Hendrik Fagel

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tagsperson, dutch-official, diplomat, ambassador
aliasesFagel, Hendrik Fagel, Baron Fagel, Dutch ambassador Fagel

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Hendrik Fagel (1765–1838) — sixth Baron Fagel, long-serving Dutch envoy in London — was, with Falck, one of the two Dutch plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. In P. H. van der Kemp’s 1900 article he is paired with Falck as one of the two objects of the historian’s censure: the plenipotentiaries are charged with having “had too good an opinion of their counterparties” and with having placed excessive trust in “the honesty of our mighty neighbour and natural ally.” Fagel was the senior career diplomat of the pair, having represented the Netherlands in London almost continuously since the 1790s.

Earlier Career and the 1814 Treaty

Fagel had been the Dutch envoy in London during the negotiations leading to the colonial treaty of 1814, and on the worthlessness of the Dutch factories in Hindostan “Falck and Fagel were already in 1814 agreed.” He was therefore a figure of considerable experience in Anglo-Dutch affairs, and his presence on the 1824 commission was intended to lend the weight of long diplomatic familiarity with the British court. Van der Kemp records that Fagel also corresponded, on 14 and 25 January 1820, with the Dutch minister Van Nagell — at that time head of Foreign Affairs — concerning Castlereagh’s communication that the Netherlands would have to suffer some sacrifices for the sake of the opposition in England. Castlereagh later denied having said so; Fagel maintained the truth of his communications.

The August 1820 Notes

The first Anglo-Dutch exchanges that bore on the issues later settled in 1824 took the form of the notes exchanged on 4 August 1820 between Castlereagh and Canning on the British side, and Fagel and Elout (then a commissioner-general) on the Dutch side. Those earlier notes had already contained the British declaration that the Netherlands “distinctly and solemnly disclaim any design on their part to aim either at political supremacy or at commercial monopoly in the Eastern Archipelago.” Van der Kemp takes pains to point out that in 1820 this declaration had been a mere pro memoria without treaty force; in 1824 it reappeared, in subtly altered form, as a binding clause — and the Dutch plenipotentiaries let it pass. The blame here lies jointly with Fagel and Elout.

The Concept-Convention of 24 July 1820

The concept-convention of 24 July 1820, offered by Fagel and Elout, contained in its first article the explicit demand “that the Government of Great Britain disavows the conduct pursued by its agents in the various parts of the Indian Archipelago, and recognises the rights of the Government of the Netherlands over the places and establishments reoccupied by virtue of the treaty of 13 August 1814, namely over those which have given rise to the altercations known.” This was the strongest formulation the Dutch ever put forward — calling, in effect, for an open British apology for Raffles’s conduct between 1818 and 1820. The article was never accepted; but its existence shows that Fagel, in 1820, was capable of a firm line which he later abandoned.

The 1824 Negotiations

In the negotiations of February 1824 Fagel and Falck worked together under instructions from The Hague, with Captain Elout as their messenger to the Dutch court. When the question of the Treaty of Pedir (1819) was raised at the eleventh hour by the British plenipotentiaries, neither Fagel nor Falck had read the Acheh treaty itself. They accepted the British representation that it concerned only hospitality to shipwrecked sailors, and raised no objection pending The Hague’s authorisation. When the true content of the Acheh treaty was revealed on 23 February 1824, Fagel and Falck did not repudiate the concession; instead they accepted the supplementary note procedure by which the British undertaking to “modify” the Acheh treaty was set alongside a Dutch undertaking to guarantee Acheh’s independence — the disputed clause that was to bedevil Dutch policy on Sumatra for the next half-century.

Fagel’s Dismissal

Van der Kemp, in a passing reference, directs the reader to his article in De Tijdspiegel of April 1899, “Fagel’s ontslag” (Fagel’s dismissal). The reference is significant: Fagel was eventually removed from his London post, and Van der Kemp treats this fact as pertinent to the question of his fitness for the 1824 commission. The 1900 article returns repeatedly to the contrast between Fagel’s evident diplomatic experience and the apparent inadequacy of his performance in 1824 — a contrast that, in Van der Kemp’s reading, indicts not so much Fagel personally as the Dutch system of diplomatic appointment that placed him in so critical a post at so critical a moment.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.

