The Evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb (20 April 1896) — the completion of the lifting of the buitenlinie — was the final phase of the wholesale abandonment of the Dutch western defensive line in the spring of 1896, executed by three colonnes — the Noordercolonne, the Middencolonne, and the Zuidercolonne — under the overall command of Kol. Stemfoort and culminating in the handover of the post of Toengkoeb to the Achehnese bendehoofd Toekoe Nja Banta. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the evacuation of 20 April 1896 brought to an end the three-week unraveling of the buitenlinie that had begun with the defection of 29 March 1896 and marked the strategic reconstitution of the Dutch position on the consolidated line of 1893.
Background
By 20 April 1896 the western buitenlinie had already been largely abandoned. The evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 12 April, the tuchtiging of Lam Goet on 14 April, and the evacuation of Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, and Senelop on 17 April had undone the western line. The three remaining posts — Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb — formed the central and southern segments of the buitenlinie and were the last to be lifted. Lt.-Gen. Vetter resolved to complete the evacuation in a single coordinated operation, both to minimise the window of Achehnese opportunity and to demonstrate the orderly character of the withdrawal.
Three colonnes were formed: the Noordercolonne, advancing from the north; the Middencolonne, advancing from the consolidated line at Koeta Radja directly westward; and the Zuidercolonne, advancing from the south. The overall command was vested in Kol. Stemfoort, who had already commanded the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit and the evacuation of 17 April. Each colonne comprised infantry, a detachment of maréchaussée, a section of mountain artillery, and the necessary engineers and ambulances for demolition and casualty evacuation.
The Operation of 20 April 1896
The three colonnes advanced on 20 April 1896 against the three remaining posts. The Noordercolonne moved on Kroeng-Gloempang in the north; the Middencolonne moved on Tjot-Rang in the centre; the Zuidercolonne moved on Toengkoeb in the south. The Achehnese, recognising — as they had at Anak-Galoeng and Lam-Barih three days earlier — that the Dutch intent was to withdraw rather than to hold, contented themselves with harassment rather than the determined defence that had characterised the siege of Aloer Oe and the battle of Senelop. The garrisons of the three posts were withdrawn in good order; the post installations were burned; the stores were loaded onto the baggage train.
The most politically significant moment of the day came at Toengkoeb. The post — the southernmost of the buitenlinie — was formally handed over to the Achehnese bendehoofd Toekoe Nja Banta, in whose territory it stood. The handover was a deliberate act of political management: by transferring the post to a known chief rather than simply abandoning it, Vetter hoped to retain some political influence in the southern mukims and to draw a distinction between the bendehoofd who accepted the handover and the resistance that had forced the evacuation. The handover was, however, a transparent fig leaf: the Dutch were withdrawing under pressure, and Toekoe Nja Banta — however well-disposed — could not long resist the tide of resistance that had carried Teuku Umar back to the Achehnese side.
The Completion of the Buitenlinie Lifting
With the evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb on 20 April 1896, the buitenlinie — the entire defensive perimeter that the Dutch had constructed beyond the consolidated line of Koeta Radja and Oleh-leh since 1893 — ceased to exist. The buitenlinie had been the physical expression of the native-allied policy of Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff and of the legioen of Teuku Umar: a chain of posts, blockhouses, and allied hoeloebalang reaching into the western and southern mukims, anchored on the posts of Ana’ Galong, Senelop, Biloel, Lamkoenjit, Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb. In three weeks of fighting and burning, all of it had been undone.
The Dutch were back on the consolidated line of 1893. The Achehnese, for the first time since the subjection of Umar in September 1893, held the initiative across the entire theatre.
Aftermath
The completion of the buitenlinie lifting on 20 April 1896 inaugurated a brief operational pause, during which Vetter reorganised his forces, received reinforcements, and prepared the counter-offensive. On 21 April 1896 the three-column operation to free Tjot Rang and Kroeng Gloempang was mounted — a final attempt to clear the road for provisioning before the line was finally abandoned. On 27 April 1896 Vetter issued his proclamation announcing military operations against Teuku Umar, and on the same day the bombardment of Lampisang began. The three-day offensive of 23 May–25 May 1896 would, five weeks later, restore the strategic initiative.
Significance
The evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb on 20 April 1896 was the formal completion of the abandonment of the buitenlinie — the strategic nadir of the Dutch campaign in the first semester of 1896. The handover of Toengkoeb to Toekoe Nja Banta was the last political gesture of the pre-counter-offensive phase. Yet the evacuation was also, paradoxically, the precondition of recovery: by abandoning the indefensible line, Vetter freed the troops, the supplies, and the strategic attention that the three-day offensive of 23 May–25 May 1896 and the tuchtiging of Lam-Krak of 9 June–10 June 1896 would require. The evacuation of 20 April 1896 was the close of the retreat and the prelude to the advance.
See Also
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Kroeng-Gloempang
- Tjot-Rang
- Toengkoeb
- Toekoe Nja Banta
- Buitenlinie
- Evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (12 April 1896)
- Evacuation of Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, Senelop (17 April 1896)
- Three-Column Operation to Free Tjot Rang and Kroeng Gloempang (21 April 1896)
- Defection of Teuku Umar (late March 1896)
- J. A. Vetter
- 1896
- Aceh War
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 119–121, 707, 1280.