F. N. Nieuwenhuizen (full name: Frederik Nieuwenhuizen) was Vice-President of the Council of the Netherlands-Indies who served as the first Government Commissioner (Gouvernements-Commissaris) for the First Aceh Expedition of 1873. Appointed by Governor-General Loudon, Nieuwenhuizen was charged with the political direction of the expedition — the task of securing from Sultan Mahmud Shah a treaty recognizing Dutch sovereignty over Atjeh, failing which the military forces would compel compliance. His handling of the negotiations in March 1873 was sharply criticized by Lieutenant-General Van Swieten as a principal cause of the expedition’s failure and the subsequent war.
The First Expedition
By the secret decision of 4 March 1873 No. 1, Governor-General Loudon ordered that a military expeditionary force be sent to Atjeh “with the objective of compelling the rulers of the realm of Atjeh, in the event of the peaceful efforts to be made beforehand by the Government Commissioner proving unsuccessful, to satisfy the demands to be made upon them by that Commissioner, if need be by force of arms.”
Nieuwenhuizen departed Batavia on 7 March 1873 aboard {{HMS Citadel van Antwerpen}}, commanded by Captain-Lieutenant J. W. Binkes, accompanied by the government steamer {{HMS Siak}} under J. H. Meijer. At Riouw, the gunboat {{HMS Coehoorn}} under J. J. Engelvaart joined the squadron. Arriving at Pinang on 16 March, Nieuwenhuizen found {{HMS Marnix}}, commanded by A. Rietveld, already awaiting orders. At Pinang, Controleur Kraaijenhoff placed himself at the Commissioner’s disposal, along with the interpreter team including Sidi Tahil, Datoe Setia Aboe Hassan, Toekoe Mohamad Arifin, and others.
The Pinang Intelligence
At Pinang, Nieuwenhuizen received reports that deeply influenced his subsequent conduct. From various quarters he learned that in Atjeh, a passionate agitation reigned against the Dutch, as a consequence of the military preparations that had become known. The Acehnese, it was reported, longed for the Dutch arrival and the moment to measure themselves against them, and felt confident of victory based on the substantial forces gathered there.
Toekoe Pajah and the Radja of Simpang-Olim, along with other Acehnese notables, were at Pinang at the same time as the Commissioner, ostensibly to observe Dutch movements. They were “bitter beyond measure” against the Dutch and had rejected a sideways invitation to meet with the Commissioner, declaring themselves resolved to fight to the last man and then to test what resistance the women and children could offer.
Furthermore, it was reported that since August 1872, more than 15,000 rifles and 5,000 barrels of gunpowder had been imported into Groot-Atjeh. The Dutch vice-consul at Pinang had communicated this officially.
These reports, Nieuwenhuizen believed, warranted an immediate bombardment upon the declaration of war to deny the Acehnese time to prepare. Captain Binkes shared this view, writing that “probably several prominent houses and perhaps the Kraton itself lay within range of the ships’ rifled guns.”
The Failed Negotiations
Nieuwenhuizen’s conduct of the negotiations — from the dispatch of Sidi Tahil with the first letter on 22 March 1873, through the exchange of increasingly frustrated correspondence with the Sultan, to the formal declaration of war on 26 March — was later subjected withering criticism by Van Swieten. The central charges were:
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Wrong intermediary: Sidi Tahil, a merchant from Priaman, was not a suitable person to represent the Netherlands-India Government before the Sultan of an independent realm. He lacked diplomatic standing and, by all accounts including that of Toengkoe Kali, behaved clumsily.
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Refusal to use Kraaijenhoff: Kraaijenhoff, who had previously spoken with the Sultan and knew him personally, had offered to carry the letter himself. Nieuwenhuizen refused, deeming it too dangerous for Kraaijenhoff’s life. Van Swieten considered this fear unfounded and argued that the Commissioner had “sacrificed a probable great advantage to avoid an imaginary danger to individuals.”
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Failure to anchor properly: The ships anchored aggressively close to shore instead of at the customary roadstead, projecting a threatening posture before any negotiation had been attempted.
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Premature rupture: The negotiations were broken off too quickly, without sufficient exploration of the possibility that the Sultan, while indecisive, was not unwilling.
The Telegram and the Governor-General’s Reply
Nieuwenhuizen’s indecision manifested most clearly in his telegram of 17 March from Pinang to Loudon, requesting permission to bombard immediately upon declaration of war. Loudon, perceiving in this request a reluctance to act on his own responsibility, telegraphed back: he gave Nieuwenhuizen full authority to act as he thought fit, even outside his instructions; he would cover him with his responsibility. “If peaceful solution is impossible, the watchword must be: act vigorously. Trust in me, as I do in you.”
