The withdrawal from the XXII Moekims outposts on 13 January 1885 was the critical retrograde movement in which Dutch forces evacuated seven distant fortifications along the exposed communications line through the XXII Moekims. Despite dire predictions that the retrograde movement would result in heavy casualties, the evacuation proceeded with minimal losses: 1 killed and 13 wounded among Dutch forces.
Background
The outposts being evacuated included Indrapouri, Djerir, Glé-Kamping, Long-Lemoh, Tjot-Basetoel, Samagani, Lepong-Ara, and Panteh-Karang. These posts had been established during the offensive campaigns of 1878–1879 to secure the route eastward from Lambaroe toward the interior. By 1884, this 121-palen line had become a liability rather than an asset.
The communicationslijn (communication line) traversed hostile territory on both sides. Every transport convoy from Anagaloeng to Djerir in early 1884 required fighting. The posts themselves enclosed no territory—merely the road itself. As the oorlogspartij (war party) gained strength and the population joined the resistance, holding these isolated positions became untenable.
Execution
On 13 January 1885, the simultaneous evacuation of Indrapouri, Djerir, Glé-Kamping, Long-Lemoh, Tjot-Basetoel, Samagani, and Lepong-Ara began. Panteh-Karang followed the next day, 14 January 1885.
Over approximately 84 palen (16.5 kilometers)—from Anagaloeng to Djerir—about 2000 men and numerous vehicles were deployed or in movement for about 7 hours. A temporary versterking (fortification) was established at Boekloe on the road from Anagaloeng to Lambaroe to protect the ongoing transport of materials and goods from the evacuated posts.
Casualties
Despite the scale and complexity of the operation, losses were remarkably light:
13 January 1885:
- Killed: 1 minder militair (lower soldier)
- Wounded: 1 officer and 12 lower soldiers
14 January 1885:
- Killed: 1 minder militair
- Wounded: 6 lower soldiers
Contemporary Reaction
The success contradicted somber predictions made by many who had anticipated that evacuating the upper posts of the XXII Moekims would require “zeer belangrijke offers” (very significant sacrifices). Some had feared it would prove impossible to bring back the Dutch possessions and artillery from those positions.
The author of the 1885 report noted the “korte geheugen” (short memory) of those who had loudly raised their voices about the unfavorable situation in Aceh while simultaneously predicting disaster from the withdrawal. The same voices, he observed, now proclaimed that deterioration rather than improvement was visible.
Significance
The successful withdrawal demonstrated that the concentration strategy could be executed without the catastrophic losses opponents had predicted. It validated the decision-making of the new administration under Colonel H. Demmeni and proved that disciplined retrograde movements were possible even in hostile territory.
The evacuation freed resources for the consolidation of the new line and demonstrated to the Acehnese that the Dutch could execute complex military operations. However, it also showed the enemy’s restraint in not attacking more aggressively during the withdrawal—a fact that would later be attributed to the defensive strength of the positions being maintained.
See Also
- Concentration Decision of August 1884
- Colonel H. Demmeni
- XXII Moekims
- Lambaroe
- Anagaloeng
- Djerir
- General van der Heyden
Source
De Geconcentreerde Stelling in Groot-Atjeh, ‘s-Gravenhage: De Gebroeders Van Cleef, 1885, pp. 24–29.