Heeren Zeventien

Properties2
tagsorganization, council, colonial, dutch, voc, atjeh, banda, monopoly, 17th-century
aliasesHeren XVII, Lords Seventeen, Bewindhebbers der VOC, Seventeen Lords, Heeren XVII, Bewindhebbers (VOC)

10 min read

The Heeren Zeventien (the Lords Seventeen) — the supreme governing body of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie from its founding on 20 March 1602 to its dissolution in 1799 — was the college of seventeen directors that directed the Company’s Asian trade, dispatched the fleets, made the strategic decisions, and issued the secret instructions that defined the Dutch East India policy in the early-modern period. The Heeren Zeventien is the principal institutional actor of Van der Woude’s Van der Woude (1948) — the title of the book refers to the body of which Jan Pieterszoon Coen was the “koopman”.

Composition

The Heeren Zeventien was composed of: eight members from the Amsterdam chamber (which held half the Company’s capital), four from the Zeeland chamber (which held a quarter), two from the Maze chamber (Rotterdam and Delft, an eighth), two from the Noorderkwartier chambers (Hoorn and Enkhuizen, an eighth), and a seventeenth member chosen in rotation by the smaller chambers. The composition reflected the distribution of the Company’s capital among the United Provinces’ commercial cities and ensured that the chief commercial interests were represented in the supreme governing body. The body met six years in Amsterdam and two years in Zeeland, in rotation — a pattern that reflected Amsterdam’s commercial primacy and Zeeland’s earlier role in the pre-VOC East India trade.

The body’s deliberations were conducted in secret — “de grootste geheimhouding in acht genomen, ook tegenover de Staten-Generaal”. The secrecy was justified by the need to protect the Company’s commercial intelligence from competitors, but it also served, as Van der Woude notes, “privé- of groeps-belangen”.

The early Heeren Zeventien and the Atjeh trade

The early Heeren Zeventien inherited the diplomatic framework that the voorcompagnieën had established at Atjeh. The Atjeh embassy of 1601 had produced a treaty of friendship and commerce between the sultan and the States-General; the VOC inherited this treaty and continued to operate under its terms. The body’s first major decision affecting Atjeh was the dispatch of the Matelieff fleet in 1605 with secret instructions to attack Malaka — instructions that, as Van der Woude notes, “verloren is gegaan”. The Matelieff campaign of 1606 was the first major VOC military operation in the Strait of Malaka and the framework within which the Dutch-Djohor military alliance of 1603-1613 was conducted.

The monopoly-by-force instructions (1608-1609)

The Heeren Zeventien’s most consequential decisions were the secret instructions of 11 April 1608 and 4 May 1609. The first, dispatched after the Verhoeff fleet had already left Texel and reaching Verhoeff at Bantam on 26 December 1608 by fast jacht, committed the Company to the new monopolistic policy: “de eylanden van Banda op ‘t allerhoochste gerecommandeert, als sijnde dese landen der Compagnie daer aen op ‘t alderhoochste gelegen”. The second, of 4 May 1609, completed the policy: the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain had just been signed; the Dutch were to use the truce to entrench the Company’s position — “dat men nu sien, dat wy daer mede ons proffyt doen” — before Spain could regain its strength.

The instructions of 1608-1609 were the legal foundation of the Coen programme of monopoly-by-force that would define VOC policy for the next two centuries. Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614 was the working-out of the instructions: “Van Banda connen ons meester maken, dezelvige eylanden met macht aantasten; sulcx moeten nootelijcken doen ende de plaetse populeren, ofte het landt verlaten, want ‘t en sal anders met Banda nyet zijn”.

The relationship with the Governor-General

The Heeren Zeventien’s relationship with the Governor-General in the Indies — the principal local representative of the Company’s authority, first established by the appointment of Pieter Both on 1 September 1609 — was the principal institutional tension of the VOC. The body’s instructions, dispatched from Amsterdam, often failed to anticipate the conditions in the Indies; the Governor-General, on the spot, often found the instructions impossible to execute. Matelieff’s Discours of 12 November 1608 identified the tension: “soo dunckt mijn dat wy de saecke van Oost-Indien niet en sullen konnen staende houden, met de selve alleen te laten regeren door de Heeren Bewinthebberen, want sie niet datse authoriteyt ghenoech hier in Indien sullen krijgen, om de saecke ten gooden eynde te brengen”. The Coen programme of “Indië onafhankelijk van Holland” was the mature working-out of Matelieff’s argument.

Significance

The Heeren Zeventien is, in Van der Woude’s narrative, the principal institutional actor of the early VOC period and the principal author of the monopoly-by-force policy that defined Dutch East India policy for two centuries. The secret instructions of 11 April 1608 and 4 May 1609 — dispatched after the Verhoeff fleet had already left Texel — were the legal foundation of the Coen programme and the proximate cause of the murder of Verhoeff at Banda and the VOC’s coercive monopoly policy at Banda. The body’s relationship with the Governor-General in the Indies — the principal institutional tension of the VOC — was the framework within which the Coen programme of “Indië onafhankelijk van Holland” would unfold, and the body’s secret deliberations — “ook tegenover de Staten-Generaal” — were the principal instance of the early-modern Dutch practice of state-backed commercial secrecy. The Heeren Zeventien’s role in the Dutch-Atjeh relationship was indirect: by 1606, when the first VOC fleet arrived at Atjeh under Matelieff, the Atjeh trade had lost most of its strategic significance for the Dutch, and the body’s attention had shifted to Banda, Malaka and the broader eastern archipelago.

See Also

Source

Coen, Koopman van Heeren Zeventien. Geschiedenis van den Hollandshen Handel in Indië (1598-1614), by Johan van der Woude (Amsterdam: C.V. Uitgeverij v/h C. De Boer Jr., 1948), Hoofdstukken I, II, XI (pp. 7-65, 326-365).

