J. F. Westerweel was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee who commanded the detachment at Panton Laboe on the night of 11–12 March 12 March 1942, when he was the first Dutch officer to report the approach of the Japanese invasion fleet off Idi on the east coast of Atjeh. He subsequently marched his brigades to Takengon, refused to recognise Palmer van den Broek’s 19 March 19 March capitulation, and was captured by the Japanese on 22–23 March 23 March 1942. He was then used by the Japanese as a gijzelaar in the pursuit of Colonel Gosenson at Blangkedjeren. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Westerweel’s role as hostage-witness to the engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 is the staff history’s only first-hand Japanese-side confirmation of Dutch-inflicted losses.
The Panton Laboe sighting (11/12 March 1942)
As detachementscommandant at Panton Laboe, Westerweel had under his command three brigades of the Seulimeum-colonne. On the night of 11–12 March 12 March 1942 he received a report from the kustwacht that hundreds of lights had been observed on the sea off the coast. He immediately dispatched one brigade by auto in the direction of Idi, where the lights had been sighted, with orders to establish what was happening. At daybreak the brigade-commandant reported by telephone that nine large ships were lying in line off the coast and that troops were being put ashore. After a brief patrol the brigade was nearly cut off by a Japanese patrol and forced to return. Westerweel alarmed the other posts and informed the Territoriaal Commandant at Takengon; he was ordered to move his brigades to Takengon as quickly as possible, which he did, arriving in the late evening.
Refusal to recognise the 19 March capitulation
When, on 19 March 19 March 1942, Palmer van den Broek decided to capitulate at Takengon, Westerweel — then with his brigades at Takengon — refused to recognise the order. He was “in kennis gesteld van dit voornemen” but “besloot met zijn troep af te marcheren om zich bij de Territoriaal Commandant te Blangkedjeren aan te sluiten.” On the night of 22–23 March 23 March 1942 he occupied a bivak in the covered terrein some distance from the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, having covered half the distance.
Capture and use as hostage
Unknown to Westerweel, the Japanese had set out from Takengon in hot pursuit of the Territoriaal Commandant. In the night of 22–23 March 23 March 1942 the bivak was “door de bevolking aan de vijand aangewezen” and was surrounded by two Japanese companies. Westerweel was captured with most of his troops; a number of his soldaten — “ongewapend en na hun uniform te hebben uitgetrokken” — succeeded in escaping in the darkness. Westerweel was returned to Takengon, where the Japanese commander, “teleurgesteld over het niet aantreffen van de Territoriaal Commandant, onmiddellijk besloot een nieuwe achtervolging in te zetten.” The pursuit was to be executed by “een bataljon, dat uit in de strijd in China geharde bergtroepen bestond.” Westerweel was taken along as gijzelaar, “om als gijzelaar te dienen voor het geval dat de Territoriaal Commandant zich niet zou overgeven.” His hands were bound behind his back and he was “voortdurend bewaakt.”
Witness to the engagement of 27 March 1942
During the Japanese advance from Takengon toward Blangkedjeren, Westerweel — as hostage — was able to observe the engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 between the Japanese battalion and Captain Van Nues’s stelling. After the Dutch capitulation at Blangkedjeren on 28 March 28 March 1942, Westerweel was able to confirm to Van Nues and to Lt Van der Waag that the Dutch mortieren en mitrailleurs had inflicted ”± 30 man aan gesneuvelden” on the Japanese — the staff history’s only first-hand Japanese-side confirmation of Dutch-inflicted losses in the Atjeh campaign.
Significance
Westerweel’s capture and use as hostage is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal narrative device by which the compilers establish the Japanese side of the Blangkedjeren engagement. His refusal to recognise the Takengon capitulation is also the staff history’s case study of the moral and operational difficulty of voortgezet verzet after a formal Dutch surrender — a difficulty the staff history emphasises throughout the Bijzondere verrichtingen na de capitulatie.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- Panton Laboe
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- F. J. van Nues
- A. van der Waag
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Takengon
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 143–150.
