Third Bali Expedition (1850) was a Dutch military campaign launched in 1850 to subdue the Balinese kingdoms of Bali. The successful conclusion of this expedition freed Dutch resources, allowing the Dutch East Indies to redirect troops and naval assets toward the suppression of piracy and smuggling on Borneo’s west coast, a region whose stability was vital for protecting the Sultanate of Aceh’s trade routes.
Link to Aceh
- The expedition’s outcome enabled the Dutch to allocate forces for the 1850‑1854 Borneo anti‑smuggling operations that indirectly safeguarded Acehnese commerce.
Account from Verstege’s Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk (1886)
Verstege, using kapitein Weitzel’s own published history of the third Balinese expedition to weigh against van Swieten’s later Atjeh doctrine, corrects the record on two counts: first against the assertion that Michiels would have wanted to attack Djagaraga “behoedzaam en stelselmatig” (“cautiously and methodically”) — “that assertion is by nothing proved”, he writes; certain is that the general by no means methodically, but with his own characteristic voortvarendheid and stoutheid (“forwardness and boldness”, “volgens Clausewitz de onmisbaarste eigenschappen voor den veldheer” — according to Clausewitz the most indispensable qualities of the general), attacked the dreaded positions where “the sun of our invincibility had begun to wane”, and that “dáár, volgens zijne inzichten, de eer onzer wapenen in al haren luister moest worden hersteld” (“there, after his views, the honour of our arms had to be restored in all its lustre”) — seventeen days after the landing Djagaraga had been stormed. Then, from Kasoemba: after the general fell severely wounded on 25 May 1849 (and died soon after), the troops retired on Padang Cove, although Kásoemba could be called a victory, and the operations were resumed only fifteen days later; “en uit WEITZEL’S boek leeren wij, dat de Baliers onze in dien tusschentijd aangenomen afwachtende houding andermaal toeschreven aan vrees, en dat zij die hadden benut om zich nog meer dan vroeger te versterken” (“and from Weitzel’s book we learn that the Balinese once again attributed to fear the waiting posture assumed by us in the meantime, and that they had used it to strengthen themselves still more than before”) — and that the last part of the campaign taught the rule “dat het volstrekt onvermijdelijk was, datgene, wat nog met de wapenen beslist moest worden, binnen den kortst mogelijken tijd tot beslissing te brengen” (“that it was absolutely inevitable to bring what still had to be decided with the weapons to decision within the shortest possible time”), the rule of conduct Verstege recalls for the Atjeh war (see Jan van Swieten on the same man in 1848-1874). Karang Assem and Kloenkoeng gave in, Kalóeng and Kloenkoeng in a comparatively short time, after the brilliant message of Djagaraga, not without important Dutch losses.
See Also
Source
20260707_232246_DLP-55-De_geschiedenis_van_het_Nederlandsche_Korps_Mariniers_van_1665_1945_OCR.txt, pp. 109‑110.
Een beroep op het Nederlandsche volk in zake het Atjeh-vraagstuk, door J. J. W. E. Verstege (Amsterdam: J. H. de Bussy, 1886), pp. 42-45. OCR: DLP-158.