The Second Letter of Teuku Umar — reproduced as Annex IV of Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 and dated from Lampisang on 29 Sawal 1313, equivalent to 12 April 1896 — was the second of three letters from Teuku Umar (writing as Toekoe Oemar, T. Djohan Pahalawan) to the Governor of Atjeh. The letter was addressed simultaneously to the Governor, the Chief of Staff, the Resident van Langen, and the assistent-resident at Koeta-Radja, and contained, according to Kruisheer, “not only his demands but also a complete program of action” he had drawn up for himself. The letter dropped much of the pretextual grievance-list of the First Letter of 30 March 1896 and stated openly Umar’s disappointment at being told he would never receive the expected knighthood, while demanding ƒ150,000 per month to pay his warriors and demanding the hereditary succession of his son as Panglima Prang.
Background
By 12 April 1896 the strategic situation in Groot-Atjeh had deteriorated sharply since Umar’s defection of 29 March 1896. The Dutch outer line (buitenlinie) was under pressure everywhere: the posts of Biloel and Lam Koenjit had been besieged since the defection, Senelop was being heavily bombarded from Lam Bada and Ana Galoeng was repeatedly attacked. Lt.-Gen. Vetter had arrived as Regeeringscommissaris on 7 April 1896, had Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff honorably relieved of his functions, and had assumed both civil and military command. On 8 April 1896 Vetter had launched Kolonel Stemfoort’s column to relieve Biloel and Lamkoenjit, and on 12 April 1896 — the very day of Umar’s letter — Vetter ordered the evacuation and burning of both posts. The first Proclamation of the Regeeringscommissaris announcing the purpose of his arrival was spread on or about the same day.
Umar wrote from his house at Lampisang, at the centre of his stelling in the VI Moekims, surrounded by his warriors and by the defected hoeloebalang of neighbouring mukims — among them T. Tjoet Toengkoeb of XXII Moekims, T. Tjoet Lamtengah of Moekim Lamtengah, and T. Hoesin Lehong Bata of Lam-Krak. He addressed his letter not only to the Governor but to the entire Dutch chain of command, signalling that he considered himself no longer a subordinate but a negotiator.
Content
The letter is the most candid of the three. Umar begins by clarifying that he has not changed allegiance — a transparent fiction given the simultaneous evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit — but he adprovided that openly his disappointment at being told he would never receive the Royal knighthood he had been led to expect. He then sets out his demands: ƒ150,000 per month to pay his warriors; a promise to fight the enemies of the Kompeni but to exclude territorial chiefs from military affairs; and a request that his son succeed him as Panglima Prang — a hereditary claim foreign to Acehnese custom.
Umar then names the benting te Ana’ Galong — that is, the benteng (fortification) of Anak Galoeng — as the place where vivres (vivres) are to be delivered for his forces, an extraordinary demand that the Dutch should provision his army at a post he himself had recently conquered for them in 1893. He declares he will not appear before the Governor until “het land van Selimoen” is acquired — a territorial demand whose meaning Kruisheer does not gloss. The letter mentions the the chief of Lhong as his helper, suggesting that the network of Acehnese chiefs aligned with him had extended toward the west coast. The letter is signed with the seal — the formal insignia of his office as Panglima Prang Besar.
Reception and Aftermath
The Dutch administration treated the Second Letter as a definitive statement of Umar’s program of action — Kruisheer’s phrase. From this point onward, Dutch policy moved decisively toward military confrontation. The Regeeringscommissaris replied to Umar in writing on 25 April 1896 with three points: (1) Umar’s profession of unchanged loyalty was false, else he would have returned the geleende oorlogsmaterieel from the Lamkrak campaign; (2) his profession of not wanting to fight the Government was equally false, else he would not have built versterkingen in the VI Moekims; (3) to be received in grace, Umar must by 26 April hand in all geleende oorlogsmaterieel, demolish the versterkingen, and submit anew. Umar’s reply of 26 April 1896 morning asked for a three-day extension without any definite promise — which the Regeeringscommissaris denied the same day. TheThird Letter of 23 April 1896 followed, and on 26 April 1896 the 11 formally dismissed Umar from his offices.
Significance
The Second Letter is the central document of the Umar crisis. Its open enumeration of grievances and demands destroyed any possibility of negotiation: the demand for ƒ150,000 monthly, the hereditary Panglima Prang claim, and the insistence on Dutch provisioning of his forces at Ana’ Galong could not be accepted by any colonial administration. Equally significant is the letter’s list of addressees, which shows Umar attempting to deal with the Dutch chain of command as a peer rather than a subordinate. The mention of the Kedjoeroean van Lhong as helper reveals the geographic scope of his alliance network, reaching across the VI and IV Moekims toward the west coast. As a historical document, the letter is the clearest single statement of Umar’s strategic programme and the most candid expression of his disappointment over the denied knighthood — a personal grievance whose consequences reshaped the Atjeh-oorlog.
See Also
- Teuku Umar
- Luitenant-Generaal Vetter
- Resident K. F. H. van Langen
- Defection of Teuku Umar (29 March 1896)
- First Letter of Teuku Umar to the Governor of Atjeh (Bijlage II)
- Third Letter of Teuku Umar (23 April 1896)
- 11 (Bijlage VI)
- Ana’ Galong
- Lampisang
- Panglima Prang Besar
- 1896
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 13 (TOC), 14, 42, 82, 341–343.