Van Swieten noted that a Government Commissioner must have the courage to act on his own responsibility in everything concerning his mission, even contrary to his instructions, when circumstances arise that the instructions did not foresee. To shrink from acting on one’s own responsibility and shift the burden to a Governor-General who is not present and cannot assess the necessity of deviation is, Van Swieten wrote, “not to be approved.”
Legacy
Nieuwenhuizen’s role in the opening chapter of the Aceh War remains one of the most contested in Dutch colonial history. Van Swieten placed the principal blame for the war’s outbreak — and its subsequent duration — on the failures of March 1873, and Nieuwenhuizen’s handling of the negotiations was, in his judgment, the proximate cause. The moderate Acehnese voices that might have produced a peaceful settlement, notably Toengkoe Kali, were alienated by the clumsy and aggressive posture of the Dutch approach. “Probably the war would not have come,” Van Swieten wrote, “if the negotiations of March 1873 had been better conducted.”
Account from Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh (1923)
F. N. Nieuwenhuizen — spelled “Nieuwenhuyzen” and “Nieuwenhujzeen” in Joh. Langhout’s text — was the Vice-President of the Council of the Netherlands Indies who, as Government Commissioner, delivered the Netherlands Indian Government’s letters to the Sultan of Atjeh in March 1873, demanded explanations for the Sultan’s “treacherous conduct”, and, on behalf of the Government, declared war on Atjeh on 26 March 1873.
The commission
After intelligence received from the Consul-General at Singapore that an envoy of the Sultan had left for France and another Atjehnese deputation sought help against the Dutch government with America and Italy — reports never fully cleared of exaggeration — the Indian Government judged that the time had come for a more resolute action. Nieuwenhuizen, then Vice-President of the Council, was charged as Government Commissioner to ask the Sultan of Atjeh for explanation concerning his treacherous conduct and to bring about a proper regulation of the relations between the Netherlands and Atjeh.
The mission
Nieuwenhuizen departed from Batavia on 7 March 1873 and, after stopping at Riouw, Singapore and Penang, arrived on 22 March in the roadstead of Atjeh with four warships. The interpreter Sidi Tahil, who had acted as interpreter at earlier visits of warships, was forthwith sent ashore with a letter from the Government Commissioner to the Sultan — for the conveyance of the interpreter use was made of a prauw stopped at sea, since the temper toward the Hollanders in Atjeh made sending Dutch boats inadvisable — in which the grievances of the Netherlands Indian government were set out and explanation was demanded concerning the equivocal actions of the Sultan; the Commissioner reserved, when that explanation should have been given, to confer with the Sultan on the way in which the desired relationship was to be brought about. Within the term of 24 hours set for an answer, the interpreter placed the Sultan’s reply in Nieuwenhuizen’s hands on the evening of 23 March: “Ware het ook niet zoo naar den wensch van het gouvernement, het is twee-maal mijn wensch!” (“Even were it not wholly the Government’s wish, it is twice my wish!”) — of any explanation not a trace. A second letter was equally insufficiently answered, whereupon Nieuwenhuizen, acting on behalf of the Netherlands Indian Government, declared war on the Sultan of Atjeh.
The first shot
Hope flickered once more: when on the morning of 27 March the flotilla accompanying the Government Commissioner prepared to open fire on the bentengs (earthworks) thrown up on the sea-strand, a further letter from the Sultan was received proposing two days’ delay. The Commissioner granted the request on condition that all war preparations on the Atjehnese coast would immediately cease; but when in the course of the day it became clear that the throwing up of bentengs continued, the condition was not fulfilled — and toward the evening of 27 March 1873 the first shot was fired by the Dutch. On his way to Atjeh Nieuwenhuizen had declared at Singapore that, notwithstanding the state of war, the “regular trade” between British India and Atjeh would not be prejudiced — a declaration overtaken by the subsequently necessary strict blockade of the Atjehnese coast.
See Also
- First Aceh Expedition (1873)
- The Naval Bombardment and Declaration of War (March 1873)
- Jan van Swieten
- J. Loudon
- Th. E. R. Kraaijenhoff
- Sidi Tahil
- Sultan Aladin Mahmoed Shah
- Toengkoe Kadli Malikoel Adil
- Aceh War
- Nieuwenhuizen’s mission to Atjeh and the declaration of war (March 1873)
- Sultan Machmoed Sjah
- First Dutch Attack on Acheh
- 1873
Source
De waarheid over onze vestiging in Atjeh, door den Luitenant-Generaal J. van Swieten, Zalt-Bommel, Joh. Noman en Zoon, [1879], pp. 10–34 (Inleiding), pp. 35–60 (Hoofdstuk I).
Vijftig jaren economische staatkunde in Atjeh, by Joh. Langhout (The Hague: N.V. Boekhandel v/h W. P. van Stockum & Zoon, 1923), pp. 19–21, 27.