The Battle of Lemboe (25–26 December 1873) was the first major engagement of the second Aceh expedition on land, fought on 25–26 December 1873 when strong Dutch columns under opperbevelhebber van Swieten sallied south from the bivouak of Penajoeng in search of a grasvlakte on which to deploy, ran into heavily entrenched Atjehnees positions at the kampong of Lemboe on the right bank of the Atjeh-rivier, and after a “bloedigen strijd” carried the position at the cost of nearly a hundred and fifty dood en gekwetsten — only for van Swieten, “onbegrijpelijk genoeg,” to order the captured ground immediately abandoned.
The Situation at Penajoeng
The landing at Pedro-punt of 6 December 1873 had placed the expeditionary force on the right bank of the Atjeh-rivier at Penajoeng, some 1200 passen from the great fortified Mesigit that guarded the northern approach to the Kraton. For eight days after the landing the army sat idle in camp. The Atjehneezen, Borel insists, used every hour of that respite: when the Dutch finally stirred, they found that the enemy “had zich overal ingegraven.” Trenches, bamboe-doeri hedges, schietkokers and versterkingen had sprung up across the entire face of the country between Penajoeng and the Kraton. The high reeds and the palm groves gave the defenders every advantage of an ambush country.
The Action of 25–26 December
On 25 December 1873 strong Dutch columns rukten zuidwaarts to find a grasvlakte on which the troops might be exercised and the veldgeschut deployed. They hit the enemy stellingen at Lemboe — a kampong on the right bank of the river — and were “van alle zijden hevig beschoten.” For hours the Dutch infantry were exposed on the open sawah to what Borel calls “moordend vuur.” The columns pressed on, and after a “bloedigen strijd” the kampong was carried on 26 December. Dutch losses were severe: “nagenoeg 150 gesneuvelden en gekwetsten.” The enemy’s losses are recorded as “vermoedelijk slechts onbeduidend,” since the Atjehneezen fired from cover and retired swiftly when their positions became untenable.
The Abandonment
What happened next is, in Borel’s account, one of the most inexplicable decisions of the campaign. The captured ground at Lemboe — paid for in Dutch blood — was ordered abandoned the very day it was taken. The explanation, so far as one can be reconstructed, lay in van Swieten’s horror of further casualties and his “gruwel van bloedvergieten”: a forward post at Lemboe would have to be garrisoned, supplied, and defended against nightly attacks, and van Swieten, Borel writes, “stak het zwaard voor goed in de scheede” rather than accept the burden. The consequence was decisive. By abandoning Lemboe the Dutch surrendered the right bank of the Atjeh-rivier to the enemy, and the position would have to be re-fought in November 1874 at fresh cost by kolonel Pel. The same pattern — capture and immediate abandonment — would recur at the expedition to Bital and the expedition to Ketapang Doewa two months later. Borel treats the abandonment of Lemboe as the first clear signal of the afwachtende houding that would dominate the rest of van Swieten’s command.
See Also
- Second Aceh Expedition (1873–1874)
- Lemboe
- Penajoeng
- Atjeh-rivier
- Conquest of Lemboe (7 November 1874)
- Expedition to Bital (12 February 1874)
- Expedition to Ketapang Doewa (15 February 1874)
- Jan van Swieten
- Afwachtende houding
- Sawah
- Bamboe-doeri versperringen
- 1873
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 14, 20, 46, 64.