Jacques l’Hermite (c. 1582-1624) was a Dutch navigator and commercial officer in the service of the VOC who, as the senior Dutch commercial officer at Bantam in the period 1608-1612, received the Verhoeff fleet’s reports on the Malaka expedition of 1608, criticised Hendrick van Bergel’s conduct as governor of Banda, and authored the “Corte Remonstrantie” of 20 August 20 August 1612 — the principal Dutch strategic memorandum of the Banda chapter between Matelieff’s Discours of 1608 and Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614. L’Hermite is a supporting Dutch figure of Van der Woude’s Van der Woude (1948).

The Bantam factorship

L’Hermite served as the senior Dutch commercial officer at Bantam in the period 1608-1612. In this capacity he received the reports of the Verhoeff fleet’s Malaka expedition of 1608 and the murder of Verhoeff at Banda of 22 May 1609. He also received the reports of the Banda governors Hendrick van Bergel (governor 1609-1610) and Willem van der Voort (governor 1610-1611), and his correspondence with the Heeren Zeventien is one of the principal Dutch sources for the Banda chapter.

The criticism of Van Bergel

L’Hermite’s most consequential judgement was his criticism of Hendrick van Bergel’s conduct as governor of Banda. After Both’s Banda expedition of 1610, Van Bergel sailed to Bantam in June 1610 to consult with L’Hermite. L’Hermite “ernstig afkeurde” — seriously disapproved — of Van Bergel’s conduct: he was of the opinion that his landgenoot “de Engelschen hadden moeten verjagen, dan zouden de Bandaneezen wel opnieuw vrede hebben moeten sluiten”. Van der Woude notes that L’Hermite’s criticism missed the point: “Het schijnt niet tot l’Hermite doorgedrongen, dat zijn landgenooten machteloos waren tegen den sluikhandel en dat zij in den toestand van gewapenden vrede op Neira en openlijken oorlog op de andere eilanden vrijwel de gevangenen waren van hun eigen fort”.

The “Corte Remonstrantie” of 20 August 1612

L’Hermite’s “Corte Remonstrantie” of 20 August 20 August 1612 was the principal Dutch strategic memorandum of the Banda chapter between Matelieff’s Discours of 1608 and Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614. L’Hermite argued that the Dutch at Banda “niet naer peys (hadden behooren) te luysteren” — should not have listened to peace — and that “eenige merckelycke macht gesonden werde, om haer geheel t’onder te brengen ende den bril te dege op den neuse te stellen” — a substantial force should be sent to subdue them entirely and put the bridle firmly on their nose. The Dutch, l’Hermite argued, should not “naer eenige vrede ofte handel en hoorde te trachten, voor ende aleer dat men haer geheelick overwonnen ende met goede verseeckeringe tot redenen gebrocht ofte gansch wtgeroyt hadde” — should not seek peace or trade until they had entirely conquered the Bandanese and brought them to reason with good surety, or rooted them out entirely.

The “Corte Remonstrantie” thus anticipated Hendrick Brouwer’s “Secrete Instructie” of 4 April 4 April 1612 (which is dated slightly earlier in the same year) and Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614 — the three documents together constitute the principal Dutch strategic memoranda of the Banda chapter and the intellectual foundation of the Coen programme of monopoly-by-force.

Significance

Jacques l’Hermite is, in Van der Woude’s narrative, a supporting Dutch figure of the Banda chapter and the principal Dutch strategic advisor at Bantam in the period 1608-1612. His “Corte Remonstrantie” of 20 August 1612 — together with Hendrick Brouwer’s “Secrete Instructie” of 4 April 1612 and Coen’s Discours of 1 January 1614 — was the principal Dutch strategic memorandum of the Banda chapter and the intellectual foundation of the Coen programme. His criticism of Van Bergel’s conduct as governor of Banda — though Van der Woude suggests it missed the point — frames the institutional tension between the Bantam factorship and the Banda governorship that would define the early VOC administration. L’Hermite’s role in the Dutch-Atjeh relationship was indirect: by 1608 the strategic centre of Dutch-Indies policy had shifted from Atjeh to Banda, and the Banda experience — not the Atjeh experience — would define the Coen programme.

See Also

Source

Coen, Koopman van Heeren Zeventien. Geschiedenis van den Hollandshen Handel in Indië (1598-1614), by Johan van der Woude (Amsterdam: C.V. Uitgeverij v/h C. De Boer Jr., 1948), Hoofdstukken V, X (pp. 130, 308-323).