The Slag bij Tjot Tjako (23 May 1896) — the bestorming van den Tjot Tjako — was the storming of the hill of Tjot Tjako by the Bergcolonne under Lt.-Col. J. B. van Heutsz on the first day of the three-day Dutch offensive against Teungkoe Oemar’s stelling around Lam-Pisang, the opening engagement of the strategic reversal of the defection of 29 March 1896. The Bergcolonne — 10 brigades of maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland, the 3e Bataljon under Maj. Hansen, a section of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers, and engineers under 1e Luit. Ruzette — marched from Ketapan Doea at 3:30 a.m. on 23 May 1896 to surprise the enemy. At 5:43 a.m. lieutenants Wagener and Vis, with the maréchaussée Wongsodikromo (No. 33780) and Todikromo (No. 28097), reached the summit; Sergeant Grebner, on his own initiative, attacked the western hoogtekam and occupied the southernmost top — an action that caused Lam-Pisang and Bineh Kroeng to be evacuated.
Background
By 23 May 1896 the Regeeringscommissaris had completed four weeks of sustained bombardment of Umar’s stellingen and was ready to launch the infantry assault. The Achehnese stelling was organised in three sectors — left wing, centre, right wing — and was anchored on the hill of Tjot Tjako, which dominated the northern approaches to Lam-Pisang. The intelligence summary listed every versterking, loopgraaf, and benteng in the stelling, with locations and estimated occupation: lead was hidden in wells at Bineh Kroeng; men from Pedir were stationed at Bt. Kesoemba; Oemar himself was hiding south of the heuvelrug; the people of Lam-Pagar had a warlike reputation; Panglima Gimba held the left wing; Pa Karim Lampagar was at Lam-Pagar; T. Mat Amin — an oelama — held a sector. The capture of Tjot Tjako was the necessary precondition for the assault on Lam-Pisang and on Oemar’s house.
The Bergcolonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz — Chef van den Staf Kapt. G. C. E. van Daalen — was assigned the task. Its composition was: 10 brigades maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland (4 officers, 189 men); the 3e Bataljon under Maj. G. A. Hansen (15 officers, 403 men); a section of mountain artillery under Kapt. Kempers; engineers under 1e Luit. Ruzette; train, ambulance, reserve munition. The native guide Panglima Ali of Pantai-Abee was attached to the voorhoede. The plan was a night march from Ketapan Doea and a dawn ascent of Tjot Tjako in two groups — the eastern helling and the north-eastern side — to take the Achehnese defenders by surprise.
The March and the Ascent
At 3:30 a.m. on 23 May 1896 the Bergcolonne marched from Ketapan Doea. The voorhoede under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland — 10 brigades maréchaussée and a peloton of the 3e Bataljon — advanced via the footpath north-west of Ketapan Doea. The night march was difficult: the footpath was narrow, the terrain broken, and the darkness complete. The colonne closed on Tjot Tjako undetected. At 5:20 a.m. the climb began. Two groups were formed: lieutenants Vis and Wagener on the eastern slope, lieutenants Stoop and Dijkstra on the north-eastern side. The Achehnese sentinels — if any were posted — failed to detect the approach until the climbing Dutch were within earshot. The enemy raised alarm cries and rolled stones down on the climbing Dutch — a traditional Achehnese defensive tactic on hill positions, intended to break the attackers’ footing and to sweep them down the slope.
At 5:43 a.m. lieutenants Wagener and Vis, with the maréchaussée Wongsodikromo (No. 33780) and Todikromo (No. 28097), plus lieutenant Rijnen and European fusiliers, reached the summit. The names of the two native maréchaussée — Wongsodikromo and Todikromo — were preserved by Kruisheer in recognition of their distinction as the first to reach the top. Lieutenant Vis then drove approximately 30 armed Achehnese from their firing positions on the north-eastern slope. By 6:40 a.m. the entire colonne was on top; the enemy was driven from Tjot Tjako. From the summit, repeater-rifle fire was directed on Lam-Pisang and on Oemar’s house, causing some 50 persons to flee south.
