C. A. Deutekom was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who commanded the Dutch troops at the Tangse stelling during the retreat of the 2de hoofdgroep from Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers in mid-March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Deutekom is the officer whose telephonic report of 17 March 17 March 1942 — that the Tangse troops refused to fight unless the korpscommandant himself was present in the forward line — precipitated Bekkers’s decision to capitulate on 18 March 18 March.
Command at Tangse
After Lt-Col Bekkers’s retreat from Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March 1942, the troops of the 2de hoofdgroep were concentrated at Tangse and Geumpang. The two companies of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Tangse came under Deutekom’s command. The IVde divisie Maréchaussee brigades from Lam Meulo and Sigli were also at Tangse.
The “Poort” collapse and the 17 March report
After the collapse of the „Poort” stelling on 13 March 13 March 1942 — when fireworks set off by kwaadwilligen triggered a panic and the troops fled, abandoning their uitrusting — Bekkers had reorganised the troops and appointed a new commander. “De geest onder deze en ook de andere troepen was zeer achteruit gegaan en deserties en het niet uitvoeren van bevelen kwamen herhaaldelijk voor.”
On 17 March 17 March 1942 the Poort stelling was again abandoned, this time after the Japanese appeared in the rear and flank — guided, the staff history notes, by Atjehnese along “niet op de kaart staande bevolkingspaden.” That evening, Deutekom “telefonisch luitenant-kolonel Bekkers mede, dat de troepen, die zich in de Tangse-stelling bevonden, niet wilden vechten, als de commandant zich niet bij voortduring in de voorste lijn bevond.” Bekkers had himself gone forward to them, but the demand was now escalated to the korpscommandant. “Ook werd de eis gesteld, dat de korpscommandant aanwezig moest zijn.”
The 18 March capitulation
The next morning, 18 March 18 March 1942, Bekkers — citing “het zeer slechte moreel, een volkomen gebrek aan vechtlust en het verraad van de Atjehers” — decided to capitulate. Deutekom’s report is presented by the staff history as the immediate occasion of the capitulation, though the underlying causes are attributed to the collapse of troop morale rather than to enemy pressure. The Tangse stelling had not been attacked in strength when the surrender was ordered.
Significance
Deutekom’s report is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the occasion of the northern-theatre capitulation. His transmission of the troops’ refusal to fight unless the korpscommandant was present in the forward line is the staff history’s principal evidence of the collapse of the geest of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon — a collapse the compilers attribute to the systematic reduction of experienced officers and indigenous reinforcements through 1940–1941 and to the hostility of the Atjehnese population.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- 2de Garnizoensbataljon
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Poort stelling (Tangse)
- Tangse
- Geumpang
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 139–140.
C. A. Deutekom was a captain of the Netherlands Indies Army who commanded the Dutch troops at the Tangse stelling during the retreat of the 2de hoofdgroep from Kotaradja under Lt-Col Bekkers in mid-March 1942. In the Dutch staff history’s account (Deel VI, Hoofdstuk V), Deutekom is the officer whose telephonic report of 17 March 17 March 1942 — that the Tangse troops refused to fight unless the korpscommandant himself was present in the forward line — precipitated Bekkers’s decision to capitulate on 18 March 18 March.
Command at Tangse
After Lt-Col Bekkers’s retreat from Kotaradja on 12 March 12 March 1942, the troops of the 2de hoofdgroep were concentrated at Tangse and Geumpang. The two companies of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon at Tangse came under Deutekom’s command. The IVde divisie Maréchaussee brigades from Lam Meulo and Sigli were also at Tangse.
The “Poort” collapse and the 17 March report
After the collapse of the „Poort” stelling on 13 March 13 March 1942 — when fireworks set off by kwaadwilligen triggered a panic and the troops fled, abandoning their uitrusting — Bekkers had reorganised the troops and appointed a new commander. “De geest onder deze en ook de andere troepen was zeer achteruit gegaan en deserties en het niet uitvoeren van bevelen kwamen herhaaldelijk voor.”
On 17 March 17 March 1942 the Poort stelling was again abandoned, this time after the Japanese appeared in the rear and flank — guided, the staff history notes, by Atjehnese along “niet op de kaart staande bevolkingspaden.” That evening, Deutekom “telefonisch luitenant-kolonel Bekkers mede, dat de troepen, die zich in de Tangse-stelling bevonden, niet wilden vechten, als de commandant zich niet bij voortduring in de voorste lijn bevond.” Bekkers had himself gone forward to them, but the demand was now escalated to the korpscommandant. “Ook werd de eis gesteld, dat de korpscommandant aanwezig moest zijn.”
The 18 March capitulation
The next morning, 18 March 18 March 1942, Bekkers — citing “het zeer slechte moreel, een volkomen gebrek aan vechtlust en het verraad van de Atjehers” — decided to capitulate. Deutekom’s report is presented by the staff history as the immediate occasion of the capitulation, though the underlying causes are attributed to the collapse of troop morale rather than to enemy pressure. The Tangse stelling had not been attacked in strength when the surrender was ordered.
Significance
Deutekom’s report is, in the staff history’s Atjeh chapter, the occasion of the northern-theatre capitulation. His transmission of the troops’ refusal to fight unless the korpscommandant was present in the forward line is the staff history’s principal evidence of the collapse of the geest of the 2de Garnizoensbataljon — a collapse the compilers attribute to the systematic reduction of experienced officers and indigenous reinforcements through 1940–1941 and to the hostility of the Atjehnese population.
See Also
- Nederlands-Indië contra Japan
- 2de Garnizoensbataljon
- Lt-Col C. J. Bekkers
- Poort stelling (Tangse)
- Tangse
- Geumpang
- 1942
Source
Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Deel VI: De strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, bewerkt door C. van den Hoogenband en L. Schotborgh (‘s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1959), Hoofdstuk V (“De strijd in Noord-Sumatra (Atjeh)”), pp. 139–140.