The Blockade of Atjeh of 1656 was the naval operation ordered by the Hooge Regeering at Batavia in 1656 to close Atjeh’s coasts to all foreign trade, in retaliation for the Atjehsche governors’ persistent violation of the Truytman treaties of November 1649. Recorded in Dr. F. W. Stapel’s Geschiedkundige Atlas van Nederland as the moment at which Acehnese-Dutch relations passed from diplomacy to coercion — and as the operation that produced, by way of the sultane’s sharp response, the arrest of Anthony van Voorst and the 1659 peace that closed the crisis.
Background
The Truytman treaties of November 1649 had given the Compagnie exclusive commercial privileges on the whole West Coast of Sumatra — “with the exclusion of all other European and native nations — except Atjehers — and a regulation of the pepper prices” (met uitsluiting van alle andere Europeesche en Inlandsche naties — behalve Atjehers — en eene regeling van de peperprijzen). The sultane’s own Atjehers were thus to be the only non-Dutch merchants permitted to trade on the Westkust.
In practice the Atjehsche governors (gouverneurs) stationed on the Westkust did not honour this. “Despite the [Truytman treaty], the Compagnie’s merchants on the West Coast, in the purchase of pepper and camphor, repeatedly suffered difficulties from the Atjehsche governors there” (Ondanks het in 1649 bepaalde, ondervonden ‘s Compagnies kooplieden op de Westkust, bij den aankoop van peper en kamfer, herhaaldelijk moeielijkheden van de Atjehsche gouverneurs aldaar).
Stapel’s editorial judgement on the Atjehers as a negotiating partner is condensed in one of the book’s most quotable sentences: “The capriciousness of the Atjehers was proverbial” (De wispelturigheid der Atjehers was evenwel spreekwoordelijk geworden). The 1656 blockade is the practical demonstration of that judgement.
The decision
When oral and written protests produced no result, Batavia acted. “When oral and written protests did not help, one resolved in 1656 at Batavia to blockade Atjeh’s coasts, in order thereby to prevent the trade with others, as in conflict with the contract of 1649, ‘under however for the present not proceeding to any further acts of hostility’” (Toen mondelinge en schriftelijke protesten niet baatten, besloot men in 1656 te Batavia, Atjeh’s kusten te blokkeeren, om daardoor den handel met anderen, als in strijd met het contract van 1649, te beletten, ‘onder nogh vooreerst tot eenige verdere acten van hostiliteyt te treden’).
The Dutch phrase quoted by Stapel — onder nogh vooreerst tot eenige verdere acten van hostiliteyt te treden — is the original journal language, and it shows Batavia’s intent to keep the operation coercive but not yet warlike. The blockade was to be a commerce-blocking measure that stopped short of bombardment or invasion.
The sultane’s response: arrest of Anthony van Voorst
The Compagnie’s calculation backfired. “This action had however an opposite effect, for instead of being intimidated by it, the sultane had the chief of the Compagnie’s trade on the West Coast, Anthony van Voorst, with all his officials arrested, and laid hands at the same time on the ‘effects’ of the Compagnie at Atjeh and on the West Coast” (Dit optreden had evenwel een averechtsche uitwerking, want in plaats van zich daardoor te laten intimideeren, liet de sultane het opperhoofd van ‘s Compagnies handel op de Westkust, Anthony van Voorst, met al zijn ambtenaren in arrest nemen, en legde tevens beslag op de ‘effecten’ der Compagnie te Atjeh en aan de Westkust).
The word averechtsche — “opposite”, “counter-productive” — is Stapel’s verdict on the entire operation. The sultane’s response was not to negotiate but to seize the persons and goods of the Compagnie’s representatives, and to do so in a manner that left no doubt about who held sovereignty on the Westkust.
Consequences
In preparing a forceful response the Hooge Regeering now also decided to enter into “the already repeatedly directed request of the Menangkabau chiefs ‘that we should bind ourselves to defend them against the Atchinders, both by water and by land’” (dat wy ons souden verbinden haar tegens d’Atchinders te defenderen, soo te water als te lande). The first expedition in 1657 achieved nothing; the second had sufficient success that Atjeh sent an embassy to Batavia to negotiate a new peace treaty, the peace of 5 October 1659.
The 1656 blockade is therefore the political hinge of the 1649–1659 decade. It marks the failure of the Truytman policy of co-operation, the definitive turn to coercion, and the moment at which the Compagnie began to enlist the Menangkabau chiefs against Atjeh — a policy that would culminate four years later in the Painansch Contract of 1663.
See Also
- Sultana of Atjeh (Taj ul-Alam)
- Anthony van Voorst
- Treaty of Atjeh-VOC (November 1649)
- Treaty of Atjeh-Perak (15 August 1650)
- Treaty of Atjeh-VOC (5 October 1659)
- Painansch Contract
- Menangkabau
- Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
- Batavia
- Westkust van Sumatra
- 1656
- 1657
Source
De Koloniën, by Dr. F. W. Stapel, in Geschiedkundige Atlas van Nederland (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), kaart 19, blz. 14 (tekst bij blad 4: Atjeh en de Westkust van Sumatra in 1684).