The Three-Column Operation to Free Tjot Rang and Kroeng Gloempang (21 April 1896) was the last major Dutch operation of the retreat phase of the spring 1896 crisis — a three-colonne descent, comprising the Noordercolonne under Maj. Soeters, the Middencolonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz, and the Zuidercolonne under Lt.-Col. van Vliet / Lt.-Col. Bendien, mounted one day after the formal completion of the buitenlinie lifting to clear the road to Kroeng-Gloempang and to free Tjot-Rang. The operation was marked by heavy combat at Lam-Hasan — where the cavalry came under fire — and by sharp engagements at Lam-Tangah (where Kapt. Drijber counter-attacked the Achehnese and inflicted 30 dead) and at Lam-Tjeu (where the versterking was taken by Kapt. Thijssen). Kapt. Kramer was killed. The retreat was contested and the casualties heavy. As described in Kruisheer’s ATJEH ‘96, the operation was the last attempt to operate on the abandoned buitenlinie before the strategic reconstitution of the Dutch position on the consolidated line.

Background

The formal completion of the buitenlinie lifting on 20 April 1896 had left a residue of unfinished business. The road to Kroeng-Gloempang — the principal axis of advance into the central mukims — was still blocked by Achehnese bentengs, and the post of Tjot-Rang was still invested. The Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, resolved to mount one final operation to clear the road and to free Tjot-Rang before definitively abandoning the line. Three colonnes were assembled.

The Noordercolonne was placed under Maj. Soeters — the same officer who would, six weeks later, command the reserve colonne at the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik. The Middencolonne was placed under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz — recently blooded in the battle of Senelop of 17 April 1896 and destined to command the Bergcolonne at the three-day offensive of 23 May25 May 1896. The Zuidercolonne was placed under Lt.-Col. van Vliet, with Lt.-Col. Bendien — both of whom had commanded at the relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit and the tuchtiging of Lam Goet. Maj. Steinmetz — commander of the 3e Bataljon — supported the Zuidercolonne. The overall design was a convergent advance: the three colonnes, moving from north, centre, and south, were to clear the road to Kroeng-Gloempang and to free Tjot-Rang.

The Combat at Lam Hasan

The Zuidercolonne, advancing from the south, ran into the first serious opposition at Lam-Hasan. The cavalry attached to the colonne came under fire from Achehnese positions in the kampong edges and was forced to retire; the infantry was deployed and a firefight developed. The Achehnese — recognising the moment of greatest Dutch vulnerability, the moment when the cavalry was unhorsed and the infantry was deploying — pressed their advantage. Kapt. Kramer was killed in the course of the engagement. The cavalry reformed and the infantry advanced, but the firefight continued for some hours.

Drijber’s Counter-Attack at Lam Tangah

The hardest fighting of the day came at Lam-Tangah, where Kapt. S. A. Drijber — commanding a company of the Zuidercolonne — found his position overlapped by Achehnese bands working around his flank. Recognising that passive defence would be fatal, Drijber launched a counter-attack at the head of his company. The counter-attack was successful: the Achehnese were driven back with 30 killed — a substantial loss that broke the immediate pressure on the colonne. Drijber’s counter-attack at Lam-Tangah was one of the few genuinely aggressive Dutch actions of the retreat phase, and it demonstrated, in miniature, the tactical pattern that would characterise the three-day offensive a month later: aggressive infantry, supported by fire, breaking the Achehnese defensive positions at close range.

Thijssen at Lam Tjeu

Concurrently, the fortified work at Lam-Tjeu was taken by Kapt. M. W. Thijssen. The versterking — an earthwork with the usual Achehnese bamboedoeri abatis — was stormed by Thijssen’s company, the defenders driven out, and the work occupied. The capture of Lam-Tjeu opened the road to Kroeng-Gloempang for the central colonne. Kapt. Kramer’s death at Lam-Hasan, however, was a serious loss, and the casualties of the day — though not enumerated in detail by Kruisheer — were sufficient to colour the operation as a costly success.

The Retreat and the Casualties

The three colonnes, having cleared the road to Kroeng-Gloempang and freed Tjot-Rang, withdrew to the consolidated line. The retreat was contested throughout, the Achehnese following up sharply and inflicting casualties at every step. The Dutch losses of the day — including Kapt. Kramer killed, an unknown number of NCOs and men killed and wounded, and a substantial expenditure of ammunition — were heavy for an operation whose strategic purpose was already exhausted. The buitenlinie had been formally abandoned on 20 April 1896; the operation of 21 April 1896 was, in essence, a mopping-up exercise that had revealed, in its cost, the futility of further operations on the abandoned line.

Significance

The three-column operation to free Tjot Rang and Kroeng Gloempang on 21 April 1896 was the last Dutch operation of the retreat phase of the spring 1896 crisis. It demonstrated, in the heavy combat at Lam-Hasan, Lam-Tangah, and Lam-Tjeu, that the Achehnese remained capable of contesting every Dutch movement on the abandoned buitenlinie; but it also demonstrated, in Drijber’s counter-attack at Lam-Tangah and Thijssen’s storming of Lam-Tjeu, that the Dutch retained the tactical capacity to break Achehnese positions when they chose to fight aggressively. The operation was, in this sense, a bridge between the retreat of April and the counter-offensive of May. Within six weeks the three-day offensive of 23 May25 May 1896 would translate the tactical lesson of Lam-Tangah into a strategic recovery.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, p. 665.