The First Letter of Teuku Umar to the Governor of Atjeh — reproduced as Annex II of Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 and dated from Lampisang on 30 March 1896 — was the earliest of three letters in which Teuku Umar (writing as Toekoe Oemar) set out to the Governor of Atjeh, Gen.-Maj. C. Deykerhoff, the reasons for his defection from the Dutch colonial government. The letter enumerated seven grievances, principally alleged insults by the Controleur te Oleh-leh and the head public prosecutor Mohamad Arief, and offered to be beaten without resistance if his feelings toward the Kompeni had not changed — while pointedly confirming that the guns supplied by the Government were still in his hands, used to guard the VI Moekims. Kruisheer records that the reasons given in this letter “proved to be entirely fabricated” — proved to be entirely fabricated.
Background
The letter was written the day after Umar’s defection became known at Koeta Radja around 1 p.m. on 29 March 1896. For nearly two and a half years, since his appointment as Panglima Prang Besar of the Government under Government Resolution of 5 September 1893, Umar had been armed and paid by the Dutch to lead a native auxiliary legioen against the recalcitrant Lamkrak mukims. On 26 March 1896 he had received a final issue of 380 + 500 guns, 25,000 cartridges, 500 kg of gunpowder, 120,000 percussion caps, 5,000 kg of lead, opium, and 18,000 dollars — and immediately turned these weapons against his patrons.
The position of Controleur te Oleh-leh and the conduct of the hoofddjaksa Mohamad Arief had been for some time a source of friction with Umar and with other Acehnese territorial chiefs. Controleur Gisolf had warned the general that Umar’s attitude was more than suspicious; the warning was ignored. Umar was present at a conference in the Governor’s office as late as 28 March 1896, even as preparations for defection were already far advanced.
Content
The letter, written from his house at Lampisang on 30 March 1896, set out seven reasons for Umar’s defection. The most prominent were alleged insults to himself and his family: he charged that the Controleur te Oleh-leh and the hoofddjaksa Mohamad Arief — whom he described as resembling a water buffalo — had insulted him, and that his older brother T. Nja Mohamad of the IX Moekims had been insulted at Pakan Badak. He further alleged that the imams of Goerah and Lamtengah (in the VI Moekims) had been kicked by the Controleur te Oleh-leh in public.
The letter then offered a striking and theatrical gesture: Umar declared that, if his feelings toward the Kompeni had not changed, the Government might send someone to beat him and he would offer no resistance. As proof of good faith he requested the signature of the Governor-General at Batavia — that is, of Jhr. Van der Wijck. Crucially for the unfolding military crisis, the letter confirmed that the guns supplied by the Government were still in his hands, used to guard the VI Moekims — an admission that the Dutch-supplied weapons were now turned against the Kompeni itself.
Reception and Aftermath
Deykerhoff’s government immediately recognised the letter’s explanations as hollow. Kruisheer records that the reasons given “proved to be entirely fabricated” (proved to be entirely fabricated). The letter nonetheless served Umar’s purpose: it bought time, established a negotiating posture, and provided a quasi-legal pretext that could be circulated among the hoeloebalang and clerics of Groot-Atjeh to justify his act. Umar followed it with two further letters dated 12 April 1896 and 23 April 1896 (the Second and Third Letters), in which the pretextual grievances of the first gave way to explicit demands for ƒ150,000 per month, a Royal decoration, and the hereditary succession of his son as Panglima Prang.
The Dutch administration responded with the Government Telegram of 26 April 1896, No. 409 and the 11 dismissing Umar from his offices, and with Lt.-Gen. Vetter’s Proclamation of 27 April 1896 announcing military operations against him.
Significance
The First Letter marks the formal opening of the diplomatic phase of the Atjeh-oorlog crisis of 1896. As a historical document it preserves the only detailed self-defence that Umar offered for his defection; the rhetorical structure — grievances against named officials, theatrical offer of personal suffering, conditional loyalty, demand for higher signature — reveals both Umar’s negotiating method and his reading of Dutch colonial bureaucratic culture. Its immediate practical effect was to confirm, in writing, that Umar retained the Dutch-supplied arms, a fact that transformed the strategic situation and forced the dispatch of Vetter as Regeeringscommissaris.
See Also
- Teuku Umar
- Generaal-Majoor C. Deykerhoff
- Defection of Teuku Umar (29 March 1896)
- Second Letter of Teuku Umar (12 April 1896)
- Third Letter of Teuku Umar (23 April 1896)
- 11 (Bijlage VI)
- Lampisang
- Oleh-leh
- Panglima Prang Besar
- 1896
- 1893
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 13 (TOC), 14, 42, 337–338.