The year 1606 was the year of Matelieff’s Malaka campaign — the first major Dutch siege of the Portuguese fortress of Malaka, conducted by Bewindhebber-Admiraal Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge with a fleet of eleven ships that had left the Texel on 12 May 1605 and appeared before Malaka on 30 April 1606. The campaign produced the first Dutch-Malakan accord of 17 May 1606, the indecisive naval battle against the Portuguese viceroy’s relief fleet of 18 August 1606, the second accord of 23 September 1606 granting the Dutch the right to build a fort on Djohor territory, and the destruction of the Portuguese fleet on 22 October 1606. The year is the principal military-naval year of Van der Woude’s chapter “Atjeh. Djohor. Malaka.” in his Van der Woude (1948).

The arrival before Malaka (30 April 1606)

Matelieff had left Texel on 12 May 1605 with nine ships, having received secret instructions to attack Malaka — instructions that, as Van der Woude notes, “verloren is gegaan”. At Mauritius he conferred with Admiraal Steven van der Haghen about the state of the Indies; both agreed that Malaka should be the first target. The fleet’s destination was kept secret from the crews until the Nicobaren, where Matelieff finally announced the plan and overcame the men’s reluctance with the promise of prize money. The fleet appeared before Malaka on 30 April 1606.

The first accord (17 May 1606)

Matelieff called on the sultan of Djohor for support. The sultan arrived on 17 May 1606 with “een oorlogsvloot van meer dan vijftig galeien en fusten, bemand met drie duizend koppen” — a force that “van weinig of geen beteekenis was”. On the same day the first accord was concluded: the sultan promised to assist in the conquest of the city, the Dutch were granted freedom from tolls and a monopoly of the trade, the booty was to be divided, the city would become Dutch property and the surrounding territory Djohor’s. The Dutch attack on the city failed; Matelieff was forced to fall back on a blockade to starve the garrison out.

The naval battles (18 August and 22 October 1606)

On 14 August 1606 Matelieff received word that a Portuguese relief fleet — twice the size of his own, under the Viceroy of India — was approaching from Atjeh. Matelieff engaged the Portuguese on 18 August 1606; both sides lost two ships; the Viceroy himself was among the dead. Matelieff, short of ammunition, retired to Djohor to repair his fleet. Returning to Malaka on 20 October 1606, the Dutch attacked the remaining seven galleons and three galleys on 22 October 1606; four galleons were captured, the other three the Portuguese themselves set on fire, and many prisoners were taken.

The second accord (23 September 1606)

During the campaign Matelieff had also concluded the second accord with the sultan of Djohor on 23 September 1606, confirming the first accord and granting the Dutch the right to build a fortified post somewhere on the sultan’s territory — a right that, as Van der Woude notes, was never realised. The strategic aim — a fortified Dutch post at Batoesawer supported by a permanent fleet in the Strait of Malaka — would frame Dutch policy in the Strait for the next decade, until the Achehnese attack on Djohor of 1613 destroyed the strategic basis of the Dutch-Djohor alliance.

Significance

The year 1606 is, in Van der Woude’s narrative, the principal military-naval year of the early Dutch-Indies relationship and the year of the first major Dutch siege of the Portuguese fortress of Malaka. The Matelieff campaign showed both what the VOC could achieve (the destruction of the Portuguese fleet) and what it could not (the conquest of a fortified city without a sustained blockade and a land force). The two accords with the sultan of Djohor of 17 May and 23 September 1606 defined the formal Dutch-Djohor alliance that would frame Dutch policy in the Strait until the Achehnese attack of 1613. The campaign also marked the strategic turn away from Atjeh — which Van der Woude treats as having lost most of its commercial significance for the Dutch by 1606 — and toward Djohor as the Dutch’ chief Malay ally.

See Also

Source

Coen, Koopman van Heeren Zeventien. Geschiedenis van den Hollandshen Handel in Indië (1598-1614), by Johan van der Woude (Amsterdam: C.V. Uitgeverij v/h C. De Boer Jr., 1948), Hoofdstuk V (pp. 127-131, 137-140).

