F. J. van Nues was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, as former captain-adjutant to the Territoriaal Commandant of Atjeh, was appointed on 25 March 25 March 1942 to command the reconstituted Dutch detachment at Blangkedjeren — a force of eleven brigades of infantry, one section of mortars and one section of machine guns, formed from the survivors of the various Dutch units that had converged on Blangkedjeren after the Japanese landings of 12 March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van Nues is the last Dutch commander to fight a set-piece engagement in Atjeh before the general capitulation of 28 March 1942.
Appointment and march (25–27 March 1942)
When Colonel Gosenson reached Blangkedjeren on the morning of 23 March 23 March 1942, he found about 500 troops of various units — including the Blangkedjeren garrison itself, the survivors of the Lokop detachment, and stragglers from the Oostkust detachments — under the command of Lt-Col Blogg (the former Territoriaal Commandant of Midden-Sumatra). Gosenson resolved to reconstitute these troops into a fighting force. After much negotiation he and Blogg eventually succeeded in forming 11 brigades of infantry, 1 section of mortars and 1 section of machine guns. Van Nues — formerly the Territoriaal Commandant’s captain-adjutant — was appointed to command.
Van Nues was further given a reconnaissance unit of eleven men under Lt A. van der Waag, all volunteers. His orders were to move along the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, to occupy a number of positions, and to prevent a Japanese breakthrough from the Takengon direction. Van der Waag’s reconnaissance unit was to operate half a day’s march ahead.
The march was set for 25 March 25 March 1942. Before departure, the cadre noticed that the indigenous soldiers had packed a sarong and a kopiah (skullcap) in their kit — preparations for desertion and passage into the civilian population. Lt-Col Blogg advised that this be accepted, since nothing could be done about it.
The engagement of 27 March 1942
The first bivouac was made at a stream about 9 km north of Blangkedjeren. On the morning of 26 March 26 March 1942 the march continued; some equipment had to be left behind because the promised coolies and packhorses did not appear. Bivouac was made in a kampong about 20 km north of Blangkedjeren, where the terrain offered good defensive possibilities. On the evening of 26 March 26 March 1942 a report arrived from Lt Van der Waag that there were no particularities.
On the morning of 27 March 27 March 1942 Van Nues went forward into the foreground with his officers to reconnoitre the fighting positions. Scarcely had the positions been occupied than Lt Van der Waag reported by messenger that the enemy was approaching — a battalion-strength force, with direction of march and speed indicated. Van der Waag reported that he had lured the enemy toward the Dutch position and had inflicted heavy losses (approximately 30 killed) with the mortars and machine guns. The losses were confirmed by Lt Westerweel, who was being held by the Japanese as a hostage.
By Van der Waag’s skilful manner of withdrawing, the Japanese were kept in uncertainty not only about the strength of the reconnaissance unit but also about that of the units following it. The Japanese advance became highly cautious and was significantly delayed.
The 28 March 1942 capitulation
In the lull in firing that followed, Van Nues held muster. Despite the success, a portion of the indigenous soldiers had deserted. To restore morale Van Nues set out with twelve men on a reconnaissance to locate the retreating Japanese and to ascertain their plans. After some kilometres he observed the Japanese advance guard at 900 metres’ distance, marching south-west toward the Dutch exit position, apparently planning to attack from the west the following morning. Van Nues returned to the stelling and shifted it several kilometres south.
On the morning of 28 March 28 March 1942 the Japanese attacked the abandoned position with mortar fire, inflicting 25 casualties. Van Nues, finding his force reduced to 25 men and under mortar fire, decided to withdraw and to make contact with Lieutenant-Colonel Blogg. At Blangkedjeren he was informed that the decision had been taken to capitulate. He was then sent northward with a white flag to offer the capitulation to the Japanese.
Significance
Van Nues’s engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 — the last set-piece Dutch infantry action of the Atjeh campaign — is presented by the staff history as a successful tactical defence undone by the desertion of the indigenous soldiers. The capitulation he was sent to offer on 28 March 28 March 1942 is the act that closed the regular military campaign in Noord- and Midden-Sumatra: less than three weeks after the Japanese landings, the regular warfare in Noord- and Midden-Sumatra had come to an end.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col Blogg
- A. van der Waag
- J. F. Westerweel
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 148–150.
