The defection of Teuku Uma — known in Acehnese-Dutch annals simply as the “Uma episode” — was the open defection, in Defection of Teuku Uma, of the celebrated Acehnese chief Teuku Uma (Umar) from his nominal alliance with the Netherlands India Government. After three years during which the Dutch, under the misjudged “concentration” policy, had armed and subsidised Uma as the linchpin of their influence over the West Coast and one of the three sagis (federated districts) of Great Aceh, Uma judged that he had now sufficient money and weapons to play a leading part among the insurgents. In March 1896 he removed the scales from the eyes of the blindly-trusting General Deykerhoff, and his secret opposition to Dutch rule thus changed to open hostility. The event was, in Snouck Hurgronje’s words, more a revelation than a reversal: “since the real purport of his actions had long been as obvious as the day, we cannot speak except in a highly specialized sense of Uma’s ‘defection’.”
Background: The “Uma Period”
The three years before the defection had earned an unhappy notoriety under the name of the “Uma period”. Since the submission of 1893, the Dutch Governor — absolutely unacquainted with native affairs — had given his entire confidence to the adventurer, and in defiance of all warnings had persisted in strengthening him by generous subsidies of Dutch weapons and Dutch money. Thus assisted, Uma had overcome his own enemies in partisan struggles, and civil war had raged “even after the Dutch power was established in Aceh”. Under the guise of fighting against the foes of the Dutch regime, “he dealt out, as his own, plentiful subsidies to his friends in the War-party and tried by all means in his power to acquire the maximum of influence both over the Dutch and their opponents.”
The End of Double-Dealing
“From the very first”, Snouck Hurgronje observes, Uma “set himself to winning substantial gains for the War-party and nominal advantages for the Dutch, which last advantages however seriously taken had no real value whatever.” The only apparent gain which Uma, appointed a commander of friendly Acehnese forces and considered by the Governor as a trusty councillor, brought to his protector, was an extension of the Dutch “line” of greater extent than the original “concentrated” line; yet this could effect nothing whatever in the way of terminating an insurrection that had its centres and its granaries outside Great Aceh, in the dependencies. The extension of the line was due to — and continued to depend on — “the slender thread of his good-will.” It was clear that the arrangement could not last. “As soon as it ceased to be possible for Uma to continue to combine the satisfaction of the wishes of the War-party with the appearance of advancing the interests of the Government, the barrel would burst — and there was not much doubt on which side Uma would elect to be.”
March 1896: The Open Defection
In March 1896, Uma thought that the time had come to remove the scales from the eyes of the blindly-trusting General Deykerhoff. “He had then sufficient money and arms to play a leading part among the War-party, and the claims which his friend Deykerhoff pressed upon him began to be burdensome.” His secret opposition to Dutch rule thus changed to open hostility. Hurgronje insists, however, that the term “defection” is misleading: the real purport of Uma’s actions had long been obvious, and the Governor’s eyes had simply refused to see.
Consequences in Great Aceh
The defection had direct political consequences within Great Aceh itself, redistributing the balance of power among the great uleëbalang families of the sagi. In 1896 the Nanta family — Uma’s in-laws, since he had married Chut Din, the daughter of Teuku Nanta — having taken a prominent part in the treachery of Teuku Uma against the Dutch, the Ne’ family was restored to power. When the Nantas were expelled, the Dutch Government appointed as chief Teuku Raja Itam, a son of the Teuku Ne’ who had been uleëbalang (territorial chief) of Meura’sa at the beginning of the Dutch operations in Aceh. Since the “defection” of Teuku Uma, the Nantas were declared deposed from the government of the VI Mukims, and the native authority in that place was exercised by the young Teuku Raja Itam, son of the late Teuku Ne’ of Meura’sa.
Significance for the Aceh War
The Uma episode, however melancholy in itself, “indirectly exercised a healthy influence upon the management of Acehnese affairs. Its termination opened all eyes to the need of vigorous action if one did not wish to abandon altogether the subjugation of Aceh.” In 1896 the war against the Acehnese — which had been allowed to be suspended since 1881 without any real resultant gain — was resumed. Above all, with Governor Van Heutsz in 1898 the new methodical offensive began that, “in less than six years”, brought the Dutch to what even the most sceptical had to admit was the beginning of the end. The traitor Uma and numbers of adventurers, fanatical leaders, and guerrilla chiefs perished in the campaigns that followed; the chiefs of dependent states, the members of the Sultan’s family, and finally their head himself, submitted almost without exception; and thousands of refugees came back to their gampongs (villages).
See Also
- Teuku Uma
- Uma period
- Submission of Teuku Uma
- General Deykerhoff
- Governor Van Heutsz
- Van Heutsz’s governorship
- Concentration Scheme
- Teuku Nanta Seutia
- Teuku Raja Itam
- Prang sabi (Holy War)
- VI Mukims
- Meura’sa
- Atjeh’s Westkust
- Great Acheh
- Aceh War
- 1896
- 1881
Source
The Achehnese, Vol. I, by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje, translated by A.W.S. O’Sullivan, indexed by R.J. Wilkinson. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906.