W. van Pesch

Properties2
tagsperson, dutch, military, colonial, knil, marechaussee, atjeh, world-war-ii
aliasesLt W. van Pesch, Luitenant Van Pesch, Van Pesch, commandant eerste stelling Bireuën-Takengon 1942

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W. van Pesch was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee who commanded the first stelling — about 10 km south of Bireuën — in Palmer van den Broek’s three-position defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road in mid-March 1942, and who, after the stelling was abandoned on 15 March 15 March 1942, conducted the only successful Dutch guerrilla of the central-Atjeh campaign: a two-week series of ambushes against the Japanese advance, ending with his capture and imprisonment at Takengon. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van Pesch’s stelling is the only Dutch position of the campaign at which the Japanese are recorded as having suffered considerable losses in a set-piece engagement.

The first stelling south of Bireuën

The three-position defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road was the operational plan drawn up by Palmer van den Broek for the 3de hoofdgroep. The first stelling, about 10 km south of Bireuën behind a river, was held by three brigades of the IIIde divisie Maréchaussee under Van Pesch, with four machine guns and two pieces of light field artillery. The stelling’s orders were to inflict as many losses as possible on the enemy and, in the face of superior force, to withdraw to Takengon. The second stelling, 25 km further back, was held under Captain Wetzels; the third, halfway between Bireuën and Takengon, under Captain Boucherie.

The engagement of 15 March 1942

On the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942 Van Pesch received word of the Japanese advance from Bireuën — the Japanese having occupied Bireuën on 13–14 March 14 March 1942 with about 1,200 troops. Van Pesch obtained permission to hold the demolition of the bridge himself until 13.00. In the course of the morning — no Japanese had yet been observed — a panic broke out in the detachment for inexplicable reasons, with a number of soldiers fleeing. The European sergeant Haveman — who stood on the road with his carbine at the ready — called out that he would shoot any man who did not return; this forceful intervention quickly suppressed the panic. Van Pesch held muster and addressed the troops, whereupon every man returned to his post.

At 10.30 an Atjehnese was observed spying out the stelling. As the enemy could now be expected at any moment, Van Pesch ordered the bridge — whose demolition had been prepared in haste — to be blown. This operation succeeded beyond expectation. The two pieces of light field artillery, originally assigned to engage the bridge with grape-shot in case the prepared charges failed, were now available against the enemy. Van Pesch’s request to use the 90 available grenades against the enemy was — for incomprehensible reasons — refused by the Territoriaal Commandant at Takengon.

At approximately 17.00 the stelling was alarmed by the approach of two cars, which emerged from a kampong edge at 3 km distance and drove over the straight road toward the bridge. The Dutch opened fire when the cars were at 300 metres’ range and inflicted considerable losses (approximately 40 men). The enemy received reinforcements and the engagement flared up again. Dutch morale, now that they had achieved success, was good: the machine-gun crew even showed themselves above their coverings, in order to cool the glowing barrels of their weapons with water from petroleum cans. After 15 minutes, however, the machine-gun ammunition was practically exhausted. At 18.00 Van Pesch went to the telephone post to brief his chiefs; the telephone crew had fled during the fight. At 19.00 he decided to break off the engagement owing to darkness, the enemy being able to outflank the stelling unseen. The cars had been moved owing to enemy fire; after a kilometre’s march they were recovered and the detachment drove to a kampong 10 km south of the stelling to bivouac.

At 21.00 Van Pesch heard a heavy explosion: Dutch troops had prematurely blown a prepared road demolition some kilometres further on, breaking both the road and the telephone link to Takengon. The troops, notwithstanding the security measures taken, feared a night-time encirclement, and concluded that the Takengon command had abandoned them. The staff history notes that it is not known who gave the order to carry out the demolition.

The guerrilla of 16 March – 1 April 1942

On the morning of 16 March 16 March 1942 Van Pesch had the cars — now useless, the road being blown — destroyed, and marched the detachment to a secret store of provisions in the forest west of the road. There he ordered the detachment to split into groups of two or three men, each with its own area, to begin the guerrilla along the road, as had previously been practised already in peacetime. The brigade commanders were each given an area; a rendezvous was agreed for a fixed day at a fixed place.

