The capture of the gun position near Biloel Zuid (24 May 1876) was a surprise assault before dawn by the 2nd company of the left half of the 6th Infantry Battalion under Captain Lucas on an Atjehnese gun position 1,300 metres southeast of Biloel Zuid. It was the first Dutch success on the mountain ground the enemy had made his own, and was bloodily answered ten days later by the surprise of the west hill-post. The event was described by H. F. Meijer in Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876 (1883).
Background
Hardly had the post of Biloel Zuid been occupied on 15 May than the enemy was seen busy in the mountains to the southeast. A new path along the slopes was soon ready, and on several hilltops he built small fortifications and gun positions from which he could dominate the post or at least keep it under continuous fire. The first shots were harmless, but the enemy ranged better every day, until his projectiles fell very near the work and the garrison was kept in permanent unrest. Colonel K. van der Heyden, commander of the south-east line, decided to drive him from the new position and, if possible, to take his guns — if only to show him that his mountain ground was not inaccessible to Dutch troops.
The plan
Reconnaissance had established that an enemy gun position stood about 1,300 metres southeast of Biloel Zuid, dominated by a closely adjoining hilltop to the west; the foot of that hill could be reached from the post over level ground. An attack by daylight would therefore offer little chance or cost many victims, so Van der Heyden decided the assault should be made by surprise at first light on 24 May.
The 2nd company of the left half of the 6th battalion — 4 officers, 32 European and 67 native non-commissioned officers and men with 4 sappers and forced-labourers with stretchers — was detailed under Captain Lucas to leave the bivouac at half past four, enter the mountains just south of the post, and climb, always well covered, to the hill dominating the gun position, then rush the position itself. A second company under Captain H. Hamakers — 5 officers, 60 European and 44 native non-commissioned officers and men (the halves of the 1st and 3rd companies of the right half of the 8th battalion), with Lieutenant Stoppendaal’s section of mountain artillery and 24 labourers with stretchers — was to move over the plain to the foot of the hill as soon as there was certainty that Lucas had nearly reached his goal, to keep off the enemy’s bands in the plain and cover the withdrawal.
The assault
Guided by a local guide, Captain Lucas reached the hilltop unobserved at half past five, whence he could fully observe and dominate the enemy position: excavations and holes for covered skirmishers, and on the summit — no more than 300 paces away — a watch of about thirty Atjehers lying peacefully asleep. Lucas posted three sections so as to overlook and command the ground in all directions, and advanced with the fourth. Near the position, an Atjeher sprang from a skirmisher’s hole and luckily escaped without shouting; Lucas had to hurry. One volley threw the enemy into confusion: most of the watch let themselves down a ravine in the greatest disorder; a few stood by the guns but were quickly driven off or shot down. At about a quarter to seven Lucas was master of the position, in which 8 killed Atjehers were found. First Lieutenant Vorst — followed on his heels by native sergeant Mertosmito and European sapper Rietveldt — was the first to enter.
The defence and destruction
The Dutch rifle fire had instantly brought alive the enemy bands in plain and mountain. In the plain they were kept at a proper distance by Hamakers’ company and the artillery section; from the hill Lucas dominated the enemy in the mountains, who fired from all sides and killed one native fusilier. While the sappers demolished the stone breastwork with its earth traverse, First Lieutenant Riesz took another nearby enemy position, abandoned just before by its defenders. When the enemy’s gun position had been destroyed and there was nothing more to do, the troops withdrew to Biloel Zuid.
Assessment
The action contributed, Meijer remarked, little beyond morale: it showed the enemy that his mountain ground was not safe from Dutch troops, and it delayed — it did not end — his continuous sniping on the hill posts. His revenge came on the night of 2–3 June, when the unfinished western hill-post was surprised. Only then was the strengthening of both hill-posts properly undertaken: blockhouses were built, the slopes were cleared, the plateaus were ringed with abatis, randjoes, glass and wire obstacles, a gun emplacement for an 8 cM. gun was made on the west hill, and a broad path was cut in its northern slope covered by filled gabions.
See Also
- Kapitein Lucas (1876)
- H. Hamakers
- Biloel Zuid
- K. van der Heyden
- Biloel Zuid operation (13-15 May 1876)
- Surprise of the west hill-post at Biloel Zuid (2-3 June 1876)
- Guerilla warfare in Groot-Atjeh
Source
Atjeh van 26 December 1875 tot 4 September 1876, door H. F. Meijer (Breda: P. B. Nieuwenhuijs, 1883), chapter VII, pp. 188–192.