Haveman was a European sergeant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee serving in the IIIde divisie at the first stelling south of Bireuën under Lt Van Pesch in mid-March 1942, whose intervention on the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942 — standing on the road with carbine at the ready and threatening to shoot any man who did not return — single-handedly suppressed a panic that had broken out for inexplicable reasons in the detachment. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Haveman’s action is the staff history’s clearest single illustration of the decisive effect of an individual European NCO’s forceful intervention on the morale of the indigenous soldiers.

The 15 March 1942 panic

On the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942, with no Japanese yet observed at the first stelling south of Bireuën, a panic broke out in the detachment for inexplicable reasons, as a result of which a number of soldiers took flight. Van Pesch was at the telephone at that moment. As he came outside he saw Haveman standing on the road with his carbine at the ready, calling out to those fleeing that he would shoot them if they did not return. The staff history attributes the suppression of the panic wholly to Haveman: this forceful intervention was the cause of the panic being quickly and completely suppressed.

The guerrilla of 16 March – 1 April 1942

After the stelling was abandoned on the night of 1516 March 16 March 1942, Haveman remained with Van Pesch as the sole European companion in the two-week guerrilla along the Bireuën–Takengon road. He arrived at the agreed rendezvous on 22 March 22 March 1942 with his group, finding Van Pesch severely ill with high fever. From tracks and buried weapons the two concluded that the other soldiers of the detachment had ceased resistance and marched to Takengon.

By 1 April 1 April 1942 the indigenous soldiers of the Van Pesch group had deserted; only Van Pesch and Haveman remained. They made for a coffee estate, learned from its manager of Palmer van den Broek’s capitulation order, and after some days’ reflection surrendered with an Ambonese Maréchaussee who had joined them.

The Takengon interrogation

At Takengon Van Pesch and Haveman were placed in a single cell, so that they were in a position to make a number of clear agreements concerning the statements to be made in any forthcoming interrogation. At the interrogation the Japanese were very bitter about the losses inflicted by the detachment. Through their pre-agreed statements Van Pesch and Haveman succeeded in misleading the Japanese and were spared great difficulties.

Significance

Haveman is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the named European NCO whose individual action restored the discipline of a stelling on the point of dissolution. The compilers’ emphasis on Haveman’s composed conduct — sustained through the subsequent guerrilla — places him in the staff history’s small gallery of examples of the European NCO as the indispensable support of the indigenous soldier in the Atjeh campaign.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 145–147.

Haveman was a European sergeant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee serving in the IIIde divisie at the first stelling south of Bireuën under Lt Van Pesch in mid-March 1942, whose intervention on the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942 — standing on the road with carbine at the ready and threatening to shoot any man who did not return — single-handedly suppressed a panic that had broken out for inexplicable reasons in the detachment. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Haveman’s action is the staff history’s clearest single illustration of the decisive effect of an individual European NCO’s forceful intervention on the morale of the indigenous soldiers.

The 15 March 1942 panic

On the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942, with no Japanese yet observed at the first stelling south of Bireuën, a panic broke out in the detachment for inexplicable reasons, as a result of which a number of soldiers took flight. Van Pesch was at the telephone at that moment. As he came outside he saw Haveman standing on the road with his carbine at the ready, calling out to those fleeing that he would shoot them if they did not return. The staff history attributes the suppression of the panic wholly to Haveman: this forceful intervention was the cause of the panic being quickly and completely suppressed.

The guerrilla of 16 March – 1 April 1942

After the stelling was abandoned on the night of 1516 March 16 March 1942, Haveman remained with Van Pesch as the sole European companion in the two-week guerrilla along the Bireuën–Takengon road. He arrived at the agreed rendezvous on 22 March 22 March 1942 with his group, finding Van Pesch severely ill with high fever. From tracks and buried weapons the two concluded that the other soldiers of the detachment had ceased resistance and marched to Takengon.

By 1 April 1 April 1942 the indigenous soldiers of the Van Pesch group had deserted; only Van Pesch and Haveman remained. They made for a coffee estate, learned from its manager of Palmer van den Broek’s capitulation order, and after some days’ reflection surrendered with an Ambonese Maréchaussee who had joined them.

The Takengon interrogation

At Takengon Van Pesch and Haveman were placed in a single cell, so that they were in a position to make a number of clear agreements concerning the statements to be made in any forthcoming interrogation. At the interrogation the Japanese were very bitter about the losses inflicted by the detachment. Through their pre-agreed statements Van Pesch and Haveman succeeded in misleading the Japanese and were spared great difficulties.

Significance

Haveman is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the named European NCO whose individual action restored the discipline of a stelling on the point of dissolution. The compilers’ emphasis on Haveman’s composed conduct — sustained through the subsequent guerrilla — places him in the staff history’s small gallery of examples of the European NCO as the indispensable support of the indigenous soldier in the Atjeh campaign.

See Also

Source

Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 145–147.