The Karimon Islands (Dutch Karimon-eilanden; also Karimun, Carimons; modern Karimun) are a small group of islands lying in the Strait of Malacca, off the south-western coast of the Malay Peninsula and to the east of Sumatra. In the early nineteenth century the Karimons were briefly considered — first by Major Farquhar of Malacca, then by Raffles — as a possible site for a new British settlement; the resulting episode, in which Raffles broke off the Acheh commission of January 1819 in order to inspect them, is the immediate origin of the founding of Singapore a few weeks later.

Farquhar’s discovery and Raffles’s detour

Major Farquhar had returned in 1818 from a voyage of discovery to West Borneo and Lingga, where at Pontianak he had been rebuffed by the Dutch commissioner Van Boekholz but at Lingga he had concluded a treaty with the sultan. On these voyages he had formed the conviction that the Karimon Islands “zouden aanbieden” — would offer — excellent opportunities for a British establishment. The Dutch governor of Malacca, Thyssen, reported to Wolterbeek on 11 November 1818 that “de Majoor hoopt nog op het bezitnemen van de Karimon-eilanden; op Poeloe Pinang schijnt het in bezit nemen van dezelve en het koningrijk Adcheen gelegen op Sumatra, een zeker plan” — that is, that the taking-up of the Karimons, together with the kingdom of Acheh on Sumatra, appeared to be a settled British design. On the afternoon of 19 January 1819 Farquhar wrote from Penang to Raffles, then preparing for the Acheh voyage, communicating his favourable opinion of the islands.

Raffles’s sudden departure from Penang

Raffles found Farquhar’s invitation of such importance that he at once abandoned the Acheh commission, which Bannerman had insisted could not be delayed. He “suddenly embarked from the Island without previous intimation either to that Government or to his colleague captain Coombs; and sailed in prosecution of the separate mission with which he was charged to the eastern Islands”. Worse, Raffles took with him the artillery and military stores which Bannerman had destined for the Acheh expedition, leaving for both colleagues only a written notification. He was back at Penang within a fortnight, having in that brief time laid the foundation of a great city — “een anti-Batavia”, in Van der Kemp’s phrase. The Dutch officials at Malacca, Thyssen wrote to Wolterbeek, feared that the Karimons were merely the first object of a new British attack on the Dutch possessions.

In the treaty of 1824

The Karimons reappear at the close of the treaty of London of 1824. Article 12 of the treaty, after providing that the Netherlands should withdraw from Singapore, continues (as Van der Kemp quotes it): “Daarentegen belooft Zijne Groot-Brittannische Majesteit, dat geen Britsch kantoor zal worden opgerigt op de Carimons-eilanden, of op de eilanden Battam, Bintang, Lingen of op eenig der andere eilanden, liggende ten zuiden van Sinkapoer”. That is, Britain pledged to establish no office on the Karimons or on Batam, Bintan, Lingga or any of the other islands south of Singapore, nor to contract treaties with their chiefs. The Karimons thus take their place, alongside Singapore itself, among the islands which the treaty of 1824 divided between the two spheres — though Van der Kemp observes that the same treaty contained, in its Article 6, the provision against new offices whose later construction would be turned against the Dutch themselves on Sumatra.

Place in the wider argument

The Karimons episode is treated by Van der Kemp as the practical proof of two propositions. First, it shows Raffles’s character — his readiness to break with instructions, abandon his colleague, and seize an opportunity when it presented itself. Second, it shows the structural weakness of the Dutch position in 18181819: although Wolterbeek’s Riouw treaty had been supposed to guarantee the Dutch against further British establishments in those regions, the very next months saw Raffles inspecting the Karimons and, only a few weeks later, raising the British flag at Singapore. The Dutch had “thought themselves secured by Wolterbeek’s later Riouw treaty against all further establishments on the English side in those parts”, Van der Kemp writes — yet that security proved illusory. The Karimons are therefore, in Van der Kemp’s argument, a hinge between the Acheh commission and the founding of Singapore: the failure of the Karimons project was the immediate condition of the Singapore success.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159–239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.