The year 1606 was the year of Matelieff’s Malaka campaign — the first major Dutch siege of the Portuguese fortress of Malaka, conducted by Bewindhebber-Admiraal Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge with a fleet of eleven ships that had left the Texel on 12 May 1605 and appeared before Malaka on 30 April 1606. The campaign produced the first Dutch-Malakan accord of 17 May 1606, the indecisive naval battle against the Portuguese viceroy’s relief fleet of 18 August 1606, the second accord of 23 September 1606 granting the Dutch the right to build a fort on Djohor territory, and the destruction of the Portuguese fleet on 22 October 1606. The year is the principal military-naval year of Van der Woude’s chapter “Atjeh. Djohor. Malaka.” in his Van der Woude (1948).

The arrival before Malaka (30 April 1606)

Matelieff had left Texel on 12 May 1605 with nine ships, having received secret instructions to attack Malaka — instructions that, as Van der Woude notes, “verloren is gegaan”. At Mauritius he conferred with Admiraal Steven van der Haghen about the state of the Indies; both agreed that Malaka should be the first target. The fleet’s destination was kept secret from the crews until the Nicobaren, where Matelieff finally announced the plan and overcame the men’s reluctance with the promise of prize money. The fleet appeared before Malaka on 30 April 1606.

The first accord (17 May 1606)

Matelieff called on the sultan of Djohor for support. The sultan arrived on 17 May 1606 with “een oorlogsvloot van meer dan vijftig galeien en fusten, bemand met drie duizend koppen” — a force that “van weinig of geen beteekenis was”. On the same day the first accord was concluded: the sultan promised to assist in the conquest of the city, the Dutch were granted freedom from tolls and a monopoly of the trade, the booty was to be divided, the city would become Dutch property and the surrounding territory Djohor’s. The Dutch attack on the city failed; Matelieff was forced to fall back on a blockade to starve the garrison out.

The naval battles (18 August and 22 October 1606)

On 14 August 1606 Matelieff received word that a Portuguese relief fleet — twice the size of his own, under the Viceroy of India — was approaching from Atjeh. Matelieff engaged the Portuguese on 18 August 1606; both sides lost two ships; the Viceroy himself was among the dead. Matelieff, short of ammunition, retired to Djohor to repair his fleet. Returning to Malaka on 20 October 1606, the Dutch attacked the remaining seven galleons and three galleys on 22 October 1606; four galleons were captured, the other three the Portuguese themselves set on fire, and many prisoners were taken.

The second accord (23 September 1606)

During the campaign Matelieff had also concluded the second accord with the sultan of Djohor on 23 September 1606, confirming the first accord and granting the Dutch the right to build a fortified post somewhere on the sultan’s territory — a right that, as Van der Woude notes, was never realised. The strategic aim — a fortified Dutch post at Batoesawer supported by a permanent fleet in the Strait of Malaka — would frame Dutch policy in the Strait for the next decade, until the Achehnese attack on Djohor of 1613 destroyed the strategic basis of the Dutch-Djohor alliance.

Significance

The year 1606 is, in Van der Woude’s narrative, the principal military-naval year of the early Dutch-Indies relationship and the year of the first major Dutch siege of the Portuguese fortress of Malaka. The Matelieff campaign showed both what the VOC could achieve (the destruction of the Portuguese fleet) and what it could not (the conquest of a fortified city without a sustained blockade and a land force). The two accords with the sultan of Djohor of 17 May and 23 September 1606 defined the formal Dutch-Djohor alliance that would frame Dutch policy in the Strait until the Achehnese attack of 1613. The campaign also marked the strategic turn away from Atjeh — which Van der Woude treats as having lost most of its commercial significance for the Dutch by 1606 — and toward Djohor as the Dutch’ chief Malay ally.

See Also

Source

Coen, Koopman van Heeren Zeventien. Geschiedenis van den Hollandshen Handel in Indië (1598-1614), by Johan van der Woude (Amsterdam: C.V. Uitgeverij v/h C. De Boer Jr., 1948), Hoofdstuk V (pp. 127-131, 137-140).