The first stelling south of Bireuën, fought on 15 March 15 March 1942 at a position about 10 km south of Bireuën behind a river, was the only set-piece Dutch infantry engagement of the central-Atjeh theatre of the Japanese invasion of March 1942 at which the Japanese suffered aanzienlijke verliezen — approximately 40 killed — for no Dutch loss. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), the engagement is the staff history’s principal example of a successful Dutch tactical defence undone by munitie-uitputting and by the premature blowing of a wegvernieling behind the stelling.
The three-stelling defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road
Palmer van den Broek’s three-stelling defence of the Bireuën–Takengon road was the operational plan for the 3de hoofdgroep — the central-Atjeh Dutch troops — in mid-March 1942. The first stelling, about 10 km south of Bireuën behind a river, was held by three brigades of the IIIde divisie Maréchaussee under Lt Van Pesch, with four machine guns and two pieces of light field artillery. The stelling’s orders were “de vijand zoveel mogelijk verliezen toe te brengen en voor overmacht op Takengon terug te trekken.”
The second stelling, 25 km further back, was held by five brigades under Captain Wetzels (IIIde divisie); the third, halfway between Bireuën and Takengon, by four brigades of the Vde divisie under Captain Boucherie.
The 15 March 1942 engagement
In the morning of 15 March 15 March 1942 Van Pesch received word of the Japanese nadering from Bireuën — the Japanese having occupied Bireuën on 13–14 March 14 March 1942 with about 1,200 troops. Van Pesch obtained permission to hold the demolition of the bridge himself until 13.00.
In the course of the morning — no Japanese had yet been observed — a panic broke out in the detachment “om onverklaarbare redenen, waardoor een aantal militairen op de vlucht sloeg.” Van Pesch was at the telephone. As he came outside he saw the European sergeant Haveman standing on the rijweg with his karabijn in the aanslag, calling to the fleeing men that he would shoot any who did not return. “Dit krachtige optreden is de oorzaak geweest, dat de paniek snel en volledig werd bedwongen.” Van Pesch held appèl, addressed the troops, and every man returned to his post.
At 10.30 an Atjehnese was observed spying out the stelling. As the enemy could now be expected at any moment, Van Pesch ordered the bridge — whose demolition had been prepared in haste — to be blown. “Deze operatie gelukte boven verwachting.” The two pieces of light field artillery, originally assigned to engage the bridge with grape-shot in case the prepared charges failed, were now available against the enemy. Van Pesch’s request to use the 90 available grenades against the enemy was — “om onbegrijpelijke redenen” — refused by the Territoriaal Commandant at Takengon.
At approximately 17.00 the stelling was alarmed by the approach of two cars, which emerged from a kampongrand at 3 km distance and drove over the straight road toward the bridge. The Dutch opened fire when the cars were at 300 metres’ range and inflicted “aanzienlijke verliezen (ongeveer 40 man).” The enemy received reinforcements and the engagement flared up again. The Dutch geest, “nu zij succes hadden geboekt,” was good: the machine-gun crew “vertoonden zich zelfs boven hun dekkingen, om met water uit petroleumblikken de gloeiende lopen van hun wapens af te koelen.” After 15 minutes, however, the munitie of the machine guns was practically exhausted.
At 18.00 Van Pesch went to the telephone post to brief his chiefs; the telephone crew had fled during the fight. At 19.00 he decided to break off the engagement owing to darkness, the enemy being able to outflank the stelling unseen. The cars had been moved owing to enemy fire; after a kilometre’s march they were recovered and the detachment drove to a kampong 10 km south of the stelling to bivak.
At 21.00 Van Pesch heard a heavy explosion: Dutch troops had prematurely blown a prepared wegvernieling some kilometres further on, breaking both the road and the telephone link to Takengon. The troops, “niettegenstaande de genomen veiligheidsmaatregelen, bevreesd waren voor een nachtelijke omsingeling,” concluded that the Takengon command had abandoned them. The staff history notes that “het niet bekend is, wie de opdracht tot het uitvoeren van de vernieling heeft gegeven.”
The subsequent guerrilla (16 March – 1 April 1942)
On the morning of 16 March 16 March 1942 Van Pesch had the cars — now useless, the road being blown — destroyed, and marched the detachment to a secret opslagplaats van vivres in the forest west of the road. There he ordered the detachment to split into groups of two or three men, each with its own area, to begin the guerrilla along the rijweg “zoals tevoren in vredestijd reeds was beoefend.” The brigadecommandanten were each given a gebied; a samenkomst was agreed for a fixed day at a fixed place.
Between 16 March 16 March and 1 April 1 April 1942 Van Pesch and sergeant Haveman — the latter having joined the lieutenant on 22 March 22 March 1942 — successfully laid several ambushes against advancing Japanese, “waarbij oprukkende Japanners werden beschoten.” The Japanese, often accompanied by Atjehnese porters, were unable to deploy. By 1 April 1 April 1942 the indigenous militairen of the Van Pesch group had deserted; Van Pesch and Haveman surrendered some days later at a koffieonderneming near Takengon, after learning of Palmer van den Broek’s capitulation order.
Significance
The first stelling south of Bireuën is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the single clear Dutch tactical success of the central-Atjeh campaign: an engagement in which the Japanese suffered aanzienlijke verliezen for no Dutch loss, and in which the Dutch troops — once Haveman had steadied them — fought with credit. The staff history’s contrast between the Van Pesch stelling and the panic that overtook the noordkust troops under Bekkers is the compilers’ principal evidence that the central-Atjeh troops, when competently led, were still capable of effective resistance. The munitie-uitputting and the premature wegvernieling are the staff history’s principal illustrations of the logistical and command failures that undid the stelling despite its tactical success.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- W. van Pesch
- Haveman
- F. Wetzels
- L. A. Boucherie
- C. Meulders
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- IIIde Divisie Marechaussee
- Vde Divisie Marechaussee
- Bireuën
- Takengon
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 144–147.