Hendrik Fagel (1765–1838) — sixth Baron Fagel, long-serving Dutch envoy in London — was, with Falck, one of the two Dutch plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London of 17 March 1824. In P. H. van der Kemp’s 1900 article he is paired with Falck as one of the two objects of the historian’s censure: the plenipotentiaries are charged with having “had too good an opinion of their counterparties” and with having placed excessive trust in “the honesty of our mighty neighbour and natural ally.” Fagel was the senior career diplomat of the pair, having represented the Netherlands in London almost continuously since the 1790s.

Earlier Career and the 1814 Treaty

Fagel had been the Dutch envoy in London during the negotiations leading to the colonial treaty of 1814, and on the worthlessness of the Dutch factories in Hindostan “Falck and Fagel were already in 1814 agreed.” He was therefore a figure of considerable experience in Anglo-Dutch affairs, and his presence on the 1824 commission was intended to lend the weight of long diplomatic familiarity with the British court. Van der Kemp records that Fagel also corresponded, on 14 and 25 January 1820, with the Dutch minister Van Nagell — at that time head of Foreign Affairs — concerning Castlereagh’s communication that the Netherlands would have to suffer some sacrifices for the sake of the opposition in England. Castlereagh later denied having said so; Fagel maintained the truth of his communications.

The August 1820 Notes

The first Anglo-Dutch exchanges that bore on the issues later settled in 1824 took the form of the notes exchanged on 4 August 1820 between Castlereagh and Canning on the British side, and Fagel and Elout (then a commissioner-general) on the Dutch side. Those earlier notes had already contained the British declaration that the Netherlands “distinctly and solemnly disclaim any design on their part to aim either at political supremacy or at commercial monopoly in the Eastern Archipelago.” Van der Kemp takes pains to point out that in 1820 this declaration had been a mere pro memoria without treaty force; in 1824 it reappeared, in subtly altered form, as a binding clause — and the Dutch plenipotentiaries let it pass. The blame here lies jointly with Fagel and Elout.

The Concept-Convention of 24 July 1820

The concept-convention of 24 July 1820, offered by Fagel and Elout, contained in its first article the explicit demand “that the Government of Great Britain disavows the conduct pursued by its agents in the various parts of the Indian Archipelago, and recognises the rights of the Government of the Netherlands over the places and establishments reoccupied by virtue of the treaty of 13 August 1814, namely over those which have given rise to the altercations known.” This was the strongest formulation the Dutch ever put forward — calling, in effect, for an open British apology for Raffles’s conduct between 1818 and 1820. The article was never accepted; but its existence shows that Fagel, in 1820, was capable of a firm line which he later abandoned.

The 1824 Negotiations

In the negotiations of February 1824 Fagel and Falck worked together under instructions from The Hague, with Captain Elout as their messenger to the Dutch court. When the question of the Treaty of Pedir (1819) was raised at the eleventh hour by the British plenipotentiaries, neither Fagel nor Falck had read the Acheh treaty itself. They accepted the British representation that it concerned only hospitality to shipwrecked sailors, and raised no objection pending The Hague’s authorisation. When the true content of the Acheh treaty was revealed on 23 February 1824, Fagel and Falck did not repudiate the concession; instead they accepted the supplementary note procedure by which the British undertaking to “modify” the Acheh treaty was set alongside a Dutch undertaking to guarantee Acheh’s independence — the disputed clause that was to bedevil Dutch policy on Sumatra for the next half-century.

Fagel’s Dismissal

Van der Kemp, in a passing reference, directs the reader to his article in De Tijdspiegel of April 1899, “Fagel’s ontslag” (Fagel’s dismissal). The reference is significant: Fagel was eventually removed from his London post, and Van der Kemp treats this fact as pertinent to the question of his fitness for the 1824 commission. The 1900 article returns repeatedly to the contrast between Fagel’s evident diplomatic experience and the apparent inadequacy of his performance in 1824 — a contrast that, in Van der Kemp’s reading, indicts not so much Fagel personally as the Dutch system of diplomatic appointment that placed him in so critical a post at so critical a moment.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159-239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.

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