Between 16 March 16 March and 1 April 1 April Van Pesch and his small group — including sergeant Haveman — successfully laid several ambushes against advancing Japanese, in which advancing Japanese were fired upon. The staff history notes that the heavy, densely overgrown terrain gave ample opportunity to find suitable places for carrying out fire ambushes. The Japanese, often accompanied by Atjehnese porters, were unable to deploy: it was striking that their weapons and ammunition were very often carried by accompanying Atjehnese, so that at the moment of the fire ambush many Japanese were unable to do anything.

Illness, capture and interrogation

On 18 March 18 March 1942 Van Pesch contracted high fever. He was found on 22 March 22 March 1942 by sergeant Haveman, who had arrived at the agreed rendezvous with his group. From tracks and from buried weapons found in the terrain, the two concluded that the other soldiers of the detachment had ceased resistance and marched toward Takengon. On 1 April 1 April 1942 the indigenous soldiers of the Van Pesch group had deserted, leaving only Van Pesch and Haveman. They decided to make for a coffee estate in the neighbourhood; from the manager they learned that Palmer van den Broek had been released from a Japanese internment camp at Takengon and had issued written orders (in Dutch and Malay) that all soldiers must surrender, on pain of being treated as francs-tireurs and shot without trial if captured armed. The manager urged Van Pesch and Haveman to surrender.

After some days’ reflection Van Pesch’s group — now reinforced by an Ambonese Maréchaussee — surrendered to the Japanese. At Takengon Van Pesch and Haveman were fortunately placed in a single cell, so that they were in a position to make a number of clear agreements concerning the statements to be made in any forthcoming interrogation. At the ensuing interrogation the Japanese were very bitter about the losses inflicted by the detachment, both at the stelling south of Bireuën and during the guerrilla. The Dutch road demolition and the losses inflicted by Lt Meulders were also laid to Van Pesch’s account. Through the agreed statements Van Pesch and Haveman succeeded in misleading the Japanese and were spared great difficulties.

Significance

Van Pesch’s stelling is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the single clear Dutch tactical success of the central-Atjeh campaign: an engagement in which the Japanese suffered considerable losses for no Dutch loss, and in which the Dutch troops — once they had been steadied by sergeant Haveman’s intervention — fought with credit. The contrast with the panic and demoralisation that overtook the noordkust troops under Bekkers and the Tangse troops under Deutekom is the staff history’s principal evidence that the central-Atjeh troops, when competently led and supported, were still capable of effective resistance.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 144–147.

W. van Pesch was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee who commanded the first stelling — about 10 km south of Bireuën — in Palmer van den Broek’s three-position defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road in mid-March 1942, and who, after the stelling was abandoned on 15 March 15 March 1942, conducted the only successful Dutch guerrilla of the central-Atjeh campaign: a two-week series of ambushes against the Japanese advance, ending with his capture and imprisonment at Takengon. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van Pesch’s stelling is the only Dutch position of the campaign at which the Japanese are recorded as having suffered considerable losses in a set-piece engagement.

The first stelling south of Bireuën

The three-position defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road was the operational plan drawn up by Palmer van den Broek for the 3de hoofdgroep. The first stelling, about 10 km south of Bireuën behind a river, was held by three brigades of the IIIde divisie Maréchaussee under Van Pesch, with four machine guns and two pieces of light field artillery. The stelling’s orders were to inflict as many losses as possible on the enemy and, in the face of superior force, to withdraw to Takengon. The second stelling, 25 km further back, was held under Captain Wetzels; the third, halfway between Bireuën and Takengon, under Captain Boucherie.

The engagement of 15 March 1942

On the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942 Van Pesch received word of the Japanese advance from Bireuën — the Japanese having occupied Bireuën on 13–14 March 14 March 1942 with about 1,200 troops. Van Pesch obtained permission to hold the demolition of the bridge himself until 13.00. In the course of the morning — no Japanese had yet been observed — a panic broke out in the detachment for inexplicable reasons, with a number of soldiers fleeing. The European sergeant Haveman — who stood on the road with his carbine at the ready — called out that he would shoot any man who did not return; this forceful intervention quickly suppressed the panic. Van Pesch held muster and addressed the troops, whereupon every man returned to his post.

At 10.30 an Atjehnese was observed spying out the stelling. As the enemy could now be expected at any moment, Van Pesch ordered the bridge — whose demolition had been prepared in haste — to be blown. This operation succeeded beyond expectation. The two pieces of light field artillery, originally assigned to engage the bridge with grape-shot in case the prepared charges failed, were now available against the enemy. Van Pesch’s request to use the 90 available grenades against the enemy was — for incomprehensible reasons — refused by the Territoriaal Commandant at Takengon.

