The Geheim schrijven (secret operational instruction) from the Regeeringscommissaris — preserved in the narrative of Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96 on page 60 — was the secret operational order issued by Lt.-Gen. Vetter as Regeeringscommissaris to Kolonel Stemfoort, the commander of the column ordered to relieve the besieged Dutch posts of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 8 April 1896. The instruction, issued before 8 April 1896 — Vetter’s first full day of operational command in Aceh — comprised three numbered orders: (1°) to inflict losses on the enemy; (2°) to prevent kampong burning; and (3°) authorisation to withdraw the garrison if needed. The instruction is the first operational document of the Regeeringscommissaris phase of the Atjeh-oorlog and reveals Vetter’s operational priorities at the moment of his assumption of command.
Background
Lt.-Gen. Vetter had arrived in Aceh on 7 April 1896 aboard the steamers Carpentier and Bantam, with the 9e Bataljon Infantry, Kolonel Stemfoort, and Maj. Breijer. His arrival was the direct response of the Government at Batavia to the defection of Teuku Umar on 29 March 1896 and to the consequent collapse of the buitenlinie. He immediately honorably relieved Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff of his functions as Civiel en Militair Gouverneur and assumed both civil and military command of Atjeh and Dependencies.
Within hours of his arrival Vetter was confronted with the operational crisis of the besieged outer posts. Biloel had been invested since the defection; Lamkoenjit had been under near-continuous attack since 31 March 1896 and had repulsed a major night assault on 4 April–5 April 1896. The 8e and 14e Bataljons of the geconcentreerde linie (concentrated line) at Koeta Radja were available for a relief operation, and Kolonel Stemfoort — who had arrived with Vetter on 7 April 1896 — was designated to command the relief column. Before the column set out on 8 April 1896, Vetter issued the secret writing setting out the operational instructions.
Content
The geheim schrijven was issued by Lt.-Gen. Vetter in his capacity as Regeeringscommissaris to Kolonel Stemfoort as commander of the relief column. The instruction comprised three numbered bevelen:
1° — Inflict losses on the enemy. The first order was that the relief column, on its march from Koeta Radja to Biloel and Lamkoenjit, should actively seek engagement with Umar’s forces and inflict losses on them. This was not a relief operation in the limited sense of breaking the siege; it was a punitive operation that would engage and reduce Umar’s forces in the field.
2° — Prevent kampong burning. The second order was that the column should prevent the burning of kampongs. This was a political as much as a military instruction: Vetter, having just assumed civil as well as military authority, was concerned to limit the destruction of civilian property and to preserve the possibility of the local population’s return to Dutch allegiance. The instruction distinguishes the Regeeringscommissaris’s approach from the more indiscriminate punitive destruction that would characterise the later operations of June 1896.
3° — Authorisation to withdraw garrison if needed. The third order authorised the column to withdraw the garrison of Biloel and/or Lamkoenjit — that is, to evacuate the posts rather than reinforce them — if operational circumstances required. This was the formal authorisation for the evacuation that would in fact be carried out on 12 April 1896, four days after the relief.
The three orders together define Vetter’s initial operational posture: aggressive engagement of Umar’s forces, restraint toward civilian property, and operational flexibility on the question of the outer posts. The instruction is secret because it authorised the potential evacuation of the outer posts — a politically sensitive decision that, if known in advance, would have damaged the morale of the garrisons and the credibility of the Dutch position.
Reception and Aftermath
The relief column under Kolonel Stemfoort set out on 8 April 1896 and reached Biloel and Lamkoenjit without major opposition, though there were sharp combats along the route — including the action near Masdjid Oleh Soesoeh in which Kapt. Geluk was killed. The relief column had 1 officer and 7 men killed, 2 officers and 23 men wounded. The garrisons of Biloel and Lamkoenjit were relieved but, in accordance with the third of Vetter’s instructions, the decision was taken to evacuate both posts. The evacuation was carried out on 12 April 1896, with both posts burned by engineer troops; the evacuation casualties were 10 wounded.
The decision authorised by the third instruction set the pattern for the next two weeks: the buitenlinie was progressively abandoned — Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet and Senelop on 17 April 1896, and Kroeng Gloempang, Tjot Rang and Toengkoeb on 20 April 1896 — and the Dutch forces concentrated around Koeta Radja. The political framework for this concentration was announced in the Proclamation of 12 April 1896. The first and second instructions — inflict losses, prevent kampong burning — defined the operational posture of the Regeeringscommissaris phase until the dismissal of Umar on 26 April 1896 and the Proclamation of 27 April 1896 opened the conventional military phase.
Significance
The geheim schrijven is the first operational document of the Regeeringscommissaris phase of the Atjeh-oorlog and reveals Vetter’s initial operational priorities: aggressive engagement, restraint toward civilian property, and operational flexibility on the outer posts. The third instruction — authorisation to withdraw garrisons — was the legal predicate for the abandonment of the buitenlinie that defined the strategic situation of April–May 1896. As a historical document, the geheim schrijven is preserved only in the narrative of page 60, not in the Annexes; its informal status as a “secret writing” rather than a formal besluit or proclamatie signals its operational rather than political character.
See Also
- Luitenant-Generaal Vetter
- J. W. Stemfoort
- Relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (8 April 1896)
- Evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (12 April 1896)
- Proclamation of the Regeeringscommissaris (12 April 1896)
- Proclamation of Lt. Gen. Vetter to the heads and people of the 3 sagi of Groot-Atjeh (27 April 1896)
- Defection of Teuku Umar (29 March 1896)
- Buitenlinie
- Regeeringscommissaris
- 1896
Source
ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, p. 60.