The Battle of Senelop (17 April 1896) — the lifting, evacuation of the posts of Senelop and Lamsoet by the 1e Colonne of Lt.-Col. J. B. van Heutsz — was the hardest-fought single action of the Atjeh-oorlog in the spring of 1896, a day of sustained combat along the kampong belt of Bralon, Lam-Bada, and Anak Baté that Kruisheer characterises as “one of the heaviest days our troops experienced in 1896” (one of the heaviest days our troops experienced in 1896). The voorhoede under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland — eight brigades of maréchaussée and a peloton of the 3e Bataljon — bore the brunt of the fighting, in the course of which the column lost a 7 c.M. A. veld-gun (its breech-block and sight removed before abandonment), a 12 c.M. mortar, and a mitrailleur-chest with barrels. Two artillery sergeants, Putman and Klaassen, died of overexertion — Putman of sunstroke, Klaassen of a stroke — in the course of the day. Enemy losses were 75 killed (including the Habib Lhong and Panglima Nja Bintang) and 88 heavily plus 80 lightly wounded. Simultaneously, the 2e Colonne of Kol. Stemfoort lifted Anak-Galoeng and Lam-Barih — an operation marred by a friendly-fire incident at Anak Baté in which Lt. Hoolboom’s mountain battery killed six European fusiliers.
Background
The evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 12 April 1896 had inaugurated the wholesale abandonment of the western buitenlinie. Lt.-Gen. Vetter resolved to complete the evacuation in a single coordinated operation. Two colonnes were formed. The 1e Colonne, under Lt.-Col. J. B. van Heutsz — Chef van den Staf Kapt. Kronouer; Adjudant 1e Luit. Gentil; toegevoegd 1e Luit. Vosmaer (acting controleur); four ordonnansen and two Achehnese guides — comprised eight maréchaussée brigades under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland (3 lieutenants, 160 European and native), a peloton of the 1e compagnie of the 3e Bataljon (repeater rifles) under Kapt. van Aken (2 lieutenants, 78 men), the 14e Bataljon under Maj. van der Noordaa (15 officers, 147 European, 308 native), the 4e Bergbatterij in two sections under Kapt. Bangert (2 officers, 38 European, 22 native, 4 guns), a cavalry platoon under 1e Luit. Herfkens (1 officer, 31 riders), an engineer detachment under 1e Luit. Plantenga (1 officer, 11 European, 19 native), and a baggage train. Its task was to lift Senelop and Lamsoet.
The 2e Colonne, under Kol. Stemfoort personally, was to lift Anak-Galoeng and Lam-Barih. The two colonnes operated in parallel on the morning of 17 April 1896.
The Advance to Lam Soet
At 6 a.m. on 17 April 1896 the 1e Colonne stood ready in march order and marched via Siroen to Lamsoet. The cavalry reconnoitred Lam Dam, Gapoe, and Loeboek; the maréchaussée did the same for the houses and yards; the engineers opened the path somewhat. Lam Soet was reached at 8 a.m. without seeing the enemy. The cavalry went ahead again after a brief rest and at 8:15 a.m. reported that the bridge south-east of the post was destroyed. Under cover of three maréchaussée brigades under 1e Luit. Dijkstra it was repaired. The hill north of Lam Oe was enemy-occupied, as was kampong Tjot Goet and the whole right bank of the Kroeng Lingkar. The colonne-commander, who had wanted to place artillery on that hill, desisted — he lacked enough troops to operate a column on the right bank of the Kroeng Lingkar, which would have been necessary.
The cavalry continued southward and, approximately 350 m south of the just-repaired bridge, ran into a heavy bamboo fence behind which a numerous band was posted. A horse was immediately wounded; the cavalry cleared the road for the maréchaussée and engineers. After reconnaissance the voorhoede-commander was told that the voorhoede had stumbled on an enemy fortification extending to the Atjeh River, and artillery was requested. The terrain in the kampongs south of the Lamsoet–Senelop road was very covered; sawahs around kampong Belang and north of Bralon and Lam-Bada were in places swampy and dotted with small heights — the tjots — on which numerous enemy bentengs, facing north, had been built. At 8:50 a.m. the colonne-commander received another message: the fortification could not be outflanked. Kapt. Graafland had meanwhile deployed: the 3e Bataljon peloton in the sugar-cane field north of the fortification, the maréchaussée with two brigades in reserve behind. The fortification had earthen walls with a double standing bamboo obstruction in front; bamboo-thorn immediately against the breastwork. While awaiting artillery, the repeater rifles opened fire at 100 m; the Ambonese maréchaussée Savie (No. 31497) was immediately wounded.