At approximately 17.00 the stelling was alarmed by the approach of two cars, which emerged from a kampong edge at 3 km distance and drove over the straight road toward the bridge. The Dutch opened fire when the cars were at 300 metres’ range and inflicted considerable losses (approximately 40 men). The enemy received reinforcements and the engagement flared up again. Dutch morale, now that they had achieved success, was good: the machine-gun crew even showed themselves above their coverings, in order to cool the glowing barrels of their weapons with water from petroleum cans. After 15 minutes, however, the machine-gun ammunition was practically exhausted. At 18.00 Van Pesch went to the telephone post to brief his chiefs; the telephone crew had fled during the fight. At 19.00 he decided to break off the engagement owing to darkness, the enemy being able to outflank the stelling unseen. The cars had been moved owing to enemy fire; after a kilometre’s march they were recovered and the detachment drove to a kampong 10 km south of the stelling to bivouac.

At 21.00 Van Pesch heard a heavy explosion: Dutch troops had prematurely blown a prepared road demolition some kilometres further on, breaking both the road and the telephone link to Takengon. The troops, notwithstanding the security measures taken, feared a night-time encirclement, and concluded that the Takengon command had abandoned them. The staff history notes that it is not known who gave the order to carry out the demolition.

The guerrilla of 16 March – 1 April 1942

On the morning of 16 March 16 March 1942 Van Pesch had the cars — now useless, the road being blown — destroyed, and marched the detachment to a secret store of provisions in the forest west of the road. There he ordered the detachment to split into groups of two or three men, each with its own area, to begin the guerrilla along the road, as had previously been practised already in peacetime. The brigade commanders were each given an area; a rendezvous was agreed for a fixed day at a fixed place.

Between 16 March 16 March and 1 April 1 April Van Pesch and his small group — including sergeant Haveman — successfully laid several ambushes against advancing Japanese, in which advancing Japanese were fired upon. The staff history notes that the heavy, densely overgrown terrain gave ample opportunity to find suitable places for carrying out fire ambushes. The Japanese, often accompanied by Atjehnese porters, were unable to deploy: it was striking that their weapons and ammunition were very often carried by accompanying Atjehnese, so that at the moment of the fire ambush many Japanese were unable to do anything.

Illness, capture and interrogation

On 18 March 18 March 1942 Van Pesch contracted high fever. He was found on 22 March 22 March 1942 by sergeant Haveman, who had arrived at the agreed rendezvous with his group. From tracks and from buried weapons found in the terrain, the two concluded that the other soldiers of the detachment had ceased resistance and marched toward Takengon. On 1 April 1 April 1942 the indigenous soldiers of the Van Pesch group had deserted, leaving only Van Pesch and Haveman. They decided to make for a coffee estate in the neighbourhood; from the manager they learned that Palmer van den Broek had been released from a Japanese internment camp at Takengon and had issued written orders (in Dutch and Malay) that all soldiers must surrender, on pain of being treated as francs-tireurs and shot without trial if captured armed. The manager urged Van Pesch and Haveman to surrender.

After some days’ reflection Van Pesch’s group — now reinforced by an Ambonese Maréchaussee — surrendered to the Japanese. At Takengon Van Pesch and Haveman were fortunately placed in a single cell, so that they were in a position to make a number of clear agreements concerning the statements to be made in any forthcoming interrogation. At the ensuing interrogation the Japanese were very bitter about the losses inflicted by the detachment, both at the stelling south of Bireuën and during the guerrilla. The Dutch road demolition and the losses inflicted by Lt Meulders were also laid to Van Pesch’s account. Through the agreed statements Van Pesch and Haveman succeeded in misleading the Japanese and were spared great difficulties.

Significance

Van Pesch’s stelling is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the single clear Dutch tactical success of the central-Atjeh campaign: an engagement in which the Japanese suffered considerable losses for no Dutch loss, and in which the Dutch troops — once they had been steadied by sergeant Haveman’s intervention — fought with credit. The contrast with the panic and demoralisation that overtook the noordkust troops under Bekkers and the Tangse troops under Deutekom is the staff history’s principal evidence that the central-Atjeh troops, when competently led and supported, were still capable of effective resistance.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 144–147.

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