Siege of blokhuis Aloer Oe (28–29 March 1896)

Properties2
tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliasesSiege of blokhuis Aloer Oe, Belegering van blokhuis Aloer Oe, Aloer Oe siege, Defence of blokhuis Aloer Oe

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The Siege of blokhuis Aloer Oe (28–29 March 1896) was the two-day investment and assault of the Dutch blockhouse (blokhuis) at Aloer Oe — a small fortified outpost attached to the post of Senelop on the western buitenlinie — by hostile Achehnese bands in the opening hours of the defection of Teuku Umar. The garrison — one maréchaussée brigade, a European sergeant of artillery named son (No. 40248), and three European gunners serving the mitrailleur — was commanded by the European sergeant of infantry Havenga (No. 19908), the brigade commander and blokhuiscommandant, whose energetic preparations and presence of mind enabled the post to hold until it was relieved by the column of Maj. van der Noordaa on 30 March 1896. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the defence of Aloer Oe — together with the concurrent sieges of Biloel and Lamkoenjit — marked the strategic collapse of the buitenlinie in the last week of March 1896.

Background

The blokhuis at Aloer Oe was one of a chain of small blockhouses — including blokhuis Montassik, blokhuis Toei Selimbing, and the blokhuizen attached to Senelop — that the Dutch had constructed in the spring of 1895 to anchor the western buitenlinie beyond the post of Ana’ Galong. The garrison was deliberately small: one brigade of the elite Ambonese-manned corps, plus a European artillery sergeant and three European gunners to serve a early machine-gun mounted in the work. Command devolved on the senior European NCO present, the infantry sergeant Havenga (No. 19908), brigade commander and blokhuiscommandant.

By 28 March 1896 the strategic situation had deteriorated sharply. Teuku Umar’s defection — already signalled by his failure to return weapons and ammunition lent for a specific purpose, by his construction of verschanzingen opposite the Dutch post at Lam-Djamoe, and by the defection of several of his followers to the resistance — was about to break into open hostilities. Controleur Gisolf’s warnings of Umar’s “more than suspicious attitude” had been overruled by Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff, and Umar had had, in Kruisheer’s words, “the audacity” (the brass) to attend a conference at the Governor’s office on 28 March 1896 despite the warnings. That same night, the Achehnese struck.

The Defence

Havenga had not waited for the storm to break. On taking command of the blokhuis he had immediately improved its defensibility: he cleared all combustibles from the immediate surroundings, improved the enclosure, laid barbed wire, planted thorn-branches, filled the water and wood supplies, and raised the parapet with sandbags. Around midday on 28 March 1896 the blokhuis was fired upon from approximately 200 m. The Achehnese then worked their way forward under cover of the trees until they had closed to within 75 m of the work, from which they shouted threats and offers of life and freedom for surrender. By nightfall their numbers had grown; some nestled under a bridge only 120 m from the parapet.

The mitrailleur failed twice during the action. On each occasion the European sergeant of artillery son (No. 40248) repaired the weapon under fire, and on the eventual evacuation of the post it was son who safely brought the mitrailleur and 20,800 cartridges back to Senelop. At approximately 1:15 a.m. on 29 March 1896 the enemy in the edge of Lam Raja raised a fearful yelling and a cannon shot. A grenade made a large hole in the front roof slope of the blokhuis; of eleven grenades fired by the enemy, four burst inside the emplacement without, miraculously, hitting anyone. An Ambonese corporal began to play the harmonica, and the Ambonese garrison sang along — Kruisheer records that the morale of the garrison was excellent throughout. The enemy then attempted a ruse: their buglers blew the signal “for the doctor,” intending to lure out a relief detachment from Senelop. Havenga, recognising the deception, repeated the same signal but followed it with the stand-down call, which Senelop correctly interpreted. At approximately 2 a.m. Senelop talso the path toward Aloer Oe and brought off the garrison, with its mitrailleur, its ammunition, and its wounded, in good order.

Aftermath

The evacuation of Aloer Oe on the night of 29 March 1896 was a tactical success — the garrison was extricated intact, with its weapon and 20,800 rounds — but a strategic confession. The western buitenlinie was no longer tenable. Within days, Senelop itself would be invested; the siege of Aloer Oe merged imperceptibly into the wider battle of Senelop of 17 April 1896 and the evacuation of the western buitenlinie on the same day. Havenga and son were singled out for praise; the latter’s salvage of the mitrailleur and its 20,800 cartridges was a particularly welcome economy in a campaign that would consume millions of rounds before its end.

Significance

The siege of blokhuis Aloer Oe was one of three simultaneous sieges — together with those of Biloel and Lamkoenjit — that announced the defection of Teuku Umar in arms. Its principal significance lies in the testimony it bears to the quality of the European and Ambonese NCOs who held the buitenlinie in the spring of 1896: men like Havenga and son, who, in the absence of any commissioned officer, prepared their post, repaired their weapon under fire, resisted a ruse, and extricated their garrison with honour. The episode also exposed the structural weakness of the buitenlinie — a chain of small works held by handfuls of men, each of which could be isolated and overwhelmed once the Achehnese were unified and Dutch-supplied.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 40–41, 1108.

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