The Heaviest Day
What followed was, in Kruisheer’s words, “one of the heaviest days our troops experienced in 1896.” The Achehnese defence was conducted with a determination and a coordination that bore witness to the unification of the resistance under Teuku Umar and his allies. The voorhoede of Graafland was forced to fight its way forward kampong by kampong — Bralon, Lam-Bada, Anak Baté — against bentengs that had to be stormed individually and that were, in the intervals, fed by reinforcements from the south. The 7 c.M. A. veld-gun, the 12 c.M. mortar, and the mitrailleur-chest — pushed forward to support the assault — were overwhelmed by the intensity of the enemy fire and had to be abandoned, their breech-blocks and sights removed to render them useless to the enemy. The two artillery sergeants, Putman and Klaassen, died in the course of the day — Putman of sunstroke, Klaassen of a stroke — victims of the heat, the overexertion, and the intensity of the combat. The text explicitly criticises Van Heutsz for placing artillery in the rearguard and for not securing the Lamsoet–Senelop communication. The casualties on the Achehnese side were 75 killed (including the celebrated Habib Lhong and Panglima Nja Bintang) and 88 heavily plus 80 lightly wounded — a figure that, while substantial, was nonetheless insufficient to break the Achehnese hold on the kampong belt.
The Concurrent Operations and the Friendly-Fire Incident
While Van Heutsz’s 1e Colonne fought its way to Senelop, the 2e Colonne of Kol. Stemfoort lifted Anak-Galoeng and Lam-Barih with relatively light opposition. The evacuation of the western buitenlinie was, however, marred by a friendly-fire incident at Anak Baté: Lt. Hoolboom’s mountain battery, firing in support of the infantry, overshot and killed six European fusiliers of the 3e Bataljon. The incident — a bitter and avoidable loss — was deeply felt in the 3e Bataljon and was the subject of a board of inquiry. Kruisheer records it without comment but with the names of the dead.
The bridge at Ana’ Galong was blown by Dutch engineers during the evacuation, sealing the western line behind the retreating column.
Aftermath
By the end of 17 April 1896 the western buitenlinie had ceased to exist. Senelop, Lamsoet, Anak-Galoeng, and Lam-Barih were all in Dutch hands only for the hours necessary to withdraw their garrisons and burn their installations; by nightfall the colonnes were back on the consolidated line. The casualties of the 1e Colonne — the lost guns, the deaths of Putman and Klaassen, the heavy losses among the maréchaussée brigades — were a sharp reminder of the cost of fighting a unified Achehnese enemy on his own ground. The death of Habib Lhong — one of the principal war-leaders of the western mukims — was, however, a substantial blow to the Achehnese, and the 75 enemy killed represented a serious attrition that the resistance could ill afford.
Significance
The Battle of Senelop on 17 April 1896 was the high-water mark of the Achehnese counter-offensive that had begun with the defection of 29 March 1896. The Dutch had been forced to abandon the western buitenlinie — the entire strategic edifice of 1893–1896 — at the cost of the heaviest day’s fighting of the campaign. But the battle was also the moment at which the initiative began to turn. The death of Habib Lhong and Panglima Nja Bintang deprived the Achehnese of two of their most effective commanders; the 75 killed and 168 wounded were losses that, repeated, would grind the resistance down. Within five weeks the Dutch would launch the three-day offensive of 23 May–25 May 1896, would capture and destroy Teuku Umar’s house at Lam-Pisang, and would chastise the Lamkrak mukims. The Battle of Senelop was, in retrospect, the moment at which the Dutch stopped retreating and began, however painfully, to advance.
See Also
- J. B. van Heutsz
- Jhr. G. J. W. C. H. Graafland
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Habib Lhong
- Panglima Nja Bintang
- Senelop
- Lamsoet
- Anak Baté
- Lam-Bada
- Mitrailleur
- Evacuation of Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, Senelop (17 April 1896)
- Putman
- Klaassen
- Luitenant Hoolboom
- 1896
- Aceh War
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 93–118, 640, 702.