Diversie to Montassik / Battle of Senelop (2 May 1896)

Properties2
tagsevent, dutch, achehnese, colonial, military, aceh-war
aliasesDiversie to Montassik, Battle of Senelop (2 May 1896), Diversion to Montassik, Tweede inname van Senelop, 2 May 1896

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The Diversie to Montassik / Battle of Senelop (2 May 1896) — the diversion to Montassik mounted by a colonne under Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz, with Chef van den Staf Kapt. G. C. E. van Daalen, on 2 May 1896 — was the second Dutch operation against Senelop in the spring of 1896, conducted fifteen days after the first battle of Senelop of 17 April 1896 as part of the wider shaping operations preceding the three-day offensive of 23–25 May. The colonne, comprising maréchaussée and a peloton of the 3e Bataljon, talso Senelop at 9:10 a.m. — Kapt. Jhr. Graafland giving the signal for the assault — but found “the birds flown” (the birds flown): the Achehnese had evacuated the post. Lamsoet was taken without opposition by the 12e Bataljon and burned. The bands of T. Brahim Montassik and Habib Sarih suffered 5 killed and 12 wounded each in the day’s fighting.

Background

The first battle of Senelop of 17 April 1896 had cost the Dutch a 7 c.M. A. veld-gun, a 12 c.M. mortar, and a mitrailleur-chest with barrels, and had cost the Achehnese 75 killed — including the celebrated Habib Lhong and Panglima Nja Bintang. The post had been evacuated by the Dutch; but the Achehnese, recognising its strategic value, had re-occupied it. The Regeeringscommissaris, Lt.-Gen. Vetter, required a diversion to draw Achehnese attention away from the preparations for the three-day offensive against Teuku Umar’s stelling at Lam-Pisang and to disrupt the Achehnese concentration in the V Moekims Montassik. He selected Lt.-Col. Van Heutsz — recently blooded in the first battle of Senelop — to command the diversion, with Kapt. G. C. E. van Daalen of the General Staff as his Chef van den Staf.

The colonne was small, mobile, and aggressive: maréchaussée under Kapt. Jhr. Graafland (the same officer who had commanded the voorhoede at the first battle), a peloton of the 3e Bataljon armed with repeater rifles, and the 12e Bataljon. The objective was a descent on Senelop and Lamsoet — a reprise of the operation of 17 April 1896 — combined with a demonstration against Montassik, the home territory of the bendehoofd T. Brahim Montassik.

The Taking of Senelop and Lamsoet

The colonne advanced on Senelop in the early morning of 2 May 1896. The approach was contested in the usual Achehnese fashion — desultory fire from the kampong edges, sniping from the tjots — but the resistance was lighter than that encountered on 17 April 1896. At 9:10 a.m. Kapt. Jhr. Graafland — standing where he could be seen by his maréchaussée brigades — gave the signal for the assault. The maréchaussée and the 3e Bataljon peloton advanced on the post. The Ambonese maréchaussée Simin (No. 8502) was the first to enter — but found “the birds flown”: the Achehnese had evacuated the post in the hours before the assault, recognising that they could not hold it against a determined Dutch attack and preferring to preserve their forces for the defence of the interior stellingen.

Lamsoet — taken on 17 April 1896 at heavy cost — was taken on 2 May 1896 without opposition. The 12e Bataljon advanced on the post, found it empty, and burned it. The destruction of Lamsoet was, in tactical terms, a small operation; in strategic terms, however, it confirmed that the Achehnese had shifted the weight of their defence from the western buitenlinie — now abandoned — to the stellingen around Lam-Pisang and Lepong.

The Engagement with T. Brahim Montassik and Habib Sarih

The diversie element of the operation — the demonstration against Montassik — brought the Dutch column into contact with the bands of T. Brahim Montassik and Habib Sarih. These two war-leaders — the former the bendehoofd of Montassik, the latter a descendant of the Prophet who had taken up arms alongside the Achehnese resistance — commanded substantial followings in the south-western mukims. Their benden engaged the Dutch column in a series of sharp firefights in the kampong belt around Montassik. The casualties on each side were 5 killed and 12 wounded — modest figures by the standard of the first battle of Senelop, but sufficient to confirm that the benden of T. Brahim Montassik and Habib Sarih were active, aggressive, and would have to be reckoned with in any future operation against the V Moekims.

Significance

The Diversie to Montassik of 2 May 1896 was a shaping operation rather than a decisive battle. Its principal effects were three. First, it confirmed that the Achehnese had abandoned the western buitenlinie and had concentrated their defence in the interior stellingen around Lam-Pisang — a strategic decision that, while it shortened the Achehnese lines, also played into the Dutch plan for a concentrated offensive. Second, it brought the Dutch into contact with the benden of T. Brahim Montassik and Habib Sarih — intelligence that would be crucial for the tuchtiging of the V Moekims Montassik of 16 June–17 June 1896. Third, it kept the Achehnese off-balance during the critical weeks of preparation for the three-day offensive. The “the birds flown” episode at Senelop was, in its way, the strategic turning point of the spring: the Achehnese had stopped trying to hold fixed positions on the western line and had shifted to a defence of the interior — a defence that the three-day offensive would, three weeks later, put to the test.

See Also

Source

ATJEH ‘96, door A. Kruisheer, Kapitein der Infanterie O.I.L., met 2 kaarten en 4 portretten (Weltevreden: N.V. Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1913). Instituut Kern, Leiden. OCR-filename: 20260715_163243_DLP-89-Atjeh_96_Met_2_kaarten_en4_DOORA_KRUISHEER_Kapiteinder_Infanterie_nemoretriever-ocr-v1_OCR.txt, pp. 138, 144, 148–156, 701.

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