Van Swieten’s legerorder on sleeping sentinels was the field order issued by generaal van Swieten at K. Radja in 1874 — the “legerorder” in which, instead of applying article 92 of the Criminal Code to sentinels found asleep on post, he instructed the chiefs of corps to punish them disciplinarily, citing an anecdote of Napoleon I who once took the rifle of a sleeping sentinel and stood his post himself. Borel considers the order unlawful and highly damaging — a characteristic instance of the “overdreven zachte en humane” (excessively soft and humane) war that van Swieten waged and of the want of discipline that, in Borel’s judgement, prolonged the Atjeh-oorlog.
The Order and Its Rationale
The legerorder was issued in response to the recurring discovery of Dutch sentinels asleep on post at K. Radja and the surrounding bivouaks — a problem that became acute after the departure of the hoofdmacht on 26 April 1874, when the bezettingskorps under kolonel Pel was reduced to a fraction of its nominal strength and the troops were exhausted by malaria, cholera, the kwade moesson and the constant alarm. Instead of applying article 92 of the Criminal Code — which criminalised sleeping on post and prescribed court-martial (krijgsraad) — van Swieten instructed the chiefs of corps to punish sleeping sentinels disciplinarily. To justify the order he cited an anecdote of Napoleon I, who, coming upon a sleeping sentinel, is said to have taken the man’s rifle and stood his post himself rather than have him punished. The anecdote — apocryphal or not — was, in van Swieten’s reasoning, an example of the humane indulgence that a great commander might extend to a tired soldier. The order was issued in writing and distributed to the corps.
Borel’s Critique
Borel’s critique of the legerorder is twofold. First, he considers it unlawful: the Crimineel Wetboek, article 92 was the statutory provision governing sleeping on post, and a field order could not lawfully withdraw its application. To do so was to substitute the commander’s personal discretion for the law of the land. Second, he considers it highly damaging: the padi-snijden concession to Langkroek, the refusal to shell kampongs, the prohibition on burning kampongs or cutting standing padi, the gifts to spies — all these “overdreven zachte en humane” measures had their counterpart in the legerorder’s indulgence of sleeping sentinels. The consequence was a relaxation of discipline at the very moment when the bezettingskorps was besieged, exhausted and reduced to a shadow of its strength. The night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit of 22 November 1875 — when a band of ~50 Atjehneezen climbed the low borstwering and “met de blanke klewang” hacked among sleeping manschappen, wounding 13 including 2 officers — was, Borel suspected, “hoogst waarschijnlijk” the fault of schildwachten who had neglected their post. The legerorder was, in Borel’s reading, an invitation to such disasters.
The Broader Pattern
The legerorder on sleeping sentinels is, in Borel’s account, one of a series of documents and acts by which van Swieten conducted what Borel calls an “overdreven zachte en humane” war. The padi-snijden concession, the prohibition on burning kampongs, the gifts to spies, the refusal to shell kampongs within range of the Kraton — all were of a piece with the legerorder. The result was a war fought with “schop en spade” rather than with the kracht der wapens, and a bezettingskorps that was, by the end of May 1874, on the brink of collapse. Pel — who inherited the bezettingskorps on 26 April 1874 — reversed most of these policies: from 28 April 1874 he ordered the daily bombardment of kampongs within range; he ordered the cutting of standing padi; he burned kampongs from which the Dutch were fired on. The legerorder on sleeping sentinels was, however, not formally withdrawn — and the want of discipline it had licensed continued, in Borel’s judgement, to cost Dutch lives through the attacks on Longbatta-Mesigit (22 November 1875), on Lemboe-N.O. (23–24 January 1876) and on the Atoeh detachment (13 February 1876). It stands, in Borel’s account, as a small but instructive document of the war.
See Also
- Jan van Swieten
- Crimineel Wetboek art. 92
- Generaal Pel
- Night attack on Longbatta-Mesigit (22 November 1875)
- Atoeh catastrophe (13 February 1876)
- Afwachtende houding
- Bezettingskorps in Atjeh
- Klewang
- 1874
Source
Onze vestiging in Atjeh, critisch beschreven, by G. F. W. Borel, Kapitein der Artillerie. ‘s-Gravenhage: D. A. Thieme, 1878. pp. 171–172, 270, 286, 294, 304.