Darul Islam

Properties2
tagsorganization, religious, rebellion, indonesian, post-colonial
aliasesDI, Darul Islam movement, Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII, DI/TII

4 min read

Darul Islam (“House of Islam”) was an Indonesian Islamist insurgent movement that sought to establish an Islamic state — the Negara Islam Indonesia (N.I.I.) — in place of the secular Republic of Indonesia, operating from approximately 1948 into the 1960s across three principal theaters: West Java under its supreme leader S. M. Kartosuwirjo, Aceh under Teungkoe Moehamad Daoed Beureu-éh, and South Celebes under Kahar Muzakkar. Its armed wing was the Tentara Islam Indonesia (T.I.I., Islamic Army of Indonesia), and the combined movement was commonly known as DI/TII.

Origins and structure

The movement grew out of the Islamist political currents that emerged during the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian national revolution. Kartosuwirjo, a Javanese Islamic leader, proclaimed the Negara Islam Indonesia on 7 August 1949 in West Java as the Dutch–Indonesian transfer of sovereignty neared. The DI was organised as a parallel state, with Kartosuwirjo as Imam, claiming sovereignty over territory it controlled by force.

By 1953, the movement operated in three distinct regional theaters, each under a semi-autonomous commander who recognised Kartosuwirjo’s nominal religious authority:

  • West Java — the original theater, controlled by Kartosuwirjo himself, combining guerrilla warfare with a shadow administration in the mountainous interior.
  • Aceh — proclaimed on 21 September 1953 when Daud Beureueh declared Aceh’s accession to the N.I.I.; Kartosuwirjo named Daud Beureueh his governor for Aceh. The rebellion was triggered by political exclusion of the Masjumi party from the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, installed 1 August 1953.
  • South Celebes — under Kahar Muzakkar, who declared South Celebes incorporated into the DI state on 6 August 1953, a fortnight before the Aceh outbreak.

The Aceh branch and its costs

The Aceh theater of the DI was of particular strategic importance. Beynon’s account of the affair (Nederland staat terecht in Indonesië, 1957) reports parliamentary figures on the human and material cost of the Aceh rebellion: approximately 10,000 dead, 27,000 people in need, material damage of 100 million rupiah, railway losses of 80 million rupiah, and 70% of railway stations destroyed.

The rebellion broke out on 20 September 1953. Garuda Indonesian Airways suspended flights to the Acehnese capital Kutaradja on 21 September. Daud Beureueh was officially designated as rebel leader on 25 September 1953. The territorial commander, Kolonel Simbolon, stated on 3 October 1953: “De toestand in Atjeh is zeer ernstig; het is niet mogelijk deze kwestie met wapenen alleen op te lossen” (“The situation in Aceh is very serious; it is not possible to solve this issue with weapons alone”).

The reconquest of Aceh’s main towns was achieved by Colonel Simbolon of Territorium I, Bukit Barisan, through October–November 1953, but the underlying insurgency continued for years. The same DI period is characterised by the De staatkundige ontwikkeling van Indonesië as the movement operating “in West-Java, Atjeh en Zuid-Celebes” — the three theaters.

The NIGO connection

The DI/TII movement was invoked in the political trials against Dutch nationals in Djakarta during 1953–1956. The indictment against Schmidt in the NIGO affair (Nederlands Indische Guerilla Organisatie) charged him with providing support — including weapons drops near Tangkuban Prahu — to the DI/TII in West Java, and with being the leader of the NIGO, which was alleged to coordinate with the DI and other armed underground organisations. A prosecution witness, Haris bin Suhaemi, who described himself as a former DI member, testified to the alleged collusion between the Dutch Hoge Commissaris and Kartosuwirjo — testimony the presiding judge refused to enter into the record, wishing to avoid international complications.

Significance

The Darul Islam movement represents the most sustained challenge to the authority of the Indonesian Republic in the 1950s, and its Acehnese branch connects directly to the longer history of Acehnese resistance to outside authority — Dutch colonial, Japanese, and then republican — that runs through the entire twentieth century. The movement also illustrates the central role of Masjumi and Islamic politics in Acehnese political identity, since it was the exclusion of Masjumi from government, not a purely religious grievance, that triggered the Aceh theater of the DI.

See Also

Source

Om een rode of groene Merdeka: Tien jaren binnenlandse politiek Indonesië, 1943–1953, by Henri J. H. Alers (Eindhoven: Uitgeverij Vulkaan, 1956), Chapter VII §34–35.

De staatkundige ontwikkeling van Indonesië in de 20e eeuw, uitgave van het Bureau Cursussen en Vertalingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, revised ed. 1955).

Nederland staat terecht in Indonesië: Achtergronden van de processen tegen Nederlanders in Djakarta, by H. C. Beynon (Utrecht: A. W. Bruna & Zoon, 1957).

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