F. J. van Nues was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who, as former captain-adjutant to the Territoriaal Commandant of Atjeh, was appointed on 25 March 25 March 1942 to command the reconstituted Dutch detachment at Blangkedjeren — a force of eleven brigades of infantry, one section of mortars and one section of machine guns, formed from the survivors of the various Dutch units that had converged on Blangkedjeren after the Japanese landings of 12 March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Van Nues is the last Dutch commander to fight a set-piece engagement in Atjeh before the general capitulation of 28 March 1942.
Appointment and march (25–27 March 1942)
When Colonel Gosenson reached Blangkedjeren on the morning of 23 March 23 March 1942, he found about 500 troops of various units — including the Blangkedjeren garrison itself, the survivors of the Lokop detachment, and stragglers from the Oostkust detachments — under the command of Lt-Col Blogg (the former Territoriaal Commandant of Midden-Sumatra). Gosenson resolved to reconstitute these troops into a fighting force. After much negotiation he and Blogg eventually succeeded in forming 11 brigades of infantry, 1 section of mortars and 1 section of machine guns. Van Nues — formerly the Territoriaal Commandant’s captain-adjutant — was appointed to command.
Van Nues was further given a reconnaissance unit of eleven men under Lt A. van der Waag, all volunteers. His orders were to move along the Takengon–Blangkedjeren path, to occupy a number of positions, and to prevent a Japanese breakthrough from the Takengon direction. Van der Waag’s reconnaissance unit was to operate half a day’s march ahead.
The march was set for 25 March 25 March 1942. Before departure, the cadre noticed that the indigenous soldiers had packed a sarong and a kopiah (skullcap) in their kit — preparations for desertion and passage into the civilian population. Lt-Col Blogg advised that this be accepted, since nothing could be done about it.
The engagement of 27 March 1942
The first bivouac was made at a stream about 9 km north of Blangkedjeren. On the morning of 26 March 26 March 1942 the march continued; some equipment had to be left behind because the promised coolies and packhorses did not appear. Bivouac was made in a kampong about 20 km north of Blangkedjeren, where the terrain offered good defensive possibilities. On the evening of 26 March 26 March 1942 a report arrived from Lt Van der Waag that there were no particularities.
On the morning of 27 March 27 March 1942 Van Nues went forward into the foreground with his officers to reconnoitre the fighting positions. Scarcely had the positions been occupied than Lt Van der Waag reported by messenger that the enemy was approaching — a battalion-strength force, with direction of march and speed indicated. Van der Waag reported that he had lured the enemy toward the Dutch position and had inflicted heavy losses (approximately 30 killed) with the mortars and machine guns. The losses were confirmed by Lt Westerweel, who was being held by the Japanese as a hostage.
By Van der Waag’s skilful manner of withdrawing, the Japanese were kept in uncertainty not only about the strength of the reconnaissance unit but also about that of the units following it. The Japanese advance became highly cautious and was significantly delayed.
The 28 March 1942 capitulation
In the lull in firing that followed, Van Nues held muster. Despite the success, a portion of the indigenous soldiers had deserted. To restore morale Van Nues set out with twelve men on a reconnaissance to locate the retreating Japanese and to ascertain their plans. After some kilometres he observed the Japanese advance guard at 900 metres’ distance, marching south-west toward the Dutch exit position, apparently planning to attack from the west the following morning. Van Nues returned to the stelling and shifted it several kilometres south.
On the morning of 28 March 28 March 1942 the Japanese attacked the abandoned position with mortar fire, inflicting 25 casualties. Van Nues, finding his force reduced to 25 men and under mortar fire, decided to withdraw and to make contact with Lieutenant-Colonel Blogg. At Blangkedjeren he was informed that the decision had been taken to capitulate. He was then sent northward with a white flag to offer the capitulation to the Japanese.
Significance
Van Nues’s engagement of 27 March 27 March 1942 — the last set-piece Dutch infantry action of the Atjeh campaign — is presented by the staff history as a successful tactical defence undone by the desertion of the indigenous soldiers. The capitulation he was sent to offer on 28 March 28 March 1942 is the act that closed the regular military campaign in Noord- and Midden-Sumatra: less than three weeks after the Japanese landings, the regular warfare in Noord- and Midden-Sumatra had come to an end.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- G. F. V. Gosenson
- Lt-Col Blogg
- A. van der Waag
- J. F. Westerweel
- Sumatra capitulation (28 March 1942)
- Blangkedjeren
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 148–150.