconstruction of the negotiations, and the article is in this sense as much a tribute to Elout’s documentary legacy as it is a critique of his performance.
See Also
- Anton Reinhard Falck
- Hendrik Fagel
- Captain Elout
- Ridder Reinhold
- Cornelis Felix van Maanen
- J. C. Baud
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824)
- Convention of 24 January 1817
- Fagel-Elout negotiations (August 1820)
- Concept-convention of 24 July 1820
- Elout’s advice of 12 February 1824
- King’s authorization of 13 February 1824
- Raising of the Acheh treaty in London negotiations
- Instructions of 31 August 1824
- Article 6 controversy
- Pinang Nota (1825)
Source
Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.
Elout — Cornelis Theodorus Elout (1767–1841), minister of Finance of the Netherlands and former commissioner-general — is one of the central figures in P. H. van der Kemp’s account of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. Although not himself a plenipotentiary in 1824, he was the minister to whom all the papers of the London negotiators were referred for advice, the author of the celebrated nota of 12 February 1824, and the father of Captain Elout who carried the draft treaty and the oral message on the Acheh reservation to The Hague. Van der Kemp holds him up as the one Dutch statesman whose judgement, in the whole affair, was both sound and unheeded.
Earlier Career: Commissioner-General and the 1817 Convention
Elout had served as one of the three commissioners-general who, in 1816, took over the Netherlands Indies from the British interim administration. In that capacity he had had to deal with the convention of 24 January 1817 under which a series of financial disputes were left for resolution by the European governments. He had also, in February 1817, recommended the idea of exchanging the Dutch factories in Hindostan for Bencoolen on Sumatra’s west coast — an idea which, in Van der Kemp’s view, “laid the ground-thought for a revision of the treaty of 1814.” That revision was to take seven years to accomplish.
The 1820 Negotiations with Fagel
In August 1820, in his capacity as commissioner-general, Elout joined Fagel in the notes exchange of 4 August 1820 with Castlereagh and Canning. It was Elout who, on that occasion, had drafted the concept-convention of 24 July 1820, the first article of which called on Britain to disavow the conduct of her agents in the archipelago — a formulation that Raffles’s machinations at Singapore and elsewhere had made rhetorically necessary. The 1820 attempt failed; but the concept-convention remains one of the strongest statements the Dutch ever made of their position, and Elout was its principal author.
The 1824 Advice
In February 1824, with the London negotiations in their final stage, the Dutch plenipotentiaries — Falck and Fagel — sent the draft treaty to The Hague for the King’s approval. The Dutch Colonial Office was at that time “without a head,” since its minister Falck was himself in London. The Foreign Office was likewise without a leading figure, being merely “looked after by one of our envoys, Ridder Reinhold, who had no understanding of the matter.” For these reasons, all the London papers were referred for advice to Elout, although he was the minister of Finance. Elout’s advice, dated 12 February 1824, was — in Van der Kemp’s judgement — “ernstig en volkomen juist” (serious and entirely correct). He sternly warned against articles 10, 11, and 12, which granted the British flag friendly reception at Tapanoeli and Anjer, and observed that “the three named articles contain so many and so great objections that one does not hesitate to advise His Majesty most strongly to settle the whole affair with a sum of money, even if it be the sum demanded, rather than to grant by treaty any particular and permanent privileges.” The King followed this advice; the offending articles were dropped.
The Acheh Reservation
What Elout did not advise on, however, was the Acheh reservation — and this, in Van der Kemp’s reading, is the central puzzle of the case. “It seems to me,” Van der Kemp writes, “that I must conclude that his advice was not sought on this; for it would have had to be disapproving, on exactly the same grounds as those he brought forward against Tapanoeli and Anjer.” The grounds are, indeed, identical: Elout’s argument was that such “permanent privileges” are sources of future disputes, and that under article 9 of the draft treaty — which guaranteed Dutch supremacy on Sumatra — the Netherlands would be in a position to protect foreign sailors shipwrecked on Acheh’s coast without needing a separate treaty engagement. Elout’s silence on Acheh is the more inexplicable because his own son, Captain Elout, was the messenger who carried the oral message on the Acheh reservation to The Hague.
Later Interventions
Even after the treaty was signed, Elout continued to be consulted. He drew up the Pro Memorie on the instructions to be given to the Indian government concerning execution of the treaty; it was on this Pro Memorie that Falck advised on 6 August 1824 “without naturally contesting it.” The instructions of 31 August 1824, which Van der Kemp singles out for containing the erroneous statement that the Acheh treaty of 1819 had reserved “exclusive trade,” were drafted under Elout’s supervision. Van der Kemp laments that this misrepresentation was then transmitted, uncorrected, by a long series of Dutch historians — Lauts, Smulders, Meinsma — and even by the official Nota of 1873.
Assessment
Van der Kemp’s portrait of Elout is that of a sound adviser in overreached circumstances: his advice against the Anjer and Tapanoeli articles was accepted, but his silence (or lack of consultation) on Acheh allowed the most consequential single error of the 1824 treaty to slip through. His Bijdragen (Elout’s Bijdragen), published in 1863, remain one of Van der Kemp’s principal primary sources for the reconstruction of the negotiations, and the article is in this sense as much a tribute to Elout’s documentary legacy as it is a critique of his performance.
See Also
- Anton Reinhard Falck
- Hendrik Fagel
- Captain Elout
- Ridder Reinhold
- Cornelis Felix van Maanen
- J. C. Baud
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824)
- Convention of 24 January 1817
- Fagel-Elout negotiations (August 1820)
- Concept-convention of 24 July 1820
- Elout’s advice of 12 February 1824
- King’s authorization of 13 February 1824
- Raising of the Acheh treaty in London negotiations
- Instructions of 31 August 1824
- Article 6 controversy
- Pinang Nota (1825)
Source
Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.