Captain Robson was a British sea-captain who, on or about 18 March 1819, brought to schout-bij-nacht Wolterbeek — through Timmerman Thyssen — corrective intelligence that contradicted an alarming earlier report by Captain Smith about British military movements against the Carrimons. He is mentioned once in P. H. van der Kemp (1900), in the postscript to Appendix 4, which reproduces Thyssen’s private letter to Wolterbeek dated 16 March 1819.

The corrective report

Thyssen’s postscript reads:

“P.S. 18 Maart, met vreugde kan ik UHEG. melden, dat de komst van kapitein Robson het geheele nieuws door kapitein Smith meedegebracht heeft geannuleerd, en dat de scheepen, die hij te Carrimon moest aantrefven, scheepen zijn, die van Pulo Penang over Benkoelen derwaarts bestemd waaren, zij moesten te Benkoelen ammunitie en andere benodigdheden inladen, alzo de heer Raffies de Gouverneur Bannerman van niet konde bekomen wat hij wenschte, en dat uit zijn Gouvernement daarin heeft voorzien.”

In other words: the arrival of Captain Robson had entirely cancelled the news that Captain Smith had brought. The ships that Smith believed were destined for the Carrimons were, in fact, ships sent from Penang by way of Bencoolen to those islands; they had to load ammunition and other supplies at Bencoolen, because Raffles — unable to obtain from Governor Bannerman at Penang what he wanted — had been supplied from his own government at Bencoolen. The riddle was finally solved when news arrived from Penang that Raffles had given up his intended seizure of the Carrimons and had settled at Singapore instead.

Significance

Robson’s corrective intelligence arrived in the same weeks as the Raffles-Coombs Acheh Commission was concluding the Treaty of Pedir at Pedir. The episode is interesting to Van der Kemp as the immediate intelligence background to Raffles’s movements in February-March 1819 — and, in particular, as a concrete demonstration of the friction between Raffles and Bannerman at Penang. Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, had refused to supply Raffles with what he asked for; Raffles had therefore obtained what he needed from his own government at Bencoolen, and the ships bringing his supplies from Penang to Bencoolen had been mistaken by Captain Smith for an invasion fleet bound for the Carrimons.

Captain Robson’s report dissolved the alarm. It also confirmed Thyssen’s own scepticism about the more dramatic version of Smith’s intelligence — Thyssen had already written that he did not believe the report that Raffles was bound for Adcheen, and predicted that he would join his friends at the Carrimons and attempt an attack on Lingga instead. The subsequent news from Penang — that Raffles had given up the Carrimons and settled at Singapore — provided the final resolution.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159–239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.

Captain Robson was a British sea-captain who, on or about 18 March 1819, brought to schout-bij-nacht Wolterbeek — through Timmerman Thyssen — corrective intelligence that contradicted an alarming earlier report by Captain Smith about British military movements against the Carrimons. He is mentioned once in P. H. van der Kemp (1900), in the postscript to Appendix 4, which reproduces Thyssen’s private letter to Wolterbeek dated 16 March 1819.

The corrective report

Thyssen’s postscript reads:

“P.S. 18 Maart, met vreugde kan ik UHEG. melden, dat de komst van kapitein Robson het geheele nieuws door kapitein Smith meedegebracht heeft geannuleerd, en dat de scheepen, die hij te Carrimon moest aantrefven, scheepen zijn, die van Pulo Penang over Benkoelen derwaarts bestemd waaren, zij moesten te Benkoelen ammunitie en andere benodigdheden inladen, alzo de heer Raffies de Gouverneur Bannerman van niet konde bekomen wat hij wenschte, en dat uit zijn Gouvernement daarin heeft voorzien.”

In other words: the arrival of Captain Robson had entirely cancelled the news that Captain Smith had brought. The ships that Smith believed were destined for the Carrimons were, in fact, ships sent from Penang by way of Bencoolen to those islands; they had to load ammunition and other supplies at Bencoolen, because Raffles — unable to obtain from Governor Bannerman at Penang what he wanted — had been supplied from his own government at Bencoolen. The riddle was finally solved when news arrived from Penang that Raffles had given up his intended seizure of the Carrimons and had settled at Singapore instead.

Significance

Robson’s corrective intelligence arrived in the same weeks as the Raffles-Coombs Acheh Commission was concluding the Treaty of Pedir at Pedir. The episode is interesting to Van der Kemp as the immediate intelligence background to Raffles’s movements in February-March 1819 — and, in particular, as a concrete demonstration of the friction between Raffles and Bannerman at Penang. Bannerman, the Governor of Penang, had refused to supply Raffles with what he asked for; Raffles had therefore obtained what he needed from his own government at Bencoolen, and the ships bringing his supplies from Penang to Bencoolen had been mistaken by Captain Smith for an invasion fleet bound for the Carrimons.

Captain Robson’s report dissolved the alarm. It also confirmed Thyssen’s own scepticism about the more dramatic version of Smith’s intelligence — Thyssen had already written that he did not believe the report that Raffles was bound for Adcheen, and predicted that he would join his friends at the Carrimons and attempt an attack on Lingga instead. The subsequent news from Penang — that Raffles had given up the Carrimons and settled at Singapore — provided the final resolution.

See Also

Source

Raffles’ Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819, by P. H. van der Kemp, in Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 6e Volgr., Deel VII (1900), pp. 159–239. Universiteitsbibliotheek Vrije Universiteit, LS.08781.