Evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (12 April 1896)

The Evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit (12 April 1896) — the ontruiming of the two western buitenlinie posts that had been relieved only four days earlier — was the formal abandonment and burning of Biloel and Lamkoenjit by order of the Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, and the most visible Dutch admission, in the opening phase of the Atjeh-oorlog crisis provoked by the defection of Teuku Umar, that the western buitenlinie was no longer tenable. Preceded by a proclamation of the Regeeringscommissaris (Bijlage V), the evacuation was the first act in the wholesale abandonment of the Dutch buitenlinie that would be completed, eight days later, by the evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb.

Background

The relief of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 8 April 1896 had retrieved the garrisons and demonstrated that the route to the two posts could still be forced by a strong column. It had not, however, altered the underlying strategic calculus. The two posts were exposed, isolated, and, in the new strategic environment created by the defection of Teuku Umar, indefensible in the long run. The cost of the relief — one officer, three European and four native soldiers killed; two officers, thirteen European, one African, two Ambonese, and seven native soldiers wounded; 37,960 Beaumont cartridges and 7,000 repeater cartridges expended — had been sobering.

Vetter had arrived as Regeeringscommissaris on 7 April 1896 with full authority and with no sentimental attachment to the buitenlinie constructed under Gen.-Maj. Deykerhoff’s administration. Within hours of the relief he had begun to consider the evacuation of the entire western line. The question was not whether, but how — and how to manage the political consequences. The posts of Biloel and Lamkoenjit had been, since their establishment, symbols of the Dutch presence in the western mukims; their abandonment would be a public confession of strategic failure.

The Proclamation of 12 April 1896

To manage the political dimension, Vetter issued a proclamation (Bijlage V of ATJEH ‘96) announcing the evacuation. The proclamation, addressed to the population of Atjeh and to the hoeloebalang of the western mukims, framed the evacuation not as a defeat but as a strategic adjustment — a deliberate concentration of force that would, the Regeeringscommissaris intimated, soon be directed against the real enemy. The text emphasised that the Government had not abandoned its sovereign claims, that it retained the capacity to re-occupy any post at will, and that those who had cooperated with the Dutch could expect protection. The proclamation is preserved, in Dutch, in the Bijlagen of ATJEH ‘96.

The Evacuation

On 12 April 1896, the garrisons were withdrawn. The engineering detachments under 1e Luit. Ruzette and the reserve companies of the 6e and 3e Bataljons — which had formed the relief column of 8 April — supervised the demolition of the post installations. Both posts were burned. The stores that could be carried were loaded onto the baggage train; the stores that could not be carried were destroyed in place. The garrisons marched east under heavy escort and were reabsorbed into the consolidated line at Tjot Goeë and Lambaroe.

The evacuation was conducted without serious Achehnese interference. The Achehnese had been content to see the Dutch go; their attention was already turning to the wider buitenlinie, where the posts of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, Toengkoeb, Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, and Senelop would all be evacuated, in turn, over the following eight days.

Aftermath

The evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit inaugurated the wholesale abandonment of the western buitenlinie. On 14 April 1896 Vetter launched the tuchtiging of Lam Goet as a punitive demonstration. On 17 April 1896 the evacuation of Anak-Galoeng, Lam-Barih, Lam-Soet, and Senelop was carried out — an operation that became the battle of Senelop when the column of Van Heutsz encountered fierce resistance. On 20 April 1896 the evacuation of Kroeng-Gloempang, Tjot-Rang, and Toengkoeb completed the abandonment. By the end of the third week of April the Dutch were back on the consolidated line of 1893, and the strategic gains of three years of native-allied warfare had been wiped out.

Significance

The evacuation of Biloel and Lamkoenjit on 12 April 1896 was, in symbolic terms, the moment at which the Dutch colonial government publicly admitted the failure of the 1893–1896 policy of native alliance. The burning of the two posts was a wound to prestige that the proclamation of the same day could not entirely staunch. In strategic terms, however, the evacuation was the correct decision: the two posts had become liabilities, consuming garrisons and ammunition out of all proportion to their value. The withdrawal freed the troops and the supplies that Vetter would need for the three-day offensive of 23 May–25 May 1896 and the tuchtiging of the Lam-Krak mukims of 9 June–10 June 1896. The evacuation also marked the beginning of the end of the Vetter interregnum: the Regeeringscommissaris would depart on 28 June 1896, having accomplished, in less than three months, the relief, the evacuation, the concentration, and the counter-offensive.

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 76, 1270.

tags	event, dutch, colonial, military, diplomacy, aceh-war
aliases	Evacuation of Biloel and Lam Koenjit, Ontruiming van Biloel en Lam Koenjit, Burning of Biloel and Lamkoenjit, 12 April 1896

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