The Benden van T. Oemar — also referred to as Umar’s bands or, in the singular, Oemar’s bende — were the armed bands led by Teuku Umar (now under the name Toekoe Melaboeh, “the traitor Oemar”) after his defection of 29 March 1896 from the Dutch colonial government, drawn mostly from Lampoe’s Oe and Lepong and estimated at approximately 1,000 men by c. 10 April 1896. Lt.-Gen. Vetter, in his dagorder of 26 May 1896, described them as a “sterke, geoefende, goed versterkte en goed bewapende bende” (strong, well-trained, well-fortified, and well-armed band) — a characterization that Kruisheer reproduces verbatim. Sub-commanders under Umar included Panglima Poelau, Ketjig Bintang van Lam Loempoer, Toekoe Mançoer (Umar’s brother), and various band leaders. The bands, equipped with the Dutch weapons supplied to Umar’s former legioen, formed the principal Acehnese field force that the Dutch confronted in the three-day offensive of 23–25 May 1896.

Background and Formation

The Benden van T. Oemar were the direct institutional successor of the Legioen van T. Djohan: when Teuku Umar defected on 29 March 1896, the legion — 250 men originally, later expanded with men from the IV/VI Moekims, Lepong, and Lehong — went over to the enemy with their Dutch-supplied weapons (380 achterlaadgeweren, 500 voorlaadgeweren, 25,000 Beaumont cartridges). Umar, now operating under the name the traitor Oemar, recruited additional men from his home territory of Lepong and from Lampoe’s Oe (the VI Moekims around Lampisang), and by c. 10 April 1896 the bands were estimated at approximately 1,000 men. Umar’s defection also forced the submission of various doubtful regions — T. Hoesin Lhongbatta with the 3 Moekims Lamrebo, 4 Moekims Ateuh (sagi XXVI), and the Moekims Hoho and Lam Djampoe of the V Moekims Montassik (sagi XXII); and Nja Mohamad of the IX Moekims, forced to submit by Umar’s abduction of his wife.

Role in the Atjeh War

The Benden van T. Oemar were the principal Acehnese field force of the spring 1896 campaign. Following Umar’s defection of 29 March 1896 and his three letters to the Governor of Atjeh (30 March, 12 April, 23 April 1896) — the second demanding ƒ150,000 monthly to pay his warriors and the third threatening further hostilities — the bands established themselves in fortified stellingen at and around Lam-Pisang, supported by trenches and fortifications described in intelligence received from the two Oemar followers who defected to Hr. Ms. Nias on 2 May 1896. The bands’ positions were bombarded continuously from 27 April to 23 May 1896 in the Bombardment of Lampisang — but, as Kruisheer notes, the results were “zeer gering” (very slight), only ~3 enemy killed and a few wounded, because the bevolking had moved to the heuvels. On 23 May25 May 1896 the bands were assaulted in the three-day Dutch offensive: on 24 May 1896 the Dutch captured Umar’s house at Lam-Pisang (1e luit. de Jongh of the 3e Bataljon first reaching the verblijf at 10:35 VM) and the Genietroepen destroyed it with dynamiet, teer, petroleum; on 25 May 1896 the Dutch stormed the stelling Daman–Lam Tjroeng–Lam Poelau. Umar himself retreated to Lepong. The bands’ sub-commander Ketjig Bintang van Lam Loempoer — formerly the designated successor as commandant of the legioen — was reportedly killed by 28 May 1896. On 26 May 1896 Vetter issued his dagorder recording the Dutch satisfaction at the success against the “sterke, geoefende, goed versterkte en goed bewapende bende”.

Composition and Strength

The Benden van T. Oemar were estimated at approximately 1,000 men by c. 10 April 1896, drawn mostly from Lampoe’s Oe and Lepong. Their armament comprised the Dutch weapons supplied to Umar’s former legioen: 380 breech-loading rifles, 500 muzzle-loading rifles, and 25,000 Beaumont cartridges. The bands were led by Teuku Umar (now Toekoe Melaboeh) as supreme commander; sub-commanders included Panglima Poelau, Ketjig Bintang van Lam Loempoer (reportedly killed by 28 May 1896), Toekoe Mançoer (Umar’s brother), and various band leaders.

Significance

The Benden van T. Oemar represented the most consequential Acehnese field force of the spring 1896 campaign — a force equipped with Dutch weapons, organized under a unified command, and capable of fortifying a defensive sone (the stellingen around Lam-Pisang) that the Dutch could only reduce through a three-day combined-arms offensive with three colonnes and an artillery bombardment lasting nearly a month. The bands’ existence was the direct institutional consequence of the Dutch stelsel of arming Atjeh auxiliaries under Teuku Umar — a stelsel that, as the Koloniaal Verslag would observe, had set “al het sedert 1893 verkregene, as it were on loose screws” (all that had been gained since 1893, as it were, loose on screws). Vetter’s dagorder characterization of the bands as “sterke, geoefende, goed versterkte en goed bewapende” is, in Kruisheer’s reproduction, the definitive Dutch assessment of the enemy that the spring 1896 counter-offensive had been called upon to defeat.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 71, 72, 82, 158, 165, 217, 218.