J. F. Westerweel was a lieutenant of the Netherlands Indies Army Maréchaussee who commanded the detachment at Panton Laboe on the night of 11–12 March 12 March 1942, when he was the first Dutch officer to report the approach of the Japanese invasion fleet off Idi on the east coast of Atjeh. He subsequently marched his brigades to Takengon, refused to recognise Palmer van den Broek’s 19 March 19 March capitulation, and was captured by the Japanese on 22–23 March 23 March 1942. He was then used by the Japanese as a gijzelaar in the pursuit of Colonel Gosenson at Blangkedjeren. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Westerweel’s role as hostage-witness to the engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 is the staff history’s only first-hand Japanese-side confirmation of Dutch-inflicted losses.
The Panton Laboe sighting (11/12 March 1942)
As detachementscommandant at Panton Laboe, Westerweel had under his command three brigades of the Seulimeum-colonne. On the night of 11–12 March 12 March 1942 he received a report from the kustwacht that hundreds of lights had been observed on the sea off the coast. He immediately dispatched one brigade by auto in the direction of Idi, where the lights had been sighted, with orders to establish what was happening. At daybreak the brigade-commandant reported by telephone that nine large ships were lying in line off the coast and that troops were being put ashore. After a brief patrol the brigade was nearly cut off by a Japanese patrol and forced to return. Westerweel alarmed the other posts and informed the Territoriaal Commandant at Takengon; he was ordered to move his brigades to Takengon as quickly as possible, which he did, arriving in the late evening.
Refusal to recognise the 19 March capitulation
When, on 19 March 19 March 1942, Palmer van den Broek decided to capitulate at Takengon, Westerweel — then with his brigades at Takengon — refused to recognise the order. He was “in kennis gesteld van dit voornemen” but “besloot met zijn troep af te marcheren om zich bij de Territoriaal Commandant te Blangkedjeren aan te sluiten.” On the night of 22–23 March 23 March 1942 he occupied a bivak in the covered terrein some distance from the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, having covered half the distance.
Capture and use as hostage
Unknown to Westerweel, the Japanese had set out from Takengon in hot pursuit of the Territoriaal Commandant. In the night of 22–23 March 23 March 1942 the bivak was “door de bevolking aan de vijand aangewezen” and was surrounded by two Japanese companies. Westerweel was captured with most of his troops; a number of his soldaten — “ongewapend en na hun uniform te hebben uitgetrokken” — succeeded in escaping in the darkness. Westerweel was returned to Takengon, where the Japanese commander, “teleurgesteld over het niet aantreffen van de Territoriaal Commandant, onmiddellijk besloot een nieuwe achtervolging in te zetten.” The pursuit was to be executed by “een bataljon, dat uit in de strijd in China geharde bergtroepen bestond.” Westerweel was taken along as gijzelaar, “om als gijzelaar te dienen voor het geval dat de Territoriaal Commandant zich niet zou overgeven.” His hands were bound behind his back and he was “voortdurend bewaakt.”
Witness to the engagement of 27 March 1942
During the Japanese advance from Takengon toward Blangkedjeren, Westerweel — as hostage — was able to observe the engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 between the Japanese battalion and Captain Van Nues’s stelling. After the Dutch capitulation at Blangkedjeren on 28 March 28 March 1942, Westerweel was able to confirm to Van Nues and to Lt Van der Waag that the Dutch mortieren en mitrailleurs had inflicted ”± 30 man aan gesneuvelden” on the Japanese — the staff history’s only first-hand Japanese-side confirmation of Dutch-inflicted losses in the Atjeh campaign.
Significance
Westerweel’s capture and use as hostage is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the principal narrative device by which the compilers establish the Japanese side of the Blangkedjeren engagement. His refusal to recognise the Takengon capitulation is also the staff history’s case study of the moral and operational difficulty of voortgezet verzet after a formal Dutch surrender — a difficulty the staff history emphasises throughout the Bijzondere verrichtingen na de capitulatie.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh en Onderhorigen
- Panton Laboe
- Major W. F. Palmer van den Broek
- F. J. van Nues
- A. van der Waag
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Takengon
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 143–150.