The Heeren Zeventien (the Lords Seventeen) — the supreme governing body of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie from its founding on 20 March 1602 to its dissolution in 1799 — was the college of seventeen directors that directed the Company’s Asian trade, dispatched the fleets, made the strategic decisions, and issued the secret instructions that defined the Dutch East India policy in the early-modern period. The Heeren Zeventien is the principal institutional actor of Van der Woude’s Van der Woude (1948) — the title of the book refers to the body of which Jan Pieterszoon Coen was the “koopman”.

Composition

The Heeren Zeventien was composed of: eight members from the Amsterdam chamber (which held half the Company’s capital), four from the Zeeland chamber (which held a quarter), two from the Maze chamber (Rotterdam and Delft, an eighth), two from the Noorderkwartier chambers (Hoorn and Enkhuizen, an eighth), and a seventeenth member chosen in rotation by the smaller chambers. The composition reflected the distribution of the Company’s capital among the United Provinces’ commercial cities and ensured that the chief commercial interests were represented in the supreme governing body. The body met six years in Amsterdam and two years in Zeeland, in rotation — a pattern that reflected Amsterdam’s commercial primacy and Zeeland’s earlier role in the pre-VOC East India trade.

The body’s deliberations were conducted in secret — “de grootste geheimhouding in acht genomen, ook tegenover de Staten-Generaal”. The secrecy was justified by the need to protect the Company’s commercial intelligence from competitors, but it also served, as Van der Woude notes, “privé- of groeps-belangen”.

The early Heeren Zeventien and the Atjeh trade

The early Heeren Zeventien inherited the diplomatic framework that the voorcompagnieën had established at Atjeh. The Atjeh embassy of 1601 had produced a treaty of friendship and commerce between the sultan and the States-General; the VOC inherited this treaty and continued to operate under its terms. The body’s first major decision affecting Atjeh was the dispatch of the Matelieff fleet in 1605 with secret instructions to attack Malaka — instructions that, as Van der Woude notes, “verloren is gegaan”. The Matelieff campaign of 1606 was the first major VOC military operation in the Strait of Malaka and the framework within which the Dutch-Djohor military alliance of 1603-1613 was conducted.

The monopoly-by-force instructions (1608-1609)

The Heeren Zeventien’s most consequential decisions were the secret instructions of 11 April 1608 and 4 May 1609. The first, dispatched after the Verhoeff fleet had already left Texel and reaching Verhoeff at Bantam on 26 December 1608 by fast jacht, committed the Company to the new monopolistic policy: “de eylanden van Banda op ‘t allerhoochste gerecommandeert, als sijnde dese landen der Compagnie daer aen op ‘t alderhoochste gelegen”. The second, of 4 May 1609, completed the policy: the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain had just been signed; the Dutch were to use the truce to entrench the Company’s position — “dat men nu sien, dat wy daer mede ons proffyt doen” — before Spain could regain its strength.

The instructions of 1608-1609 were the legal foundation of the Coen programme of monopoly-by-force that would define VOC policy for the next two centuries. Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614 was the working-out of the instructions: “Van Banda connen ons meester maken, dezelvige eylanden met macht aantasten; sulcx moeten nootelijcken doen ende de plaetse populeren, ofte het landt verlaten, want ‘t en sal anders met Banda nyet zijn”.

The relationship with the Governor-General

The Heeren Zeventien’s relationship with the Governor-General in the Indies — the principal local representative of the Company’s authority, first established by the appointment of Pieter Both on 1 September 1609 — was the principal institutional tension of the VOC. The body’s instructions, dispatched from Amsterdam, often failed to anticipate the conditions in the Indies; the Governor-General, on the spot, often found the instructions impossible to execute. Matelieff’s Discours of 12 November 1608 identified the tension: “soo dunckt mijn dat wy de saecke van Oost-Indien niet en sullen konnen staende houden, met de selve alleen te laten regeren door de Heeren Bewinthebberen, want sie niet datse authoriteyt ghenoech hier in Indien sullen krijgen, om de saecke ten gooden eynde te brengen”. The Coen programme of “Indië onafhankelijk van Holland” was the mature working-out of Matelieff’s argument.

Significance

The Heeren Zeventien is, in Van der Woude’s narrative, the principal institutional actor of the early VOC period and the principal author of the monopoly-by-force policy that defined Dutch East India policy for two centuries. The secret instructions of 11 April 1608 and 4 May 1609 — dispatched after the Verhoeff fleet had already left Texel — were the legal foundation of the Coen programme and the proximate cause of the murder of Verhoeff at Banda and the VOC’s coercive monopoly policy at Banda. The body’s relationship with the Governor-General in the Indies — the principal institutional tension of the VOC — was the framework within which the Coen programme of “Indië onafhankelijk van Holland” would unfold, and the body’s secret deliberations — “ook tegenover de Staten-Generaal” — were the principal instance of the early-modern Dutch practice of state-backed commercial secrecy. The Heeren Zeventien’s role in the Dutch-Atjeh relationship was indirect: by 1606, when the first VOC fleet arrived at Atjeh under Matelieff, the Atjeh trade had lost most of its strategic significance for the Dutch, and the body’s attention had shifted to Banda, Malaka and the broader eastern archipelago.

See Also

Source

Coen, Koopman van Heeren Zeventien. Geschiedenis van den Hollandshen Handel in Indië (1598-1614), by Johan van der Woude (Amsterdam: C.V. Uitgeverij v/h C. De Boer Jr., 1948), Hoofdstukken I, II, XI (pp. 7-65, 326-365).

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