The Biloel Zuid operation (1315 May 1876) was the march of three Dutch columns through the IX Moekims — the largest Dutch movement since March — to cleanse that district of the enemy and to found the post of Biloel Zuid (Biloel South) at the foot of the Barisan mountains, closing the road between the XXII and the XXV Moekims. It was described by H. F. Meijer in Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876 (1883).

Purpose

The continuous raids of the enemy in the occupied districts south of the Atjeh River forced the civil and military commander, Major-General Wiggers van Kerchem, to carry out a plan long formed: to march a considerable force through the IX Moekims, cleanse the district of enemies and destroy their hiding places, and at the same time to erect a fortification at the foot of the mountains south of the post of Biloel. The new post would make the enemy’s communication between the XXII and XXV Moekims very difficult, if not impossible, and would better protect the part of the population of the IX Moekims that had returned and settled — under the protection of Colonel K. van der Heyden, commander of the south-east line — near Oleh Soesoe. Its head Toekoe Tjoet Bantah had reported on 20 April that all his people had fled to the mountains after threats of an incursion by the orang toenong (the people of the XXII Moekims), and had declared they would not return until a Dutch fortification closed the way.

The three columns

Three columns, each of four companies of infantry, one section of mountain artillery, a detachment of engineers (Genie) and the necessary dressing-station personnel, took part — the 1st column also had two mortars. The survey brigade went along under Captain F. C. E. Meijer.

  • The 1st column (commander Major of Infantry Diepenheim; acting chief of staff First Lieutenant Schultz), formed of troops from Kota Radja, marched on 13 May via Ketapan Doewa across the Kroeëng Daroe and through the kampongs Aroen, Kandang and Poenei to Boekit Daroe. When Diepenheim fell sick, Captain A. Bosch took command. On the morning of 14 May the column advanced via Empehbling, bridged the brook called Loeëng Lemoh — under a harmless fire from a nipah-bush — and continued along the western edges of the kampongs Lampēnéhēn and Lamkoenjit towards Gērot, then, declining to follow the foot of the mountains farther under enemy fire from the slopes, by Lamtadoe, Maneh, Toeram and Biloel, where its bivouac was pitched at half past two.
  • The 2nd column (commander Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry F. T. Engel; acting chief of staff First Lieutenant Ter Beek), with three companies of the barisan of Soemenēp and one European company of the right half of the 8th battalion, marched from Kota Radja past Mandarsa Poetih and Gitjiel Oeleiloe along the right bank of the Kroeëng Daroe towards Ketapan Doewa and then through Kandang, Lamtoe and Oleh Soesoe to Lampēnéhēn. The going was so heavy in the drowned terrain that the mountain guns had to be taken off their carriages and the ammunition carried by soldiers and forced-labourers — a delay of three hours. On the morning of 14 May it joined the 1st column at kampong Maneh at half past ten, and then marched via Toeram to Biloel, bivouacking west of the post at half past twelve.
  • The 3rd column (commander Colonel of Infantry K. van der Heyden; acting chief of staff First Lieutenant Jaeger), formed in the south-east line, marched out of Lambaroe at six on the morning of 14 May through Lamsajoeng, Lēbēr (Lamrong) and Tjot Bēhēl — burning Lēbēr and Tjot Bēhēl — and reached Biloel at half past eleven, where the civil and military commander General Wiggers van Kerchem directed the movements of the three columns.

The founding of the post

Before seven in the morning of 15 May the combined troops stood at the chosen site. From an enemy lilla battery posted in the mountains a few harmless shots were fired, quickly silenced by Dutch artillery. Two companies of the 3rd column occupied two projecting hilltops dominating the site. Wiggers van Kerchem approved the emplacement and ruled that the post should be named Biloel Zuid; on it two blockhouses for some twenty men each were to be built on the two hills. The 3rd column, reinforced by one company of the 8th battalion, one company from the left half of the 6th battalion and one section of artillery of the 1st column, remained on the spot under Major Van Teijn until the work was complete; the other two columns returned to Kota Radja, the 2nd after midnight, the 1st next morning. Wiggers van Kerchem went back along the south-east line the same afternoon.

After-effects

The position, taken the same day as the march, was armed on 18 May and finished on 24 May. But, Meijer added, experience showed the reverse of the hope: the enemy made himself a very usable path along the slopes of the mountains and continued to move between the districts; he watched the post with jealous eyes and for a long time fired from the mountains on the men going to and from the hilltops, costing the Dutch many a victim. A road between Biloel and Biloel Zuid, begun at once, long remained unsafe — on 19 May Lieutenant Six Dijstra was wounded on it. The enemy now built small fortifications and gun positions on other hilltops, from which he daily ranged better. It was to end this that Colonel Van der Heyden ordered the surprise capture of the gun position on 24 May — the success avenged bloodily in the night surprise of 2–3 June.

Assessment

The operation showed the ease with which a strong combined column could move anywhere when it chose its time — the enemy offered no serious resistance at all — and the equally quick return of the guerilla as soon as the column had passed. Meijer’s verdict on the permanent result, the post of Biloel Zuid, was sceptical: it took away the enemy’s easiest access and nothing more.

See Also

Source

Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876, door H. F. Meijer (Breda: P. B. Nieuwenhuijs, 1883), chapter VII, pp. 180–188; sketch no. 4 (Biloel Zuid).