The plundering of two British merchant vessels at Koeala Batèë and Koeala Meureudoe in 1844 — in Kreemer’s history — was one of the principal Atjèhnese maritime outrages of the pre-war period, answered not by the Dutch (who were bound by the London treaty to ensure the safety of Atjèhnese waters) but by the British themselves, who — like the Americans in 1833 — “zichzelf voldoening verschaffen door de beide plaatsen met hun eigen oorlogsschepen te tuchtigen” — “procured themselves satisfaction by chastising both places with their own warships.”
The incident
Kreemer records the incident in a single clause: “In 1844 werden twee Britsche handelsvaartuigen geplunderd te Koeala Batèë en te Koeala Meureudoe; ook toen moesten de Engelschen — evenals de Amerikanen in 1833 — zichzelf voldoening verschaffen door de beide plaatsen met hun eigen oorlogsschepen te tuchtigen” — “In 1844 two British merchant vessels were plundered at Kuala Batëë and at Kuala Meureudu; then too the English — like the Americans in 1833 — had to procure themselves satisfaction by chastising both places with their own warships.”
The pattern of foreign self-help
The 1844 incident is, in Kreemer’s narrative, the second of two cases (the first being the 1831–1833 American case) in which a foreign power, denied Dutch protection of its shipping in Atjèhnese waters, undertook its own punitive expedition against Atjèhnese coastal towns. The pattern revealed the hollowness of the Dutch claim — made in the London treaty of 1824 — to be the guarantor of safety in Atjèhnese waters. The recurrence of plundering — 1851 saw a Napolitaansch vessel plundered, 1852 an Engelsche schooner — and the Dutch government’s admission in 1852 “dat zij dergelijke daden der Atjèhers niet beletten kon” — “that she could not prevent such deeds of the Atjèhnese” — completed the exposure of the 1824 framework.
Significance
The 1844 plunder is, in Kreemer’s account of the causes of the Atjèh-oorlog, a key moment in the erosion of the 1824 treaty system. The willingness of the British to undertake their own punitive action — bypassing the Dutch — demonstrated that the international guarantee of Atjèhnese integrity was already fraying, and that the Dutch monopoly on legitimate military action against Atjèh was not matched by a Dutch capacity to police Atjèhnese waters. This disjunction between obligation and capacity is the structural flaw that Kreemer identifies as the “kiem” — the seed — of the Atjèh war, already present in the 1824 treaty itself.
See Also
- Acheh
- Kuala Bathee
- Kuala Meureudu
- Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824
- Causes of the Atjèh-oorlog (Kreemer’s account)
- Schooner Dolphijn incident (1836)
- Aceh War
- Bombardment of the Atjehse coast by the British (1844)
- 1844
Source
Atjèh. Algemeen samenvattend overzicht van land en volk van Atjèh en onderhoorigheden, door J. Kreemer, Archivaris van het Atjèh Instituut. Eerste Deel. Leiden: N.V. Boekhandel en Drukkerij voorheen E.J. Brill, 1922. Hoofdstuk I, B (“Periode 1824—1873. Oorzaken van den Atjèh-oorlog”), blz. 10–11.