Grebner’s Initiative and the Evacuation of Lam-Pisang and Bineh Kroeng
Sergeant Grebner, on his own initiative, attacked the western ridgeline of Tjot Tjako. The official plan had not assigned the western hoogtekam to any unit, but Grebner — recognising that the southernmost top of the hoogtekam commanded both Lam-Pisang and Bineh Kroeng — seized the opportunity. His attack drove off the enemy, leaving one dead, and occupied the southernmost top. The effect was immediate: the Achehnese, finding their flank turned and their rear threatened, evacuated both Lam-Pisang and Bineh Kroeng. Grebner’s initiative — the action of a single sergeant in defiance of the formal plan — was, in tactical terms, the decisive moment of the day. Without it, the assault on Lam-Pisang on 24 May 1896 might have been a much harder operation.
Van Heutsz’s Four Messages
Van Heutsz sent a series of four messages to the commander, Kol. Stemfoort, during the morning of 23 May 1896:
- Bericht No. 1 (6:40 a.m., received 8:30 a.m.): “Toean Tjot Tjako niet beklimbaar voor artillerie, moet zadel Zuid van dien berg beklimmen onder dekking. Versoek drinkwater.” (Tjot Tjako not climbable for artillery; must climb the southern saddle under cover. Request drinking water.)
- Bericht No. 2 (8:17 a.m.): Grenades fell in Lam-Pisang; need reserve munition, drinking water, and ice.
- Bericht No. 3: To the commandants of the 6e and 2e Bergbatterij — instructions on dekking (cover) for transport of wounded and on the disposition of the artillery.
- Bericht No. 4 (sent 9:15 a.m., received 11:15 a.m.): “Lam-Pisang verlaten. Wij hebben heuveltop ten O. van Oemar’s huis bezet. Bineh Kroeng also verlaten. Vele Atjehers loopen weg in Z. richting. Troepen kunnen doorrukken. Versoeke toezending bereden ordonnansen.” (Lam-Pisang abandoned. We have occupied the hilltop east of Oemar’s house. Bineh Kroeng also abandoned. Many Achehnese walking away in southern direction. Troops can advance. Request sending of mounted orderlies.)
The fourth message was crucial. The bevelhebber, on the advice of the Regeeringscommissaris by telephone, had initially decided to halt operations for the day. The receipt of the fourth message — reporting that Lam-Pisang was abandoned and that the troops could advance — reversed this decision. The offensive continued. The episode is one of the most-cited examples in the Atjeh-oorlog of the friction between the political and military high commands, and of the consequences of delayed communications in mobile warfare.
Casualties and Outcome
The Dutch casualties of the storming of Tjot Tjako were 1 dead (during the climb) and several wounded; 1 Amboineesch maréchaussée wounded; later in the morning 1 dead and 8 wounded total; 1 artilleryman killed on the advance. The enemy casualties were not enumerated in detail, but the Achehnese had been driven from numerous positions and were not pursued into the valley due to the slow progress of the infantry in the plain. A bivak was established on the summit of Tjot Tjako. The capture of Tjot Tjako opened the way for the capture of Lam-Pisang on 24 May 1896 and the bestorming of the Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau on 25 May 1896.
Significance
The Slag bij Tjot Tjako on 23 May 1896 was the opening engagement of the three-day Dutch offensive and one of the most-celebrated Dutch assaults of the Atjeh-oorlog. The night march, the dawn ascent, the distinction of Wongsodikromo and Todikromo as the first to reach the summit, the initiative of Sergeant Grebner, and the four messages of Van Heutsz — all were preserved by Kruisheer as exemplars of the operational art in colonial mountain warfare. The battle also marked the emergence of Van Heutsz as a field commander of the first rank — the officer who could conduct a night march, surprise the enemy at dawn, occupy a dominating height, and force the Achehnese to evacuate their principal base. The Slag bij Tjot Tjako was, in this sense, the foundation on which the three-day offensive — and Van Heutsz’s own subsequent career — was built.
See Also
- J. B. van Heutsz
- Jhr. G. J. W. C. H. Graafland
- H. M. Vis
- Wagener
- Wongsodikromo
- Todikromo
- Grebner
- Rijnen
- Tjot Tjako
- Three-day Dutch offensive of 23–25 May 1896
- Capture of Lam-Pisang and Oemar’s House (24 May 1896)
- Bestorming van de Stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau (25 May 1896)
- Bergcolonne
- Korps Marechaussée
- 1896
- Aceh War
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 186–194.